

For Reference

NOT TO BE TAKEN FROM THIS ROOM

Ex LIBRIS
UNIVERSITATIS
ALBERTAENSIS



THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

UNITED STATES--ARGENTINE RELATIONS, 1945-1947

by



CONSTANTINE L. RICHARDSON

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend for acceptance, a thesis entitled "United States--Argentine Relations, 1945-1947" submitted by Constantine L. Richardson in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Date

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1971

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study has been to isolate the goals which the United States government sought in its relations with Argentina, to examine the techniques employed by United States officials to achieve these objectives, and to show the role of circumstances as a factor in the relations between the United States and Argentina.

Prior to 1945 relations between the two countries, though never really friendly, had been least strained when the United States sought the cooperation of the Argentine government and showed willingness to compromise on policies which it wished to implement. Relations were most strained when the United States sought to force Argentina to accept policies with which the latter country could not agree. At the end of 1944, relations were bitter following a two-year attempt by the United States to coerce Argentina.

At the beginning of 1945, Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller calculated that the United States would need Latin American support in the postwar world both for strategic and economic reasons, and he embarked upon a policy of cooperation and compromise with Argentina. United States-Argentine relations during Rockefeller's tenure as Assistant Secretary were relatively tranquil since the Rockefeller approach coincided with an Argentine desire to end the differences between the two countries if it could be done without

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study has been to isolate the goals which the United States government sought in its relations with Argentina, to examine the techniques employed by United States officials to achieve these objectives, and to show the role of circumstances as a factor in the relations between the United States and Argentina.

Prior to 1945 relations between the two countries, though never really friendly, had been least strained when the United States sought the cooperation of the Argentine government and showed little or no interest in the policies which it wished to follow. Relations were bitter following a two-year attempt by the United States to pressure Argentina.

At the beginning of 1945, Assistant Secretary of State Nelson Rockefeller calculated that the United States would need Latin American support in the postwar world for strategic and economic reasons, and he embarked upon a policy of cooperation and compromise with Argentina. United States-Argentine relations during Rockefeller's tenure as Assistant Secretary were relatively tranquil since the Rockefeller approach coincided with an Argentine desire to end the dis-

making too many concessions.

However, continuation of the Rockefeller approach was unacceptable to others in the State Department, and particularly to Spruille Braden, Ambassador to Argentina and later Rockefeller's successor as Assistant Secretary. Braden reasoned that the National Socialist policies, the totalitarian practices, and the Axis sympathies of the Farrell-Peron regime were inimical to the peace and prosperity of the Western Hemisphere and thus they should be eradicated. The Assistant Secretary and the State Department under his influence thought that the interests of the United States and the Western Hemisphere could be served best by the promotion of liberal trading practices and of democracy. To achieve his ends Braden embarked upon a policy of coercion for which he sought British and Latin American support.

Braden's premises were accepted but his priorities were not. The Assistant Secretary failed to obtain the support of the Latin Americans and the British, and in the face of a deteriorating world situation, he lost the support of his own government which abandoned the policy of coercion in favour of one of cooperation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to Dr. D. H. Dinwoodie for his helpful criticisms and suggestions given me during the preparation of this thesis. I am also grateful to C.I.D.A. for providing me with the opportunity to study in Canada and to the History Department of the University of Alberta for its financial assistance which allowed me to use the opportunity to study.

I am particularly grateful to my friend and colleague Mrs. Phyllis R. Lombard without whose help and encouragement I never would have completed this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	v
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER	
I. The Historical Background to United States-- Argentine Relations, 1945-1947	3
II. Cooperation: The Rockefeller Approach, November, 1944 - May, 1945	48
III. Braden Tries Coercion, June, 1945 - February, 1946	76
IV. Coercion Yields to Cooperation, March, 1946 - August, 1947	143
V. Conclusion	172
BIBLIOGRAPHY	182

INTRODUCTION

This study has been prompted by a desire to examine the factors that determine the relationships between countries, particularly those between a great and a small power. These factors include the goals and objectives which nations seek to attain, the environment and personalities that decide those ends, and the methods employed to achieve them. Additional influences are the restraints, external and internal, that operate to impede the realization of a nation's goals.

United States-Argentine relations 1945-47 provide an excellent opportunity to make such a study; for, in that period the United States was one of the world's greatest powers and Argentina was a minor power; yet, the latter was able to defy the United States and in large measure frustrate its objectives in the Western Hemisphere as well as to force a shift in its techniques.

In this study, therefore, an attempt will be made to isolate the United States objectives and to examine the milieu--current and traditional--in which the goals were formulated. An effort also will be made to show the means by which the United States tried to achieve its ends and the relationship between personnel and techniques. Finally, an attempt will be made to analyze the role of circumstances as a factor in United States-Argentine relations.

The principal source of information for this thesis has been United States government publications, particularly the Foreign Relations series. Unfortunately, the series is unavailable for 1947; for that year the New York Times and various current periodicals have been of particular assistance. Since the emphasis is on the formulation of United States policy, use of Argentine sources has been minimal.

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO UNITED STATES- ARGENTINE RELATIONS, 1945-47

Prior to 1889, when the first Inter-American Conference was held, the United States and Argentina had taken very little interest in each other's affairs. Each was busily engaged in its own internal development, and since both had predominantly agricultural and pastoral economies, there was little opportunity for commercial exchange. It was to industrialized Britain and Western Europe that Argentina looked for her commercial contacts. However, the situation began to change in 1889 when as a result of the commercial expansionist mood then prevalent in the United States, President Cleveland's administration invited the Latin American countries to a conference calculated to tighten hemispheric bonds.

This inter-American conference, which met in Washington, provided the first arena where spokesmen of Argentine and American foreign policies met. In opposition to United States attempts to establish closer links between the countries of the hemisphere, Argentina claimed that she was open to the trade, people and capital of the world and refused to join any bloc which might restrict her happy relations with Europe. Argentina and the United States also found themselves at odds over the issue of sovereignty.

In support of this concept the Argentine delegation proposed, and was supported by the rest of the Latin American delegates, that under no condition were aliens to enjoy the right to have their own government interpose in their behalf. The United States stood alone in its opposition to the motion.¹

In the years following 1889, the United States continued to sponsor inter-American conferences, to press for United States hegemony in the western hemisphere, and to maintain the right to interfere in the other republics in support of United States citizens. Toward these United States sponsored conferences Argentina maintained an attitude of aloofness, and on the question of sovereignty she remained adamant. At the turn of the century the positions of the two countries were contained, for Argentina, in the Drago Doctrine,² which sought to outlaw the use of armed intervention for the

¹For a discussion of the circumstances surrounding the calling and proceedings of the first Inter-American Conference, see S. F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1943), p. 126; J. Lloyd Mechem, The United States and the Inter-American System, 1889-1960 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 51-53; Harold F. Peterson, Argentina, and the United States 1810-1960 (New York: State University of New York Press, 1964), pp. 281-84; Thomas F. McGann, Argentina, The United States and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), pp. 130-65.

²Argentine Foreign Minister Luis María Drago proposed that the United States make common cause with the rest of the hemisphere nations in repudiating the use of armed intervention by European powers to collect public debts. See Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and Argentina (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 90-92. Argentina also called for the application of the Monroe Doctrine during her controversy with Britain over the Falkland Islands. The United States reacted coldly; Peterson, p. 289; see also Arthur Whitaker, "Drago's Economic Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine" in The Western Hemisphere Idea, Its Rise and Decline (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954), pp. 88-107.

collection of debts, and, for the United States, in the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, under which the United States arrogated the right "to exercise of an international police power" for the collection of debts.³

The War of 1914-18 introduced considerable stress into United States-Argentine relations. A situation that could have resulted in closer relations between the two countries turned out, through United States arrogance, to have the reverse effect. Initially both nations decided that neutrality toward the European conflict was the best way to serve the national interest.⁴ Although Argentina displayed eagerness "to act jointly with the United States and the other American republics" to protect the rights of neutrals, which the exigencies of war made more and more precarious, there was no coordination of efforts. The United States reacted coldly to all Argentine overtures for "a close understanding" between the two governments "upon the doctrine which would best protect the common interests" and for Pan American agreement on rules and procedures for neutrality; President Wilson preferred unilateral United States championship of neutral rights for the American States.⁵ If the United States had

³Mecham, p. 67; George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt: and the Birth of Modern America 1900-1912 (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 155-59; Foster Rhea Dulles, America's rise to World Power (New York: Harper and Row, 1955), p. 72-77; Peterson, pp. 260-62.

⁴The United States position is well explained in Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and The Progressive Era (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), pp. 145-73. The Argentine position is presented in Percy Alvin Martin, Latin America and the War (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1925) pp. 173-86.

⁵Peterson, pp. 306-307.

not spurned Argentine offers of co-operation in the period 1914-16, it might have been easier to obtain that co-operation after February, 1917, when the United States became a belligerent. To Secretary of State Lansing's invitation to break diplomatic relations with Germany, Hipólito Yrigoyen, President of Argentina since 1916, returned a simple note of acknowledgement. Yrigoyen believed that "it would be a terrible thing to involve his people in the Great War." Furthermore, Germany had broken no promise to Argentina or otherwise caused concrete injury which could be considered a casus belli.⁶ United States efforts to persuade Argentina to change her policy of neutrality did not endear the United States to the Argentines.⁷ Further, the economic war measures instituted by the United States in 1917 which restricted trade between American citizens and certain Latin American firms, were very unpopular in Argentina.⁸

This wartime parting of the ways did not end in the postwar decade. Rather, as both nations readjusted to traditional patterns of trade and to new international developments, the rift tended to widen.

The failure of the United States government to respond favourably to Argentine overtures to further develop

⁶Ibid., p. 308.

⁷The Ambassador in Argentina (Stimson) to the Secretary of State, December 22, 1917, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917. Supplement 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 393-94.

⁸Link, p. 253; Peterson, pp. 318-19.

the inter-American system brought the first reaction during the Peace Conference following World War I. Although the Argentines generally approved of President Wilson's idea of a "universal association of nations" and Argentina was the first South American nation to accede to the League Covenant, the inclusion of an article recognizing "regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine," brought strong dissent from the Argentine delegation.⁹ The armed interventions carried out by the United States in the internal affairs of the Caribbean countries in the postwar decade and President Coolidge's assertion that " . . . there is a distinct and binding obligation on the part of self-respecting governments to afford protection to the persons and property of their citizens, wherever they may be"¹⁰ gave great offence to Latin Americans generally, but most of all to Argentina, the leader of the anti-interventionist movement in Latin America.¹¹

But Argentine resentment against the United States because of its attempts to give the Monroe Doctrine hemispheric validity and because of her rampaging in the Caribbean was mild compared to the hostility that was generated by the United States postwar economic policy. The war of 1914-18, and particularly United States involvement therein, had produced a vast increase in United States-Argentine

⁹Peterson, pp. 366-67.

¹⁰Cited in Bemis, p. 419n.

¹¹Peterson, p. 368.

trade.¹² This increase resulted from a United States demand for Argentine products and a concurrent relaxation of its tariff restrictions on Argentine exports.¹³ However, in 1921, in an effort to aid the farmers who were suffering from the effects of an economic recession which had begun the previous year, the Harding administration reinstituted import controls which severely restricted Argentine exports to the United States.¹⁴ As the conditions facing the United States farmers failed to improve, the Government resorted to more and more restrictive measures culminating in the sanitary restrictions of 1927 which effectively excluded Argentine beef from the United States market. Talk of retaliatory action was strong in Argentina and President Alvear even suggested the possibility of tariff legislation based on the principle "buy from those who buy from us."¹⁵

Argentine resentment against the United States for its advocacy of the right of intervention and its economic policy toward Argentina found expression in the inter-

¹²Britain still purchased large quantities of Argentine products but could no longer supply Argentine needs. Germany had also been eliminated as a market and source of supply. United States Army needs led to increased Argentine exports to the United States, and the United States could most easily supply Argentine needs. See Peterson, pp. 305, 320-21, 340-43,

¹³Ibid., p. 345.

¹⁴John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy 1921-1933 (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 5-22, 54, 57. William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity 1914-1932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 109-10. For the effect on Argentina, see Peterson, p. 352.

¹⁵Peterson, pp. 352-55.

American Conference held at Havana in 1928. There, the United States delegation, led by ex-Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, had been instructed to exclude all controversial subjects from the agenda and to resist the doctrine of absolute non-intervention. Only two political questions--reorganization of the Pan American Union and the report of the Rio Commission of Jurists--were on the agenda. But the Argentine delegation succeeded in injecting into the discussion of even these two topics the issues that divided the United States and Argentina. To the proposal that the union of the American republics "rests on the juridical equality of the Republics of the Continent and in the mutual respect of the right inherent in their complete independence," the chief Argentine delegate, Dr. Honorio Pueyrredón, moved an amendment that a declaration against barriers to inter-American trade be appended. Dr. Pueyrredón sought to lead his delegation out of the conference when his proposed amendment was defeated but was overruled by the Argentine Foreign Minister, who wished it understood that if the conference failed it would not be due to the Argentine stand on the tariff question, on which Argentina stood alone, but to United States "intransigence on nonintervention."¹⁶ While the United States reserved the right to carry out "interposition of a temporary character" for the protection of the lives and property of its citizens,¹⁷

¹⁶Mecham, pp. 100-103; Peterson, pp. 376-78.

¹⁷Bemis, pp. 251-52.

Argentina sought to establish the position that

. . . the sovereignty of states lies in the absolute right to full domestic autonomy and entire external independence. . . . Diplomatic or armed intervention whether permanent or temporary, is an attack against the independence of these states. . . .¹⁸

In 1928 there was no meeting of these divergent ways; in fact, Argentina ceased to participate in further inter-American conferences sponsored by the United States. Therefore, when President Roosevelt enunciated the Good Neighbour Policy in 1933, no reservoir of goodwill towards the United States existed in Argentina.

II

By 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt became President, the United States was in full retreat from its previous interventionist diplomacy in the Caribbean, and the Monroe Doctrine had been shorn of what to the Latin Americans were its more objectional accretions.¹⁹ Except for a short-lived reversal in Cuba in 1933,²⁰ the architects of what came to be known as the Good Neighbour Policy were not only constrained but determined to continue this retreat, and by 1942, the Roosevelt

¹⁸Peterson, p. 376.

¹⁹See, for example, J. Reuben Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, Department of State, Publication No. 37 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), p. xxiii; see also Bemis, pp. 202-24, and L. Ethan Ellis, Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-33 (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1968), pp. 263-90; and Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1967), pp. 5-47.

²⁰See Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, pp. 47-108; and E. David Cronon, "Interpreting the New Good Neighbor Policy; The Cuban Crisis of 1933," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIX (November, 1959), pp. 538-67.

administration had renounced the practice of armed intervention in the Central American countries, had declared itself absolutely opposed to interference by word or deed in the affairs of the Latin American republics, and had ceased to use recognition of governments as a diplomatic weapon.²¹

²¹For a study of United States liquidation of its former practices see Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, pp. 118-259; Bemis, pp. 256-94. This liquidation has been variously interpreted. Some see it as resulting from the repugnance of the American people for a policy of imperialism. See, for example, Frank Tannenbaum, "The Anvil of American Foreign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, LXIII (December, 1948), pp. 501-27; Bemis, pp. 256, 389-91. Others see the shift in policy as the result of Roosevelt's awareness of the developing crisis in Europe and a desire to have Latin American allies rather than enemies; see, for example, Allan Nevins, The New Deal and World Affairs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 31. Nevins, however, also sees the Good Neighbour Policy as an expression of "the radical aims, human spirit and economic liberalism of the New Deal," a view shared by Basil Rauch, The History of the New Deal, 1933-38 (New York: Capricorn Books, 1963), pp. 223-27. Others emphasize the economic aspects of the policy. W. A. Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy, 1900-1955 (Chicago: Rand McNally Company 1956), II, p. 741 sees the mounting mood of the Hoover-Stimson years combining with the disappearance of dollars with which to maintain a policy of imperialism as being most responsible. This view is supported by Professor David Green, The Containment of Latin America (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), pp. 13-112; and James Petras, Politics and Social Structure in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), p. 304, both of whom see a satiated United States devising means of beguiling the Latin Americans into accepting the predominance of United States political and economic influence. All these pressures seem to have influenced the United States policy makers, and there was no doubt that, as Wood shows, the former policy of interventionism was both expensive and ineffective and only productive of much hostility in Latin America and had to be liquidated if the United States wanted to achieve the positive aspects of the Good Neighbour policy. See Wood, p. 7.

However, this United States policy of careful restraint in the use of power was not the only element of the Roosevelt administration's policy towards Latin America. The State Department had not abandoned its objectives of the promotion of liberal trading practices and the defence of American investments in Latin America; nor had the Roosevelt administration relinquished either the idea of United States predominance in the Western Hemisphere or the ensurance of United States security.

But the Department's policy makers now were determined to achieve their objectives by the deliberate cultivation of the cooperation of the Latin American States in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. The Department's position was stated by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, considered the main architect of the Good Neighbour Policy. In instructions to United States diplomatic representatives in Latin America, the Under Secretary declared:

This government is desirous of carrying on with the Central American republics a policy of constructive and effective friendship based upon mutual respect for each others rights and interests. It would obviously be incompatible with this policy to become involved in the domestic concerns of any of the Central American republics. It has been adequately demonstrated that there is great danger that such involvement in matters which are not directly of concern to us will prejudice not only the interests of the United States in Central America, but the interests of the countries of Central America as well.²²

²²The Secretary of State to the Minister in Honduras (Keena), April 30, 1936, Foreign Relations, 1936, V, pp. 134-36.

This attitude was not confined to the United States dealings with only Central America but figured in the policy towards all Latin America. For example, in considering the type of action that the United States should take in case of domestic violence in a Latin American country which threatened the lives of American citizens and the investments of American capital, Welles decided that American capital invested abroad, "in fact as well as theory," should be "subordinate to the authority of the people of the country where it is located," that American capital usually was invested abroad because of the possibility of a greater return than if it were invested domestically, and that one of the risks it would have to face "is the possibility of domestic violence which may cause damage to the capital invested."²³ In Welles' opinion, American investors in Latin America could not be permitted to jeopardize the "entire Good Neighbor policy through obstinacy and shortsightedness," because the national interests of the United States as a whole "far outweigh those of the petroleum companies."²⁴

Rather than adhere to practices that were expensive, inefficient and productive of nothing but hostility, Welles believed that the United States should encourage all the

²³Sumner Welles, The Roosevelt Administration and Its Dealings with the Republics of the Western Hemisphere (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1935), p. 6.

²⁴Memorandum by Sumner Welles to President Roosevelt June 26, 1939, cited in Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, p. 265.

American republics to accept the idea that matters of concern to all the republics should be the responsibility of all. As early as 1933, Welles declared, "I would stress, in particular, the continental responsibility for the maintenance of peace in this hemisphere, and the necessity for the perfection of the mechanism required for carrying out of that obligation."

For Welles who believed that "we cannot expect to preserve the sincere friendship of our neighbors on the continent if we close our markets to them," there was "no more effective means of enhancing friendship between nations than in promoting commerce between them." Welles was convinced that if the United States wanted to enjoy "the markets of the American continent," which had "as vast a potential for development as any in the world," the American governments individually would have to take without delay the necessary action "to abolish those barriers and restrictions" which then hampered the "healthy flow of commerce between their respective governments."²⁵

Welles was not alone in demanding "perfection of the mechanism" for the maintenance of peace in the hemisphere and the abolition of the "barriers and restrictions that hampered the healthy flow of trade." For example, at the inter-American conference held at Montevideo in December, 1933, Secretary of State Cordell Hull proposed a resolution which

²⁵Charles C. Griffen, ed., "Welles to Roosevelt: A Memorandum on Inter-American Relations, 1933," Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIV (May, 1954), pp. 190-92.

recommended that the American republics remove the barriers to trade, particularly excessive tariffs.²⁶ Hull also proposed the negotiation of bilateral reciprocity agreements based upon mutual concessions. Further, on March 2, 1934, President Roosevelt requested Congress "to authorize the Executive to enter into executive commercial agreements with foreign nations, and in pursuance thereof within carefully guarded limits to modify existing duties and import restrictions in such a way as will benefit American Agriculture and industry."²⁷

There was equal emphasis on the question of hemisphere peace. On this matter President Roosevelt declared:

The maintenance of law and the orderly process of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation within its own borders first of all. It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other Nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such an event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbors.²⁸

The President's position was emphasized in 1936, when the State Department was asked to revert to the former practice

²⁶Mecham, p. 120; Bemis, p. 301; see also Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Conferences of American States, 1st Supplement 1933-40 (Washington, D.C. 1940), pp. 20-22.

²⁷Edgar B. Nixon, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, II., March, 1934-August, 1935 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 1.

²⁸Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Random House, 1938), p. 546.

of restoring order in Nicaragua.²⁹ The Department declared that if the situation became so critical

. . . as to threaten life and property, and if requested by all contending factions this government would consider the possibility of rendering some assistance, but this government would not act alone, but only in company with a group of nations, and that even under these circumstances this government would not take the initiative.³⁰

Finally, at a special Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace called at Buenos Aires in December, 1936, at the initiative of the United States, President Roosevelt revealed his desire for strengthening the Inter-American security system and erecting bulwarks against aggression from abroad. He said

In the determination to live at peace among ourselves we in the Americas make it at the same time clear that we stand shoulder to shoulder in our final determination that others who, driven by war madness or land hunger might seek to commit acts of aggression against us, will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good. I repeat what I said in speaking before the Congress and the Supreme Court of Brazil: Each of us has learned the glories of independence. Let each one of us learn the glories of interdependence.³¹

The same theme was struck at the Buenos Aires meeting, by Secretary Hull who declared

The Western Hemisphere must now face some hard realities. For the purpose of our undertaking, we must frankly recognize that for some time the forces of militarism have been in the ascendant in a large part of the world;

²⁹There was a civil war in Nicaragua, and the United States Government was asked to perform its usual role of pacifier. See Wood, pp. 13-47.

³⁰The Assistant Secretary of State (Welles) to the Minister in Nicaragua (Long), May 19, 1936, Foreign Relations, 1936, V, pp. 821-22.

³¹Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, V. p. 606.

those of peace have been correspondingly on the decline. We should be lacking in common sense if we ignored the plain fact that the effects of these forces will unavoidably have direct impact upon all of us. We should be lacking in ordinary caution if we fail to counsel together for our common safety and welfare.³²

The Secretary and the President were probably trying to extend the recent United States neutrality position to the hemisphere.³³

But attempts to liberalize trade and Pan Americanize the United States neutrality legislation met the inveterate hostility of the Argentine government. The attempt to establish more liberal trading practices foundered against traditional Argentine trading patterns and against Argentine hostility directed at United States measures restricting Argentine imports. The attempt to evoke a uniform response from an organized Latin America ran counter to Argentine ideas of its own right to lead the Latin American nations and to Argentine conceptions of its national interest.

Unfortunately for the United States objectives, by

³²Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), I, pp. 498-500.

³³In 1935, the United States Congress had not only rejected a proposal to join the World Court but had enacted legislation designed to keep the United States neutral in deed and word in the event of war in Europe. See Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction (New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 238-43; Dexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt, 1932-45 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 96-100; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-40 (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 215-20. For the attempt to Pan Americanize this legislation see Laurence Duggan, The Americas: The Search for Hemispheric Security (New York: Holt, 1949), pp. 71-72; and Sumner Welles, Time for Decision (New York: Harper, 1944), p. 204.

1933 the landed oligarchy, which was traditionally hostile to the United States, was again controlling Argentine policies.³⁴ United States attempts to eliminate trading barriers between the American republics was met by the Roca-Runciman Agreement, reached in 1933 and renewed in 1935, between Britain and Argentina. This agreement, which tied Argentina even more firmly to the British trading system,³⁵ has been described as a "panic reaction" to the world depression of 1929 and to British attempts to establish more exclusive ties with the meat, wool, and grain producing dominions, a British move which threatened the foundations of the Argentine economy as then established.³⁶ But the Argentine government might well have seen no alternative since its efforts to establish better trading relations with the United States were frustrated. An Argentine proposal to negotiate a reciprocal agreement on condition that the United States drop its sanitary and other restrictions against Argentine imports and lower the tariff rates to 1913 levels could not be taken up although the State Department recognized the validity of the Argentine

³⁴In 1930 the aged President Hipólito Yrigoyen and his Union of Civic Radicals, having failed to deal adequately with Argentina's problems consequent upon the world depression of 1928, were forcibly removed by the Army and in 1931 were replaced by the landed oligarchy under the name of the Partido Democrática Nacional. See Peter G. Snow, Argentine Radicalism (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1965), pp. 5-6, 8-13, 35-37; H. S. Ferns, Argentina (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 133-39; A. P. Whitaker, Argentina (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1964), pp. 44-45, 54-59, 71-72, 87-94.

³⁵Under the Roca-Runciman Pact Britain agreed to purchase as much chilled beef as it had in mid-1932, and Argentina agreed to give British manufacturers top priority, allow 1930 tariff rates, and give British investments and citizens "benevolent treatment." See Peterson, pp. 362-63.

³⁶Ferns, p. 163.

claim.³⁷ As Bryce Wood establishes, the State Department's desire to remove the restrictions for political ends was frustrated by the attitude of the pastoral and farming interests in the United States and the fact that it was not a high enough priority to obtain the support of President Roosevelt.³⁸

While it is impossible to determine definitively the effect of the Department's inability to meet Argentine terms, it is highly probable that the failure coloured United States-Argentine relations during the 1930's. For example, the inter-American conference at Lima in 1938 was almost sabotaged by the uncooperative attitude of the Argentine Foreign Minister, José María Cantilo. Cantilo was acutely aware of Argentina's need for European markets and was determined that nothing should interfere with them. The State Department had no adequate answer to Argentina's need for markets.³⁹

³⁷Peterson, p. 363.

³⁸Bryce Wood, "The Department of State and the Non-National Interest: The Cases of Argentine Meat and Paraguayan Tea," Inter-American Economic Affairs, XV (1961), pp. 3-32. Wood's explanation is much fuller and differs somewhat from that of Peterson which shows the United States adamant on the tariff and restrictions issue but makes no effort to explain why. See also Manuel A. Machado, jr., Aftosa: A Historical Survey of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Inter-American Relations (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1969), pp. 20-32. Machado shows that in view of an extensive outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in Argentina in 1942, the United States Secretary of Agriculture was wise to restrict the importation of Argentine meat but that between 1933-1942 the Sanitary embargo was merely a device to exclude Argentine meat for economic reasons.

³⁹Peterson, pp. 394-95.

But the economic was neither the only nor the most divisive element in United States-Argentine relations. For example, although at the Montevideo conference hostility between the United States and Argentina was muted largely because the United States was prepared to liquidate the more obnoxious elements of its policy of imperialism and in so doing undercut the hostile Argentine position implicit in Carlos Saavedra Lamas's Anti War pact which sought to outlaw intervention as diplomatic tool,⁴⁰ it was not exorcised. The United States efforts at subsequent conferences to convert "the loose-jointed inter-American association into a regional security system,"⁴¹ was to be even more divisive than the economic issue.

At the Buenos Aires conference in 1936, Secretary Hull proposed the creation of a permanent inter-American Consultative Committee, to be composed of the Foreign Ministers of the several American republics, which not only would assist states in the observance of their treaty obligations but also would collaborate on ways and means of preventing conflicts and meet regularly to exchange information and views. This proposal met determined opposition from the Argentine delegation because it suggested a political organization of the continent and because it appeared to be an attempt to create a kind of American League of Nations working in opposition to

⁴⁰For an account of Argentine hostility and the United States felt need to allay that hostility, see Bemis, pp. 269-70; Peterson, pp. 381-83; and Hull, I, pp. 320-27.

⁴¹Whitaker, The United States and Argentina, p. 104.

the League of Nations meeting at Geneva. Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Foreign Minister and leader of the Argentine delegation, had drafted his own project for voluntary collaboration with the League of Nations by non-member states which had accepted the Kellogg-Briand Pact of Paris,⁴² or the Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Pact, or both. The principal purpose of Lamas' proposal was absolute nonintervention. In direct contrast to the United States proposal, it looked away from the United States and toward Europe. However, in keeping with the spirit of the developing Good Neighbour Policy which emphasized the principle of unanimity, a compromise convention was accepted. This convention was strictly limited to inter-American affairs, contained no permanent Consultative Committee, and said nothing about Dr. Lamas' formula for absolute nonintervention.

The fissure evident at Buenos Aires was to widen as both the United States and Argentina reacted to new pressures which came with the developing world crisis and the threat of war. The deteriorating world situation in the period 1936-1938 made the American public more determined than ever to insulate

⁴²Co-authored between March 27 and August, 1928, by French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand and United States Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, the pact sought to outlaw war.

⁴³Mecham, p. 127-28; Welles, Time for Decision, pp. 206-207; Hull, I, pp. 493-500; Whitaker, The United States and Argentina, pp. 106-107; A. Conil Paz and G. Ferrari, Argentine Foreign Policy, 1930-1962 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), pp. 37-39; Bemis, pp. 284-87; Peterson, pp. 389-93.

itself against Europe's troubles,⁴⁴ and impelled the United States leadership to attempt to coordinate hemisphere policy in the interest of United States security.⁴⁵ The opportunity was provided by the regular inter-American conference which met at Lima, Peru, December 9-27, 1938. But here the pattern which had already shown itself at Buenos Aires was again demonstrated. A highly qualified declaration was adopted. Largely a reaffirmation and extension of the inter-American solidarity pledge agreed upon at Buenos Aires, it carried a clause looking toward consultation through meetings of foreign ministers of the twenty-one nations in case of the occurrence of acts "susceptible of disturbing the peace of America."⁴⁶ This was a far cry from the United States' objective which visualized a firm commitment by the various American governments to act uniformly in resisting aggression from a non-American source and to regard aggression against any one country as aggression against all.⁴⁷ But even this innocuous declaration was achieved only over strong Argentine objections.⁴⁸

However, the Argentine attitude was not one of mere

⁴⁴William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolationism: The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1952), I, pp. 11-39.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 40; Mecham, pp. 135-36; Peterson, p. 393.

⁴⁶Mecham, p. 142.

⁴⁷Langer and Gleason, Challenge to Isolationism, p. 41.

⁴⁸Peterson, p. 395; Mecham, pp. 139-43; Paz and Ferrari, pp. 43-49.

obstructionism as was demonstrated at the special foreign ministers conference held at Panama following the outbreak of war in Europe in September, 1939. Here the same José Cantilo, who had been so uncooperative at Lima, now took the initiative in setting the inter-American consultative machinery in motion and, as Peterson states it, "worked hand in glove with Under Secretary Welles to achieve unanimity on a broad plan of hemisphere security."⁴⁹ Further evidence that Argentina needed no urging when she considered her vital interests were endangered was given following the Graf Spee incident of December 13, 1939.⁵⁰ Again the Foreign Minister took the initiative in calling for more effective means of protecting the rights of neutrals. But the United States in an attitude reminiscent of the Wilsonian response in a similar situation failed to support the proposal.⁵¹ It was when the United States demanded sacrifices that the Argentines were not disposed to make that difficulties arose. Argentina objected to the proposal to establish a three-hundred-mile "security zone" around the hemisphere, although the Foreign Minister favoured collective representation to the belligerents in an effort to keep war from the waters adjacent to the continent. Further, the Argentines refused to patrol the waters of the "security zone" lest it precipitate conflict with the belligerents.⁵²

⁴⁹Peterson, pp. 400-402.

⁵⁰A naval battle involving the German pocket Battleship Graf Spee and the English Cruisers Ajax, Achilles, and Exeter was fought in Argentine territorial waters.

⁵¹Paz and Ferrari, p. 54; Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolationism, II, pp. 608-609.

⁵²Peterson, p. 402.

Argentine reluctance to make sacrifices was ever more clearly demonstrated in 1940-42, as shifts in the Argentine government and continued internal stresses kept Argentina neutral while the United States became involved in the war. Ill conceived United States attempts to change Argentina's attitude were to result in an even wider parting of the ways as would be evidenced at the Foreign Ministers' conference at Havana in 1940.

The Argentine cooperative attitude at Lima and at Panama can be credited largely to the influence of President Dr. Roberto M. Ortiz, President of Argentina from February, 1938 to June, 1942. Dr. Ortiz had succeeded to the office as a result of the manipulation of the electoral process by the conservative oligarchy which had seized power in 1931. In spite of strident opposition from the conservative oligarchy, President Ortiz tried to effect reforms in both the electoral process, which would make it more responsive to the wishes of the Argentine people, and in foreign policy, which would result in closer alliance with the United States and the other American republics.⁵⁵ But the same fraudulent deal that had brought Dr. Ortiz to the presidency tied with him in the

⁵⁵ For attempted reforms by President Ortiz see Ysabel F. Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), pp. 285-87; Whitaker, Argentina, p. 100; Snow, pp. 56-57; Robert A. Potash, The Army and Politics in Argentina 1928-1945, Yrigoyen to Perón (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), pp. 106-16; Ferns, p. 167. For inter-American cooperation, see Welles, Time for Decision, p. 214 and Where Are We Heading? (New York: Harper and Bros., 1946), pp. 190-91.

office of Vice President the reactionary Dr. Ramón S. Castillo, spokesman for the conservative minority which was then ruling the country.⁵⁶ By the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Havana in 1940, President Ortiz had been forced by illness to delegate his powers to the Vice President.

The elevation of Castillo to the Presidency in Argentina coincided with the German conquest of France and Holland in 1940 and United States fears of a possible take over by Germany of the new world possessions of the conquered countries. When the United States Congress passed a resolution not to recognize the transfer of any hemisphere region from one non-American power to another, the State Department informed both Berlin and Rome and sought to obtain Latin American support for the resolution. Secretary Hull issued a call for early consultation.⁵⁷ Whether out of pique at the unilateral decision taken by the United States⁵⁸ or as an indication of the new isolationist trend, the Argentine delegation reacted strongly against a United States draft of a comprehensive resolution to cover any forceful transfer of hemisphere territory. Foreign Minister Cantilo argued that change from one non-American power to another was not necessarily hostile to the peace and safety of the American

⁵⁶Rennie, p. 262; Potash, pp. 104-106.

⁵⁷Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolationism, II, pp. 607-29.

⁵⁸The Foreign Minister had initially agreed to send delegates to the conference, but when he heard of the United States' unilateral action he contended that there was no further need for a conference.

republics and questioned the right of those republics to sit in judgement on political shifts in Europe especially before they occurred. Doubting the wisdom of policies which guaranteed the status quo without considering the desirability of change, he contended that the future status of the colonies in question should be determined by the peoples themselves and proposed a resolution that would eliminate the right of any European power to hold colonies in the Western Hemisphere.⁵⁹ The Argentine objections were only overcome by an appeal over the heads of Foreign Minister Cantilo and acting President Castillo to President Ortiz who authorized the delegation to accept the convention.⁶⁰

This uncooperative attitude was again exhibited, and with greater intensity, at the Foreign Ministers' conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1942, when, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States proposed a resolution calling on such American nations that had not already done so to immediately and completely sever diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan.⁶¹ Argentina was irrevocably opposed to the resolution, and the conference adopted a compromise resolution merely recommending the breaking of

⁵⁹The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, July 20, 1940, Foreign Relations, 1940, V (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 235-37; hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations, 1940, V.

⁶⁰The American Delegate to the Second Foreign Ministers' Meeting (Hull) to the Secretary of State, July 23, 1940, ibid., pp. 239-41; Hull, I, pp. 825-27.

⁶¹Mecham, 210-13; Peterson, pp. 416-19; Hull, II, pp. 1143-50.

diplomatic relations with the Axis.⁶² The Argentine government had decided that neutrality was the best policy.

However, the State Department sought to reverse this Argentine decision in the interest of a unified hemispheric policy. In its efforts to do so, the Department, which had been authorized to supply military material called Lend-Lease to the other American republics,⁶³ attempted to exploit the Argentine desire for military equipment by withholding Lend-Lease material from Argentina until she complied with the United States wishes.⁶⁴ The State Department reasoned that the Argentine desire for military material would result in the desired shift in Argentine policy, especially in the presence of the ostentatious growth of the United States-equipped-Brazilian army. But the State Department had sadly miscalculated the Argentine mood. Rebuffed by the United States, the Castillo government sought to obtain arms from Germany.⁶⁵ Its failure helped to provoke the revolt of June, 1943 which brought to power in Argentina a regime that was even more determined than Castillo's to maintain Argentine neutrality.

⁶²Hull, II, pp. 1148-50; Mecham, p. 210.

⁶³For United States attempts to prepare continental defences see William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War (New York: Harper and Row, 1953), pp. 147-74; and for the Argentine reaction to the United States attempts see the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Armour), May 23, 1940, Foreign Relations, 1940, V, pp. 16-17.

⁶⁴Paz and Ferrari, pp. 79-90; Hull, II, p. 1378; see correspondences between State Department officials and between the Department and the Ambassador in Argentina, February 1 - June 1, 1942, Foreign Relations, 1942, V (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 376-77, 384-86, 393-400.

⁶⁵Potash, pp. 159-74.

III

The Argentine revolution of June, 1943, established the army as the most significant factor in domestic and foreign policy making, but there was incessant manoeuvring for control in the new government led by President-general Pedro Ramírez. On one side were the ultra-nationalist isolationists--Vice President and Minister of War Edelmiro Farrell, Interior Minister Alberto Gilbert, Minister of Agriculture General Diego Mason, and Navy Minister Benito Sueyro--who argued that Argentina's honour was being impugned by having to break relations with the Axis under pressure from the United States and Brazil. On the other side were Foreign Minister Segundo Storni, Finance Minister Jorge Santamarina, Minister of Public Works Admiral Ismael Galíndez, and Minister of Justice and Public Instruction Colonel Elbio Anaya, all of whom advocated closer relations with the United States and the Allies. At the lower levels the major bureaucratic positions were occupied by nationalistic members of the Grupo Obra de Unificación (GOU), an ultra-nationalist army organization.⁶⁶ The apparently even balance at the higher level was therefore upset by the neutralist character of the lower echelons.⁶⁷

⁶⁶Colonel Enrique P. González headed the Presidential Secretariat and Colonel Juan Domingo Perón headed the Secretariat of the Ministry of War; the Chief of Police was Colonel Emilio Ramírez who was considered a Germanophile.

⁶⁷Potash, p. 209; Ray Joseph, Argentine Diary (New York: Random House, 1944), p. 21 provides evidence supporting the pro-allied orientation of a sector of the regime.

In spite of the weighting on the nationalist-neutralist side, the Argentine government could possibly have been induced to declare war on the Axis powers if the United States had been prepared to make concessions. But the State Department opted to adopt a harsh line in its dealing with the Ramírez regime. Initially the result of the Department's conviction that the desire for military equipment would force the Argentine regime to be more tractable, this decision subsequently became an expression of significant changes which had occurred among the Department's Latin American policy makers.

Following the army coup of June, 1943, the United States Ambassador to Argentina, Norman Armour, assessed the situation as follows:

. . . it is becoming increasingly evident that a struggle for supremacy is going on between democratic and pro-severance-of-relations forces in the Government on the one hand and pro-totalitarian, "neutralist," and anti-American or anti-British groups likewise in or close to Government on the other, with the latter showing considerable strength.⁶⁸

Armour recommended that the United States do everything possible to help the new regime even though it might appear that "we are departing from a policy already decided upon." He continued

. . . Anything that will tend to show that we have faith in the good intentions of the new Government, that we are prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt and cooperate with them will I feel create a feeling of confidence and understanding that no amount of material given once the step has been taken, would yield.

⁶⁸The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, July 13, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, V (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 431.

The Ambassador further contended that the Argentine government was only following the same type of dictatorial internal policy that had been popularized by Brazil, but there was a distinct possibility that in its external policy it would line up with the democracies.⁶⁹

The State Department's view of the situation in Argentina did not coincide with Ambassador Armour's. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles believed that one of the main reasons for the Golpe de Estado of June 3 was the desire of the Argentine military to acquire United States armaments.⁷⁰ It was therefore decided to abstract as much as possible from Argentina before extending Lend-Lease materials. Not only should Argentina break with the Axis powers, an act that would have minimal effect on the war effort, but she should be made to implement a long list of inter-American "commitments." This would not only restore hemispheric solidarity, but it would serve as an object lesson to other Latin American republics which might consider following the Argentine line.⁷¹

Therefore, in reply to Foreign Minister Storni's

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 435-36.

⁷⁰Potash, p. 221. Other interpretations, e.g., Paz and Ferrari, conclude that the State Department was skeptical about the regime's good intentions and saw no difference between the various factions; see Paz and Ferrari, pp. 106-107. However, the correspondence between Welles and Armour indicates that Potash's interpretation is correct; see the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Armour), June 18, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, V, pp. 417-18.

⁷¹The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Armour), June 18, July 5, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, V, pp. 417-18, 426-27.

explanation of the difficulty of breaking relations with the Axis and his request for Lend-Lease supplies "to restore Argentina to the position of equilibrium to which it is entitled with respect to other South American countries,"⁷² Secretary of State Hull administered "a castigation as one friendly nation has seldom administered to another through diplomatic channels."⁷³ The Foreign Minister was reminded of all Argentina's sins of omission and commission and informed that the United States was not interested "in playing power politics in South America" and that there would be no Lend-Lease until the Argentine government had done "its plain duty by breaking with the Axis."⁷⁴

While it is impossible to decide whether the granting of Lend-Lease would have enabled Storni to effect his policy, there is no doubt that the refusal of such aid and the manner of the refusal constitute a deciding factor in the outcome of the internecine rivalry in the Ramírez regime. In a move calculated to appeal to Argentine pride and win support among the people, the nationalist-neutralists promptly released the

⁷²Storni felt that in view of the ultra-nationalist feeling pervading the majority of the members of the new regime, the break with the Axis should not appear to have been made under pressure, and it should be shown to benefit Argentina. See ibid., pp. 447-51.

⁷³Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs, 1943, p. 24.

⁷⁴The Secretary of State to the Argentine Foreign Minister (Storni), August 30, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, V, pp. 454-60.

Storni note and Hull's reply.⁷⁵ The reaction was as they anticipated. His position now untenable, Storni resigned and was replaced by the ultra-nationalist and neutralist General Alberto Gilbert. Thus, the hand of the nationalists in the Cabinet was strengthened and the pro-Allied forces correspondingly weakened. The attitude of the new forces in the Cabinet was best expressed by the newly appointed Minister of Education Gustavo Martínez Zuviría, who in adverting to the claim that Argentina was obligated to break with the Axis, laconically remarked, "No such obligation exists."⁷⁶

The struggle for power in the Ramírez regime did not end with the elimination of the pro-Allied forces. Juan Domingo Perón, considered the most astute of the group of army officers who came to power in 1943, moved at two levels to secure a firmer base for the operations of the regime.⁷⁷

⁷⁵Paz and Ferrari, pp. 110-11; Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs, 1943, p. 25; Potash, p. 222. Potash suggests that Storni's original letter had been amended by the G.O.U. which deliberately included conditions to evoke a harsh reply from Secretary Hull. The available evidence does not support or deny Potash's suggestion. Ray Josephs, a contemporary observer, supports the idea of the editing by the G.O.U. but attributes it to their naively expecting to get arms. See Josephs, p. 152.

⁷⁶Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs, 1943, pp. 25-26.

⁷⁷Interpretations on Perón's rise to power vary considerably. He has been pictured as a moral and physical coward working Iago-like for his own selfish ends. See Potash, pp. 209-16. Conversely he has been seen as a man with "plenty of ability, personality and integrity" who never spared either himself or others in his efforts for "the spiritual regeneration of the Argentine Army and, through the army, of the whole of the Argentine people. See Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs, 1943, p. 27. The British Ambassador to Argentina (1942-46) has described Perón as "a brilliant improviser with a strong political sense and much personal charm, but not in the least interested in Nazi or other ideology." See Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few (London: Hollis & Carter, 1952), p. 310.

In the first place, he sought to present the G.O.U. as the moving force in the Golpe de Estado and to win the support of the younger officers for that organization, for the Ramírez regime and possibly for himself.⁷⁸ Further, from his post as Director of the National Labour Department, Perón mounted a sustained programme to win the support of labour for the Ramírez regime. He took the labour leaders out of the concentration camp where earlier Ramírez policy had put them and brought them to the negotiating table, learned their demands and used his office to satisfy them. Actively involved in organizing unskilled labour, Perón treated labour grievances as legitimate concerns of the Government.⁷⁹

Perón's programme won the support of junior and middle grade officers (probably because of their awareness of lower-class conditions gleaned from their assignments in depressed areas, their contacts with raw recruits comprised of lower-class conscripts, and their belief that such a programme was an effective counter to communism). However, the senior officers and many of his colleagues in the Cabinet were suspicious of Perón and sought to eliminate him as a threat to their own positions. His enemies were themselves removed from the Cabinet, and Perón rose to a more influential position in the decision-making process.⁸⁰

⁷⁸Potash, pp. 207-12.

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 227-28; Samuel L. Baily, Labor, Nationalism and Politics in Argentina (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967), pp. 75-78; R. J. Alexander, The Perón Era (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 22-30; Ferns, pp. 171-75.

⁸⁰Potash, pp. 212-16; 222-29.

The United States Embassy in reporting on the movements in the Ramírez Cabinet saw only two variables--pro or anti-Axis--and reported to the effect that the pro-Axis faction had won. The Embassy's evaluation was accepted by Secretary Hull who, following the forced resignation of Under-Secretary Welles in October, 1943, had assumed more direct control of policy toward Argentina.⁸¹ Taking a jaundiced view of these developments in Argentina and of Argentina's failure to adopt a foreign policy uniform with that of the rest of the hemisphere, Hull concluded that it was necessary to institute more stringent measures against Argentina.⁸²

Two actions by the Argentine government gave the State Department the opportunity to initiate these measures. While Foreign Minister Storni was making his ill-fated attempt to obtain military supplies from the United States,

⁸¹The different approaches of these two officials was demonstrated in the controversy between the United States and Argentina at the Rio Conference in 1942, where Argentina balked at United States attempts to secure a declaration of war from all the Latin American countries. Welles adopted a conciliatory approach in the interest of hemispheric unity. Hull was harshly critical of Welles' approach and favoured the adoption of a tough policy toward Argentina. See Mecham, p. 211; David H. Popper, "The Rio de Janeiro Conference of 1942," Foreign Policy Association, Report, XVIII (April 15, 1942), p. 29; Hull, pp. 1148-50; Lottie M. Manross, United States Policy Toward Argentina: A Survey of Past and Present Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 16.

⁸²The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Armour), January 11, 1944, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, VII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 228-29; hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations 1944, VII; Hull, II, pp. 1390-94.

another equally ill-fated attempt was begun to obtain military supplies from Germany. An inner group of the Cabinet won the consent of President Ramírez to send a mission to Germany for this purpose.⁸³ The man selected to carry out the mission⁸⁴ was arrested in Trinidad early in November, and the purport of his assignment became known to the Allies. Simultaneously with this revelation, Argentina was accused of subverting the pro-Allied governments of its neighbours in South America. Particularly, the State Department claimed to have evidence that the Ramírez regime had master-minded the coup that overthrew the government in Bolivia on December 20, 1943, and that this was only the first in a series of revolutions planned by Argentina to create a South American bloc of states neutral and anti-American in character.⁸⁵ The State Department threatened to publish evidence of Argentine "pro-Axis" and "subversive" activities. This threat, coupled with a United States show of force at Montevideo, Uruguay, and a

⁸³Potash, pp. 222-23. This information contradicts the claim made by the U.S. Department of State in its Blue Book on Argentina that Colonel Perón was the organizer of the attempt.

⁸⁴Argentine Naval Reserve officer Osmar Alberto Helmuth.

⁸⁵The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Armour), January 11, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VII, p. 228; Hull, II, pp. 1386, 1388, 1411; A. P. Whitaker, "Power Politics in South America," Current History, IV (July, 1943), pp. 382-86, gives evidence of Argentine efforts to secure friendly neighbours, but this was an effort to maintain its traditional position of leadership in South America then being threatened by Brazil with United States' aid.

threat to freeze Argentina's funds in the United States,⁸⁶ caused the Ramírez regime to break relations with the Axis powers in February, 1944.⁸⁷

Any cause for rejoicing provided by the break with the Axis proved to be short-lived as President Ramírez did not survive the break, and the supplementary measures which he had promised to take against the Axis nationals and agents were not forthcoming from his successor, General Edelmiro Farrell. Farrell's failure to cooperate with the United States caused the State Department to embark upon a policy that would be characterized by the most caustic comments and stringent actions yet employed against Argentina. Initially, however, the Department confined itself to a policy of non-recognition of the new regime.

In deciding not to recognize the Farrell government, the State Department must have considered a number of factors. First of all, the chances for survival of the Farrell regime

⁸⁶The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, November 26, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, V, pp. 464-65.

⁸⁷George Pendle, Argentina (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 94-95; Other suggestions are that the regime hoped to secure needed arms from the United States. In view of the fact that the Cabinet members most implicated in the Helmuth affair (González and Gilbert) were most active in effecting the break whereas previously they had been most vociferously opposed, it is highly probable that the threat to publish the information influenced their decision. The most decisive factor, however, seemed to have been the belief that Britain was supporting the United States in its action. Perón is said to have used the information that Britain was not actually backing the United States effectively against his opponents in the regime. See the Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, February 17, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VII, p. 251.

did not appear strong. There had been four changes of the chief executive in eight months, and there was nothing to indicate that Farrell would reverse this trend. Deadly rivalry for the top position existed between Colonel Perón and General Perlinger. Furthermore, in addition to the hostility to the military regime which the liberals--the traditional political business and trade union elite--had exhibited from the time of the coup, there were signs that many nationalists formerly hostile to civilian rule were becoming disillusioned with the military regime and demanding a return to constitutional government.⁸⁸

All this was known to Ambassador Armour when, in assessing the situation following the Ramírez ouster, he concluded that Ramírez resigned under pressure and that Farrell should be given the same treatment as Bolivia.⁸⁹ He wrote:

⁸⁸Potash, p. 238. Potash cites unpublished State Department sources, which indicate that the State Department was aware of the situation in Argentina.

⁸⁹Following the Bolivian revolution of December 20, 1943, the State Department decided to abandon the policy of recognizing defacto governments and reverted to the pre-Good Neighbor practice of using non-recognition as a diplomatic weapon. On United States initiative, the Inter-American Emergency Advisory Committee on Political Defence adopted a resolution proposing that recognition of the new Bolivian government should be subject to previous consultation among the nations forming the Pan American Union. During the consultation, the State Department indicated that it had evidence showing that forces external to Bolivia and inimical to the defence of the American republics ". . . inspired and aided the Bolivian revolution." As a result of this diplomatic activity eighteen Latin American republics failed to recognize the new Bolivian regime. Only Argentina did. This was a distinct diplomatic victory for the United States and probably strengthened its resolve to pursue a similar course relative to Argentina. See Oscar Edmund Smith, Yankee Diplomacy: United States Intervention in Argentina (Dallas, Texas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1953), p. 94; Hull, II, p. 1389.

Should Farrell's government be placed in the same category as that of Villarroel⁹⁰ by other American Republics and Great Britain, this would certainly encourage internal elements in opposition to it.⁹¹

Secretary Hull concurred in this evaluation and advised abstention from any act that could be construed as recognition.⁹² As a result of this decision, Ambassador Armour refused to consult with Colonel Perón when the latter requested such consultation although he recognized that Perón was the most influential individual in the new regime. "Perón," he said, "is the key figure in the Government; but," he continued, "a clear and forceful presentation of our position might possibly cause him to take necessary steps" in a direction desired by the United States. Although the United States was not prepared to state specific conditions that Argentina should meet ("Farrell and Perón know the terms on which the United States was prepared to cooperate" was the attitude adopted), Perón's messenger was informed that the appointment of "a good Foreign Minister" and certain changes in the Cabinet, notably the removal of General Perlinger, the Minister of the Interior, were steps in the right direction.⁹³

⁹⁰Major Gualberto Villarroel, revolutionary president of Bolivia after the coup d'etat of December 20, 1943.

⁹¹The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, February 25, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VII, p. 253.

⁹²The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, February 26, 1944, ibid., pp. 254-55.

⁹³The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, March 6, 1944, ibid., pp. 260-61.

For Armour, as well as for Hull, the question was essentially one involving the whole future of American continental solidarity or, as Hull saw it, "developing a working relationship with an Argentine Government prepared and able to cooperate for hemisphere solidarity and security." Meeting the problem involved two levels of operation. First, the Farrell regime was to be induced to carry out its own house cleaning or, failing that, the "better element" in Argentina would do it. Secondly, Argentina was to be ostracized by the entire American family of nations until such housecleaning had been done.⁹⁴ The Department's thinking is revealed in the following memorandum:

. . . if the steps indicated are not taken before recognition it is doubtful that they will ever be taken. There is good reason to believe that recognition is very much desired by the principal leaders of the Government, particularly the Perón-Farrell faction and therefore constitutes a more powerful instrument than may be generally appreciated. The Government seeks recognition (1) to strengthen its internal position, (2) to obtain a greater and more effective participation in inter-American affairs and (3) as a necessary step to obtain a voice in discussions of postwar plans and at any international conference which may follow the cessation of hostilities.⁹⁵

For these reasons the State Department decided to press its advantage. Hoping to precipitate a crisis that would result in a more acceptable government, it presented to the Farrell regime a set of conditions calculated to be unacceptable to the ultranationalists. Secondly, it instructed

⁹⁴Argentina was to be presented with a list of conditions which the United States considered pre-requisites to recognition. See the Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, April 13, 1944, ibid., p. 267.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 268.

the United States Ambassador in Buenos Aires to refrain from entering into official relations with the Farrell government. Furthermore, fearing that Brazil would repeat its exploit of June, 1943,⁹⁶ the Department made efforts to maintain a united front among the Latin American republics which, following the lead of the United States, had not recognized that regime.⁹⁷

The Embassy in Buenos Aires was convinced, and so informed the State Department, that the Farrell regime in its concern to obtain recognition would make minimal concessions that would appeal to the Latin American republics and thus succeed in securing recognition from some if not all the republics. This action, the Embassy argued, would have the effect of dividing the hemisphere into two hostile blocs.⁹⁸ The Embassy's assessment was correct; for on March 2, 1944, President Farrell initiated a programme calculated to appeal to traditional Latin American fears of United States intervention. Farrell made it quite clear that Argentina's foreign policy would be determined by her own internal needs

⁹⁶Brazil had broken the attempted united front on the occasion of the June 3 coup and had started a stampede in which the United States had been swept into recognizing the Ramírez regime. See Kelly, p. 296; Foreign Relations, 1943, V, pp. 374, 376-77.

⁹⁷Correspondence between the State Department and the Ambassador in Argentina (Armour), February 25-March 11, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VII, pp. 253-63. In contrast to the Bolivian situation in which eighteen of the twenty republics had supported the United States initiative, on this occasion Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay (all neighbors of Argentina and dependent economically on that country) and subsequently Ecuador recognized the Farrell regime. See Whitaker, Inter-American Affairs, 1944, p. 12.

⁹⁸Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, February 28, 1944, Foreign Relations 1944, VII, p. 256.

and not by external forces.⁹⁹

But the threats presented by the Argentine initiative and possible disaffections in the non-recognizing ranks caused the State Department to redouble its efforts to tame the recalcitrant Argentine regime. Emphasizing the danger posed by Argentine pro-Axis activity,¹⁰⁰ rather than its real objective--hemisphere unity on United States terms and in the interest of liberal capitalism¹⁰¹--the State Department sought not only to hold the non-recognizing Latin American countries in line, but also to win the support of those which had recognized the Argentine regime and of the strategically placed British government.¹⁰²

Intense pressure was applied to those Latin American countries for example, Chile, which had broken the united

⁹⁹The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, March 1, 1944, *ibid.*, p. 258. This Argentine move was probably calculated to appeal to long-established fears of the Latin American countries of United States encroachments on their sovereignty.

¹⁰⁰The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, March 15 and 21, 1944, *ibid.*, pp. 300-35.

¹⁰¹See Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 192-292; Green, The Containment of Latin America, pp. 85-112, 234-35; Edgar S. Furniss, jr., "American Wartime Objectives in Latin America," World Politics, II, 1949-50 (1950), pp. 373-89; and Richard Pattee, "The Argentine Question: The War Stage," The Review of Politics, VIII (1946), pp. 475-500.

¹⁰²British credit and trading relations with Argentina were vastly superior to those of the United States; and, as Hull himself reveals, any United States coercive policy toward Argentina, in order to succeed, must have had British support. See Hull, II, pp. 1409-12.

front on recognition, and there was increased diplomatic activity on the occasion of Argentina's independence day celebrations when the Farrell regime made further attempts to break its diplomatic quarantine.¹⁰³ The State Department correctly interpreted the Argentine initiative and in spite of the fact that the other Latin American republics were wavering, as well as, to a certain extent, because of that fact, judged the time right to apply the ultimate in pressure on Argentina. Despite pleas from Laurence Duggan, Director of the Office of American Republics Affairs, who argued that enemy activity in Argentina was of minimal effect and not worth risking damage to the Good Neighbour concept of consultation through a Foreign Ministers Conference at which Argentina would have the right to be represented,¹⁰⁴ the Department persisted in its policy. It accepted Ambassador Armour's assessment that "the Farrell Government and the whole 'June 4 movement'" had "deteriorated to a critical extent, due to the growing internal dissatisfaction and the pressure of events abroad,"¹⁰⁵ and opted to institute against

¹⁰³The Argentine initiative was well-timed, as May 25, its independence day, had great emotional significance throughout Latin America where it was regarded as "Americas" day. It was on May 25, 1810, that a revolutionary junta was organized in Buenos Aires to supplant the Spanish Viceroy. See Foreign Relations, 1944, VII, p. 309n.

¹⁰⁴Duggan cited opinions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the basis of his conclusion. See Memorandum by the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs (Duggan), June 24, 1944, ibid., pp. 325-27.

¹⁰⁵Summary Statement on the situation of the Farrell Government, October 7, 1944, ibid., pp. 287-88.

the Argentine regime even more stringent measures than those adopted early in 1944. The United States recalled its ambassador and requested the Latin American republics and Britain to take similar action, froze Argentine gold deposits in the United States, denied Argentine representation at the international monetary conference hosted by the United States at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July, 1944, and severely curtailed commercial exchanges between the United States and Argentina.¹⁰⁶

As events were to show, the State Department had made the wrong decision caused from an almost total misreading of the Argentine situation and the willingness of the British and the other Latin American republics to support a United States coercive programme. The Farrell regime was eager to bargain.¹⁰⁷ While it is impossible to give final reasons for this eagerness, it is highly probable that (as Potash suggests) a desire to acquire United States armaments was a significant factor. The regime could boast of the first heavy tank produced completely in an Argentine arsenal and could display a new airplane constructed at the military aviation factory at Cordova. But if his ambitious plans, outlined in his address inaugurating the chair of national defence at the University of La Plata, were to be implemented,

¹⁰⁶New York Times, August 17, p. 1, September 27, 1944, p. 1; Guerrant, p. 44.

¹⁰⁷The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, June 3, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VII, pp. 276-77.

Perón needed more than the nascent Argentine industry could supply. All efforts to secure such armaments from Germany proved fruitless and of the 900 million pesos assigned for modernizing the equipment of the Argentine armed forces after the June 4 revolution in 1943, almost 800 million remained unspent in June, 1944.¹⁰⁸ Whatever the reasons that disposed them to bargain, representatives of the Farrell regime were not prepared to make too great a concession before being assured of recognition and possibly arms.¹⁰⁹

Even more important than Argentine failure to meet the United States' price for recognition was the Department's failure to obtain the cooperation of the British for its coercive policy. The British were not overly eager to cooperate and only consented to withdraw their Ambassador after a personal appeal from President Roosevelt.¹¹⁰ Even though Prime Minister Churchill informed the President that the British were eager to cooperate with the United States in its attempts to get a correct response from Argentina, he presented the President with conditions that proved to be insurmountable. Churchill asked Roosevelt to remember

that this community (Britain) of 46,000,000 imported 66,000,000 tons (beef) a year before the war and is now managing on less than 25,000,000. The stamina of the

¹⁰⁸Potash, pp. 252-54.

¹⁰⁹The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, June 3, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VII, pp. 276-77.

¹¹⁰Correspondence between the State Department, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) and the British Government, June 25-August 4, 1955, ibid., pp. 327, 330, 332-34, 337, 338-41.

workmen cannot be maintained on a lesser diet in meat. You would not send your soldiers into battle on a British service meat ration, which is far above what is given to workmen. Your people are eating per head more meat and more poultry than before the war while ours are most sharply cut.¹¹¹

Cordell Hull had no effective answer to give the British in their concern for their meat supply. The Ministry of Food refused to approve any reduction in food reserves, and the United States War Food Administration would not support a proposal to make up loss of Argentine supplies through a ten percent reduction of American consumption.¹¹² This failure to supply an adequate alternative was to doom Hull's coercive policy.

The British were not only reluctant to curtail their imports from Argentina but also were very critical of the United States policy towards Argentina. They criticised the State Department's failure to submit a realistic list of conditions to Argentina and argued that the United States was misusing the act of recognition. For them it was not a moral approval of the Government in question but "an act of well established international procedure." They would find it hard

. . . to justify before public opinion a situation in which Sir David Kelly was kept away from his post for an indefinite period of time, if invidious comparisons

¹¹¹The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt, July 14, 1944, ibid., p. 333.

¹¹²E. Louise Pepper, "Cordell Hull's Argentine Policy and Britain's Meat Supply," Inter American Economic Affairs, X (Autumn, 1956), pp. 11-12, 15-16.

were to be drawn, in Parliament and elsewhere, between the lack of diplomatic protection from which important British interests were likely to suffer at the hands of an ultranationalist Government and the continued presence in Buenos Aires of United States Service missions advising the recalcitrant Government.

The British Government could not see the justice of applying harsh economic and diplomatic sanctions against Argentina which had at least broken relations with the enemy while neither the British nor the United States applied similar measures against the Government of Eire. The British therefore urged the United States to modify its tough policy and refrain from criticism of the Argentine Government. Above all, the British Government wished to be consulted in advance of United States decisions and not be presented with a fait accompli.¹¹³

The State Department accused the British of being much too concerned over their beef supply and economic interests and unconcerned about the principles for which they were fighting. Hull argued that

. . . recognition of the Farrell regime would inevitably induce the belief among the people of Argentina--as well as among the people of the United Nations--that solemn international obligations may notwithstanding the disastrous experience of recent years be disregarded with impunity.

The Secretary further contended that "if collective action in support of the interests of a community of states" was ever to be effective, the United States and Britain would have to be willing to bear the resentment born of patriotism

¹¹³The British Charge' (Campbell) to the Secretary of State, August 4, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, VII, p. 339.

if they wished to develop "a real and practical sense of international responsibility, not only among governments but also among people. According to Hull, Argentina and the Argentine people were to be made to behave as proper international citizens. Without British support Hull could do nothing. While Hull lectured and moralized the British proceeded to secure their meat supply.¹¹⁴ As Arthur M. Schlesinger, jr. saw it, "The Hull policy of bark without bite succeeded only in confusing the hemisphere without seriously deterring Colonel Perón."¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Halifax), August 30, 1944, ibid., pp. 345-46.

¹¹⁵A. M. Schlesinger, jr. "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors," Fortune (August, 1946), p. 161.

CHAPTER II

COOPERATION: THE ROCKEFELLER APPROACH,

NOVEMBER, 1944 - MAY, 1945

At the beginning of 1945 the State Department's posture towards the Farrell regime in Argentina remained rigid. The United States was prepared to enter into consultation with the other American republics on the question of recognizing Argentina as soon as its government had demonstrated its intention of adhering to Argentina's inter-American obligations and of abandoning its threat to inter-American peace. This demonstration would involve

1. Re-affirmation of break with Axis, leading to declaration of war.
2. Dissolution of Axis organizations, elimination of Axis interests in black-listed firms and jailing of Axis individuals.
3. Termination of the state of siege and prompt action to restore Argentine constitution and the calling of elections thereunder.
4. Adequate guarantees that the Argentine Government officials [would] cooperate fully in the interchange of information and the taking of appropriate measures against the Axis and Axis sympathizers.

But a conger of forces eroded the Department's position, and the United States not only recognized the Farrell

¹Memorandum prepared in the Department of State, January 2, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, IX (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 366-67. Hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations, 1945, IX. A similar position was stated on February 9, 1945, just prior to the Mexico City Conference, see the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, February 9, 1945, ibid., pp. 100-101.

regime on April 9, 1945, but sponsored that regime for admission to and original membership in the United Nations Organization. These forces came to a focus first at the special inter-American conference held at Mexico City February 21 - March 8, 1945, and later at the United Nations Organization conference held at San Francisco April 25 - June 26, 1945.

The first step in a series leading to Argentine recognition was taken by Argentina herself when, on October 27, 1944, she requested the Governing Board of the Pan American Union to convene a meeting of the foreign ministers to consider the "misunderstanding" that existed between the Argentine republic and other American nations.² The Argentine government invited a frank investigation of its international conduct and its relations with other American republics but reiterated its determination not to allow its internal policies to be the subject of discussion. This, the government said, would set a "dangerous precedent against the reciprocal respect that all states owe to each other." Argentina was appealing for the unity of the continent based on the principles of "consultation" and "respect among the nations of the continent."³ While it is not possible to determine finally the reasons for the Argentine request, it seems highly probable that, as Potash suggests, the desire to acquire military

²Pan American Union, Bulletin, LXXIX (January, 1945), pp. 48-49; New York Times, October 28, 1944, pp. 1, 7.

³New York Times, October 25, 1944, p. 7.

equipment from the United States⁴ and a desire to end the diplomatic quarantine into which the dispute with the United States had placed her were the dominant factors.⁵

The Argentine request embarrassed the new Secretary of State, the relatively inexperienced Edward Stettinius, Jr., who had been appointed in November, 1944, and his Assistant Secretary of State for American Republics Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller, particularly since it coincided with a mounting desire among the other Latin American countries for similar consultation.⁶ However, the State Department succeeded in excluding Argentina from the conference which that country had requested by arranging a meeting at Mexico City of those American republics "cooperating in the war effort." Furthermore, in an effort to play down the Argentine question at the conference, the State Department drafted an agenda which, while allowing for the possibility of discussion of that question, did not include specific provision for such discussion.

⁴Argentina had failed to obtain the desired military equipment from Germany and the Argentine officer corps was getting restive from the lack. See Potash, pp. 252-53.

⁵Ibid., p. 254.

⁶Olive Holmes, "The Mexico City Conference and Regional Security," Foreign Policy Reports, XXI (May 1, 1945), p. 42. See also S. G. Inman, "Some Latin American Views on Postwar Reconstruction," Foreign Policy Reports, XX (March 15, 1944), pp. 1-11; and John C. Campbell, United States in World Affairs 1945-47 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1948), p. 109.

This stratagem did not succeed; for the agenda was modified by the host government.⁷ Support for the Mexican desire to resolve the Argentine issue in order to end the further deterioration of the hemisphere system came from such widely separated Latin American republics as Honduras, Venezuela, and Colombia, as well as from Argentina's neighbours Bolivia and Brazil.⁸ The Latin American countries were giving expression to the feeling of unease that pervaded the continent because of the prolonged United States hostility to Argentina and other evidence that the United States was no longer interested in hemisphere matters.⁹

The United States successfully resisted pressure to have Argentina present at the conference. However, prior to the formal opening of the conference, the chiefs of delegations after a secret meeting had authorized Manuel C.

⁷The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics except Argentina, January 5, 17, and 19, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 2, 8, 10-11. This account of the genesis and development of the agenda differs considerably from Nelson Rockefeller's cited in Joe Alex Morris, Nelson Rockefeller, A Biography (New York: Harper & Bros. 1960), pp. 189-91. Rockefeller claims to have initiated the idea of the conference and worked out the agenda with representatives of the Latin American nations except Argentina, and he ignores completely the difficulty over the Argentine request.

⁸Correspondence between Diplomatic Representatives in Honduras, Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia and Brazil and the State Department, January 12 - February 18, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 6, 13, 18, 21, 29, 41.

⁹Peterson, p. 441; Welles, Where Are We Heading?, p. 205. The State Department had specifically excluded the Latin American republics from the Dumbarton Oaks discussions and had not consulted with the Latin American countries prior to the talks. Meham, pp. 254-55.

Gallagher y Canaval, Foreign Minister of Peru and delegate to the conference, to inform the Farrell regime of the terms on which Argentina could be readmitted to the inter-American fold. These terms required the Farrell regime to turn over the control of the government to the supreme court pending honest elections and to declare war on the Axis powers.¹⁰

Rockefeller knew that Argentina would not accept the terms since they were the same ones which had been rejected when he had earlier sent a secret and unofficial mission to Buenos Aires in an attempt to resolve the differences with the Farrell regime.¹¹ However, the United States delegation contended that the Farrell regime did not merit the confidence of the American republics collaborating in the war because it had refused "to adopt and enforce the drastic measures essential to control and destruction of that (Nazi) power" and because it was a totalitarian regime "closely patterned on fascist lines," and insisted that the Argentine government must accept the conditions which Gallagher had been authorized to convey.¹² While it is impossible to give a final reason for the insistence on collective pressure, it seems probable in the first place that the United States government was sensitive to the charge that it was carrying on a vendetta against the Farrell

¹⁰Morris, p. 195.

¹¹Ibid., p. 195n.

¹²Morris, p. 195; see State Department's attitude on Argentina in Memorandum on the Argentine Problem, February 1, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 448-51

regime,¹³ and secondly that it believed that an Argentine refusal might make the other American republics more receptive to United States suggestions.¹⁴

As expected the Argentine government rejected the terms, and the conference proceeded to consider the Argentine demand to be heard. Unlike the other items of the agenda which were given full publicity, this question was considered only by the chiefs of the delegations and in absolute secrecy.¹⁵ This procedure was clearly a diplomatic victory for the State Department which had consistently sought to prevent open discussion of the Argentine question.¹⁶

The discussion resulted in Resolution LIX of the Final Act of the Mexico City conference. This resolution deplored the fact that the "Argentine Nation" had not yet found it possible to take the steps that would have permitted its participation at the conference and formally expressed the hope that Buenos Aires would adhere to the resolutions drawn up at the meeting as well as orient its foreign policy in such a fashion as to "achieve its incorporation into the

¹³New York Times, February 22, 1945, pp. 1, 19.

¹⁴This possibility is suggested by Morris in his account of Rockefeller's objectives for Latin America. See Morris, p. 195.

¹⁵New York Times, March 6, 1945, pp. 1, 8, March 7, p. 9.

¹⁶Memorandum by William Sanders, a technical officer of the Delegation, to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith), January 23, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 57.

United Nations."¹⁷ In effect, to achieve diplomatic recognition, the Farrell regime had to adhere to the Act of Chapultepec¹⁸ and declare war on the Axis powers. In signing the Act of Chapultepec the Argentine government would obligate itself to settle all disputes by peaceful means and to join in opposing any country, American or non-American, that interfered with the war effort by violating the political independence or territorial integrity of any hemispheric nation. In addition, the Argentine government would have to intensify its efforts to "eradicate remaining centres of Axis subversive influence in the hemisphere," and "take effective measures to prevent Axis inspired elements from regaining or securing any vantage point within the territory subject to its jurisdiction."¹⁹ On the other issue (Argentine Alleged Nazi-Fascist

¹⁷ Resolution LIX of the Final Act of the inter-American conference in Pan American Union, Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Feb. 21 - Mar. 8, 1945, Report Submitted to the Board of the Pan American Union by the Director General (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1945), pp. 97-98.

¹⁸ The Act of Chapultepec is considered the core resolution of the Mexico City Conference. See Joseph L. Stuns, "The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace at Mexico City and the Problem of Reorganization of the Inter-American System," The American Journal of International Law, XXXIX (1945), pp. 527-33; also Manuel S. Canyes, "The Inter-American System and the Conference of Chapultepec," ibid., pp. 504-17; and Robin Humphreys, "The Pan American System and the United Nations," International Affairs, XXII (1946), pp. 75-84.

¹⁹ Pan American Union, Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, pp. 26-96. See also New York Times, March 6, 1945, p. 8, March 7, p. 9; and Thomas C. Mann, "Elimination of Axis Influence," Department of State Bulletin, XII (May 20, 1945), pp. 924-26.

tendencies), which had soured relations between Argentina and the United States, the resolution was mute.

The Farrell government, which as early as January 19 was reported as having undertaken a "last-minute drive . . . to impress American Governments" before the Foreign Ministers meeting at Mexico City, found no difficulty in accepting the terms offered under Resolution LIX. On March 27, 1945, the Argentine Government declared war on Japan and on Germany as an ally of Japan,²⁰ and on April 4, Argentina adhered to the Final Act of the Mexico City Conference.²¹

On April 9, 1945, the United States, Great Britain, and the Latin American republics which had formerly adhered to a nonrecognition policy extended recognition to the Farrell regime.²² For the United States, the action was not only a significant departure from the position at the beginning of the conference but an almost complete reversal of the policy that Secretary of State Hull had initiated and maintained against Argentina. Whereas Secretary of State Hull had refused to state specific terms which the Argentine government was expected to meet, but rather made general demands which amounted to a call for the Farrell regime to liquidate itself; the terms of the resolution were explicit. Moreover, there

²⁰The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, April 3, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 372.

²¹The Ambassador Mexico (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, April 4, 1945, ibid., p. 152.

²²Memorandum for the President by the Secretary of State, April 8, 1945, ibid., p. 376.

was no specific reference to the Argentine internal situation, and the general resolutions which could cover such situations made no provision for enforcing compliance.

The United States State Department under Stettinius and Rockefeller further dismantled Hull's policy towards Argentina when on April 12, three days after extending recognition to the Farrell Regime, the following instructions were issued to the Chargeé in Argentina:

Reconsideration has been given to the economic arrangements existing between this country and the Argentine. The economic side of our Argentine policy has been consistently geared into the development of our political relations. Argentina now has accepted the opportunities presented by the inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace to take measures to reaffirm its solidarity with the other American republics. This has made possible the resumption of diplomatic relations with the Argentine by the other American republics.

An economic policy toward the Argentine that is comparable in every respect with the economic policy of this country toward the other American republics is compatible with these political developments.²³

Thereupon, without any question of Argentine good faith the State Department began, although it did not continue, to dismantle the whole system of economic restrictions which previously had been erected against trade with Argentina. Initially the Department refused to consider an Argentine request to have the Proclaimed List withdrawn on the grounds that "mere intervention of Axis spearhead firms is not

²³The Secretary of State to the Chargeé in Argentina (Reed), April 12, 1945, *ibid.*, pp. 530-31. During the period of Hull's "crack-down" on Argentina, trade between Argentina and the United States was cut to the absolute minimum. At one point United States ships were forbidden to visit Argentine ports.

regarded as a valid basis for withdrawing [the] Proclaimed List for Argentina" and demanded "actual accomplishment of expropriation forced sale or liquidation" of the firms and "the implementation and execution of a satisfactory replacement program."²⁴ However, on May 25, 1945, diplomatic representatives in the American Republics were informed that effective May 26, the Confidential List of Unsatisfactory Consignees²⁵ would be eliminated and were not instructed to make an exception regarding Argentina.²⁶ Rather, the State Department had requested the Foreign Economic Administration to drop the slow down policy and expedite export licenses for Argentina.²⁷ Furthermore, the United States contracted to supply Argentina with fuel oil in return for specified quantities of Argentine vegetable products to satisfy the needs of the United States and the other United Nations.²⁸ In addition to the measures calculated to restore normal economic relations

²⁴Secretary of State to Chargé in Argentina (Reed), April 19, 1945, ibid., p. 456. The Proclaimed List was a published list of firms in Latin America with which United States' citizens were forbidden to trade.

²⁵The secret list (popularly known as the "Black List") of firms and persons in Latin America with which United States' citizens were forbidden to trade.

²⁶Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, May 25, 1945, ibid., p. 460.

²⁷The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, May 31, 1945, ibid., p. 537.

²⁸The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Chargé in Argentina, April 24, 1945, ibid., p. 535. See also Department of State Bulletin, XII (June 17, 1945), p. 1116.

between the United States and Argentina, the State Department also agreed to supply Lend-Lease material to Argentina.²⁹

The secrecy surrounding the discussions on the Argentine question precludes a definitive interpretation of the shift in United States policy. It would appear, however, that the change resulted from the interaction between United States objectives for the postwar world, Latin American resistance to these objectives, and the desire of certain members of the State Department to build hemispheric unity. It must be remembered that the Mexico City Conference followed conferences of the major powers held at Dumbarton Oaks and at Yalta. At both these earlier meetings the United States had advanced the United Nations concept. But the proposal for the new international organization did not evoke any great enthusiasm among the Latin American nations, whose representatives at Mexico City submitted a summary critique of the position accorded the smaller states in the United Nations.

This submission proposed strengthening the small nations in relation to the "Big Three" by increasing the powers of the General Assembly and by ensuring greater representation in the Security Council. It expressed a preference for settling regional matters through the inter-American system rather than having them submitted to the world

²⁹A mission headed by Avra Warren, director of the Office of American Republics Affairs, which was sent to Argentina recommended that Lend-Lease supplies be extended to Argentina. See Whitaker, ed., Inter-American Affairs, 1945, p. 41; see also, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 378-80.

organization.³⁰ The Latin Americans opposed the decision taken at the Yalta conference under Soviet pressure to invite only states at war against the Axis powers to the proposed conference at San Francisco. Stalin had been very critical of the seven Latin American countries for refusing to declare war against the Axis³¹ and had singled out Argentina as unwanted at San Francisco.³² Uncertainty about their future in the postwar world probably accounts for the pressure by Latin American nations to rebuild hemisphere solidarity.

Aware of this concern, the United States was determined to set at rest fears of some of the republics that we plan to abandon the inter-American system and place all our reliance on world organization, and that we are not, in our preoccupations as a great power, intending to use them as pawns in coming struggle for world influence and markets. This was accomplished without giving the rest of the world, especially the British and the Russians, the impression that the United States was "presenting it with fait accompli on issue of spheres of influence before final agreement on

³⁰Holmes, "The Mexico City Conference," pp. 44-45. See also Whitaker ed., Inter-American Affairs, 1944, pp. 67-70.

³¹Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1949), pp. 179-81.

³²Ibid., pp. 108, 180. See also Minutes of the Yalta Conference, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta; Proceedings and Documents (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 773, hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta.

Dumbarton Oaks."³³ Therefore, while the major objective of the United States delegation at Mexico City was to obtain Latin American support for the Dumbarton Oaks proposals on United Nations organization, there were also attempts to strengthen the inter-American system and exclude Axis agents and war criminals from the continent, as well as provide for the defense of the continent.³⁴ It was apparently realized that such aims could only be effective with Argentine cooperation.

It has been suggested that the United States was narrowly intent on either creating a hemisphere bloc responsive to United States needs which could dominate the United Nations or eliminating British competition for post-war Latin American markets.³⁵ Although the United States may have been

³³Memorandum of Department Policy Committee Meeting Preparatory to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace January 25, 1945, and Memorandum by William Sanders, a Technical Officer of the Delegation, January 29, 1945, Foreign Relations 1945, IX, pp. 62-63, 74-75.

³⁴New York Times, March 2, 1945, p. 5.

³⁵Holmes, "The Mexico City Conference," p. 48; see also Kolko, pp. 457-61. Professor Kolko cites unpublished manuscripts of the then Ambassador to Mexico, George Messersmith, whom he describes as "the key architect of U.S. policy toward its southern neighbors, and in particular on the delicate Argentine question which Washington treated publicly as a question of Argentine pro-Axis sentiment, but in fact it reflected a deep fear of British economic penetration in the nation, and through it, the southern Latin American region." While the Published sources, e.g. Foreign Relations, do not support Messersmith's key role but speak in vague generalities about "joint action to create conditions which will encourage an economy of abundance . . .," several contemporary commentators emphasize the Anglo-American economic rivalry. See e.g. George Soule, "Anglo-American Economic Relations," The Political Quarterly XVI (1945), pp. 117-23; Norman MacKenzie, "Argentina and Britain," ibid., pp. 124-34; and Richard Pattee, "The Argentine Question: The War Stage," The Review of Politics, VIII (1946), pp. 475-500.

influenced by these considerations, the most significant factor in settling the Argentine problem appears to have been the firm conviction in the minds of key members of the United States delegation to Mexico City that hemispheric unity should be re-established. The Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Nelson Rockefeller, was dedicated to the idea of unity and cooperation in the Western Hemisphere"³⁶ and was prepared at the conference to make concessions on the Argentine issue to achieve this end. Rockefeller argued that he intended to lure Argentina back into the inter-American fold where combined pressure could be more effectively applied to reorient Argentine foreign and domestic policies. The appointment of Spruille Braden, a veteran diplomat of wide experience in Latin America and considered a firm defender of democratic principles and practices,³⁷ to the post of Ambassador to Argentina, tends to

³⁶Morris, pp. 189, 198. In the State Department's discussions on the proposed Mexico City Conference, Rockefeller consistently stressed the idea of a strong and united inter-American System. See, e.g., Memorandum of Department Policy Committee Meeting Preparatory to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, January 25, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 62-63. At the Mexico City Conference he advised Leo Pasvolsky (State Department official responsible for planning on the international Security System) to return to Washington if that functionary were to continue to disrupt attempts to unify the hemisphere and spurned the advice of Adolf Berle (Ambassador to Brazil, and former Assistant Secretary of State) to be careful in negotiating with Perón, on the grounds that "unity was important."

³⁷See J. Newman, "Diplomatic Dynamite, Spruille Braden," Colliers, CXVI (November 10, 1945), pp. 11-12 for a contemporary portrait of Spruille Braden.

support that conclusion. But the alacrity with which the State Department agreed to supply Lend-Lease material to Argentina and Rockefeller's role in securing the admission of Argentina to the United Nations Conference at San Francisco,³⁸ indicate that the Assistant Secretary was not prepared to demand too high a price for the readmission of Argentina to the inter-American system.

II

Rockefeller's enthusiasm for reconstituting the inter-American system was not shared by his colleagues in the State Department. In fact a strong element, led by Leo Pasvolsky, considered that any strengthening of the inter-American system would weaken the United Nations Organization. And on the question of Argentine membership in the United Nations Organization and participation in the San Francisco conference, State Department officials were almost unanimously opposed. In their opinion, recognition of Argentina would not commit the United States "in any way to sponsorship of Argentina's adherence to the United Nations declaration until there was agreement that from the world as well as a hemisphere point of view it was warranted."³⁹ Yet at San Francisco the

³⁸For a further discussion, see pp. 73-75.

³⁹Acting Secretary of State (Dean Acheson) to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), April 5, 1945, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, I (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 200; hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations 1945, I. See also Memorandum of conversation with British Foreign Secretary (Anthony Eden) by the Secretary of State, April 17, 1945, ibid., p. 328, and Minutes of the meeting (Executive Session) of the United States delegation to San Francisco, ibid., pp. 389, 394 and 411-16. The minutes of the discussions reveal that between April 5-25th, only Nelson Rockefeller, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, was favourable to Argentine admission. The best that the delegation was prepared to do was to invite Argentina to attend the conference "at a later

interplay of United States objectives, previous commitments, and the objectives of other powers, resulted in the United States sponsorship of Argentine membership of the United Nations and participation in the conference.

Reports from San Francisco that the United States had sponsored the admission of Argentina to the United Nations coincided with news filtering out of Buenos Aires, that President Farrell's regime had reinstituted and intensified a reign of terror in Argentina. Criticism of the delegations' action on Argentina mounted to a crescendo and focused on Secretary of State Stettinius and Assistant Secretary Nelson Rockefeller. The tenor of this criticism was expressed in an editorial in the Washington Post which commented

. . . The regime which is described by Mr. Cortesi as having done things "recently that exceed anything that this correspondent can remember in his seventeen years of experience in Fascist Italy" was railroaded into the company of "peace-loving states" in San Francisco by Secretary of State Stettinius and Assistant Secretary Rockefeller. . . . Mr. Cortesi provides a shocking epilogue to the Stettinius-Rockefeller-Warren shenanigans. We don't know whether the heroes of the San Francisco exploit think themselves smart or merely cynical. All we know is that the bloc they have built up is built upon sand, and that, far from earning from our Latin American friends any encomium for putting together this jerry-built contraption, we are earning their criticism and disgust . . .⁴⁰

date if this invitation was understood not to include Argentina's signing the United Nations Declaration. As Secretary Stettinius stated the position, "Sentimentally we oppose it. We just cannot let Argentina come in at the last minute on a declaration pledging full support to the war against the Axis when the Argentines had not given such support."

⁴⁰ Cited in Morris, P. 212.

Criticism of the United States action at San Francisco and the attempt to saddle Rockefeller with the responsibility for that action have persisted. For example, writing in 1962, Thomas F. McGann concluded that in sponsoring Argentine admission to the United Nations "the United States inflicted upon itself the first great public defeat of principle and propaganda in the cold war." McGann argued that the United States delegation yielded to pressure from the other Latin American States which were inclined to appease Argentina because of the fear of communism on the part of the ruling group in Latin America. These fears were accentuated by the United States' own growing fright and perceived need for unity. Furthermore, McGann continues, there was in those months a "tragic absence of leadership at the highest levels of the government of the United States. Stettinius was incapable and he was advised by Rockefeller whose right hand man was Avra Warren, a smooth diplomatic operator in whom the rule of expediency reaches its final perfection."⁴¹

⁴¹Thomas F. McGann "The Ambassador and the Dictator: The Braden Mission and its implications for United States Foreign Policy," The Centennial Review VI (1962), p. 346. While subsequent commentaries have not been as caustic as McGann's, they too emphasize the Rockefeller role. See, e.g., David Green, "The Cold War comes to Latin America," in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 163-65. Professor Green agrees that the Latin American countries favoured the admission of Argentina but sees the United States as lining up the Latin American nations rather than responding to their pressure. He, too, concludes that due to the "skillful maneuvering of Assistant Secretary Rockefeller, Truman had reluctantly agreed to support Argentina's admission to the conference as a step toward inter-American unity." Morris, pp. 208-211, writes that when the conference was deadlocked due to Russian refusal to allow the

The records show that Rockefeller did play a part in influencing the decision of the United States delegation to support Argentine admission to the United Nations. But they also show that Rockefeller's efforts could only succeed because of the other forces operating at the San Francisco Conference. To understand these forces, it is necessary to examine the commitments for post-war reorganization that the United States had undertaken earlier.

The first set of commitments that would affect United States policy toward Argentina was assumed at the "Big three" conference held at Yalta, February 4-11, 1945, and was related to the future of Poland, then in process of being liberated by the Russian army. Although recognizing the predominance of the Soviet position in Poland, American statesmen were not prepared to have United States influence completely nullified and hoped that by the provision of economic aid for reconstruction they could "gain the good-will of the population of Poland as well as aid the development and growth of trade on a liberalized, multilateral basis and under the freest possible conditions."

In addition, the Americans recognized that in the

admission of Argentina without admitting Poland at the same time, Rockefeller organized the Latin Americans to oppose the Russian tactics; and former Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1969), p. 188, after describing how Argentina had been excluded from the Mexico City Conference, claimed that "... the same policy had been proposed for the United Nations Conference at San Francisco but Nelson Rockefeller and Stettinius switched to a soft line and let Argentina attend and become an original member."

bewildering situation that would exist after liberation, the de facto provisional government would be in a position of considerable influence. Moreover, the United States government ". . . stood unequivocally for a strong, free and independent Polish state with the untrammelled right of the Polish people to order their internal existence as they see fit." The United States delegation, therefore, joined with the British in refusing to recognize the Russian-oriented Lublin Provisional Government,⁴² and won Soviet agreement that the Lublin government would be expanded to include "democratic" (pro-American) leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad, and "pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot," before recognition would be extended.⁴³

By March 5, when the invitations to the San Francisco Conference were issued, there had been no agreement on the 'Polish Provisional Government of National Unity',⁴⁴ and no invitation had been extended to Poland. The Soviet Government indicated its intention of torpedoing the Yalta agreement by demanding that the Lublin Poles be invited to the

⁴²Briefing Book Paper: Suggested United States Policy Regarding Poland, Foreign Relations, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta; Proceedings and Documents, pp. 230-36, 508, and 667.

⁴³Minutes of the Seventh Plenary Meetings, February 10, 1945, ibid., pp. 897-98, 938.

⁴⁴The name suggested for the expanded Lublin government.

Conference.⁴⁵ The United States and Britain agreed that under no circumstances should the Soviet-dominated government in Poland be recognized by being invited to San Francisco. They forwarded strong protests to Stalin, but to no avail; for, on April 22, 1945, the Soviet Union announced that it had unilaterally recognized the Lublin Government.⁴⁶ So serious had the situation become that British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden recommended that the Conference be postponed "while we continue to hammer at the Polish issue in Washington." Without Soviet co-operation on the basis of the Yalta decision, he argued, there would be "no three-power unity on which San Francisco can be based." President Truman, however, after consulting with his chief military and diplomatic advisers, decided to go ahead with the Conference schedule, commenting that "if the Russians did not wish to join us that would be too bad."⁴⁷ The talks on Poland were to be

⁴⁵Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States 1940-45 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958), p. 628; "Aide Memoire Soviet Embassy to Dept. of State" Foreign Relations, 1945, I (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 113-14.

⁴⁶The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), March 15, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, I, pp. 124-25, 139-40; Russell, pp. 629-30.

⁴⁷Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (New York: Bantam Books, 1953), p. 419. President Truman imparted the United States' decision to Foreign Minister Molotov, in language which caused that official to complain that no one had ever spoken to him in that manner before; to which Truman replied, "Live up to your commitments and no one will talk to you like that again." Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency, The History of a Triumphant Succession (London: Colliers-Macmillan Ltd., 1966), pp. 79-80.

continued at San Francisco, and the Polish issue was to influence the discussion on the admission of Argentina to the United Nations.

One other Yalta decision that was to influence American thinking on Argentine membership in the United Nations was the agreement on multiple membership for Soviet Republics in the world organization. Modifying its earlier request for separate United Nations seats for each of its sixteen republics, the Soviet Union at Yalta demanded individual representation for the two "autonomous" republics, the Ukraine and White Russia.⁴⁸ Apparently inclined to think that an extra two votes in the General Assembly would not be very important since the decisions would be made in the Security Council, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to support the Russian claim for separate membership for the Ukrainian and White Russian republics when the matter arose at the proposed conference.⁴⁹ Obviously Roosevelt had fears about the public and Congressional reaction to the agreement; for he insisted that it be kept secret, and it was only revealed when a press leakage on March 28, 1945, forced the Administration to make it the subject of public announcements.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Minutes of the Fifth Plenary Meeting, February 8, 1945, Foreign Relations, the Conferences of Malta and Yalta, p. 775. The Russian demand seems to have been based on the conception that each of the other two "Big Powers" had a number of satellite states: Britain in the members of the Empire that would be members of the United Nations and the United States in the countries of Latin America.

⁴⁹Stettinius, pp. 173-75, 187-88, 202, 296-97.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 281.

Because of this secrecy, the Latin American republics were not informed of the agreement to admit the two Soviet Republics. The question of separate membership for the Russian republics was destined to play a part in the admission of Argentina to the United Nations; for, and this introduces a third element, the Latin American Nations only consented to support the United States commitment on condition that Argentina be simultaneously admitted.⁵¹

The Latin American nations were able to apply pressure on the United States because of its commitment, undertaken at the Mexico City Conference, to secure Argentine admission to the United Nations if Argentina met certain conditions. In weighing its priorities, the American delegation to the United Nations Conference concluded that it had an obligation to secure the admission of the two Soviet Republics to the Organization. Even Senator Vandenberg, who had reservations about admitting the two Soviet Republics, agreed that it was an inescapable commitment. The delegation was advised by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, that the Soviet Union was most likely to withdraw from the conference if its demands for membership for the Ukraine and White Russia were not met. The delegation at the same time recognized the need for Latin American assistance if it were to successfully carry out its agreement but

⁵¹ Sumner Welles, Where Are We Heading? p. 211; John A. Houston, Latin America In the United Nations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956), pp. 27-28.

refused to make a cynical swap of the Soviet Republics for Argentina when that possibility was suggested by Assistant Secretary Rockefeller as the only means of securing the Latin American vote. From the United States point of view, there was no time factor involved in meeting its commitment to secure Argentine membership in the United Nations; it could wait until a more opportune time. Moreover, the delegation hoped to postpone the whole matter of the seating of the two Soviet Republics and Argentina as long as possible. In its estimation, initial membership meant being listed among the original members, not the right to participate in the Conference.⁵²

The Russians, however, interpreted initial membership as meaning participation in the conference and refused to wait for the decision until the Conference would be considering provisions for membership in the organization. Molotov insisted on placing the question of admitting the Soviet Republics on the agenda of the first meeting of the Steering Committee, the body responsible for controlling the proceedings. In the face of Russian obduracy on this matter,

⁵²Russell, p. 631; Minutes of the 16th Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States delegation, April 25, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, I, pp. 388-89, 411-13. The Russell position tends to cast considerable doubt on that taken by Barton J. Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy and Cold War" in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, pp. 25-27, and David Green, "The Cold War in Latin America," pp. 163-65; Both these historians argue that the admission of Argentina to the United Nations was an expression of Truman's "tough policy"--using American economic and military power to coerce a reluctant Russia.

the United States delegation reasoned that its government must not provide an opportunity for a charge of failing to meet a Yalta commitment which might have repercussions on the more crucial Polish situation. It was therefore decided to support the admission of the two Soviet Republics and Argentina as members of the organization, but, as a face-saving measure, to delay the seating in the Conference until a later date. As a result, when the Soviet delegation moved that the Ukraine and White Russia be admitted as original members of the organization, the United States delegation voted in its favour and the motion was carried unanimously.⁵³

Whether the United States delegation would have been able to obtain Soviet cooperation in delaying the seating of the Soviet Republics was not tested; for when the Soviet delegation proposed that Ukraine and White Russia be invited to the Conference, the Latin Americans entered the picture. The Colombian delegate moved that the Soviet request be sent to the Executive Committee for further study. The Latin Americans were determined "to connect this move with their desire to see Argentina admitted."⁵⁴

Realizing that the issue of seating the Soviet Republics and Argentina could no longer be delayed, the United States delegation appealed to President Truman who

⁵³Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States delegation at San Francisco, April 25, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, I, pp. 410-16; Russell, pp. 633-36.

⁵⁴Russell, p. 636.

authorized Stettinius to handle the matter as seemed best. The only reservation he made was that Argentina not be allowed to sign the United Nations declaration and thus become one of the United Nations.⁵⁵

In an attempt to resolve the situation, a meeting was arranged between the four sponsoring powers--United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and China--on the one side and a committee representing the Latin American states and consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Mexico, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela on the other. Speaking for the committee, Dr. Padilla of Mexico contended that Argentina had been requested by the other Latin American governments to meet certain conditions in order to acquire diplomatic recognition and membership in the United Nations. These conditions, the Latin Americans felt, had been met, and they requested the organizing committee to invite Argentina to the Conference.

At this point Molotov introduced the other issue influencing the United States decision to sponsor Argentine membership in the United Nations. Molotov could not understand how Argentina could be invited to the United Nations, when, as he contended, Argentina had collaborated with the enemy, and a similar invitation was not extended to Poland. He refused to consider an invitation to Argentina if one

⁵⁵Minutes of the Twenty-First Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States delegation, at San Francisco, April 27, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, I, p. 483.

were not extended simultaneously to the Lublin Government.⁵⁶

In response to this Russian stand the Latin Americans indicated that their support for the admission of the Ukraine and White Russia would be withheld. The United States delegation took the Latin American threat seriously and decided that in order to honour its commitment to ensure the admission of the two Soviet Republics it had to concede the Latin American demand on Argentina.⁵⁷ Therefore, when the question of Argentine membership in the United Nations was raised, the United States delegation voted in its favour.⁵⁸

Although most attempts to explain the United States action on the Argentine question have stressed inadequate leadership,⁵⁹ it is difficult to perceive what other courses

⁵⁶Minutes of the Fourth Four-Power Preliminary Meeting on Questions of Organization, San Francisco, April 28, 1945, ibid., p. 486; Russell, p. 637.

⁵⁷Russell, p. 637; Minutes of Fourth Four-Power Meeting, Foreign Relations, 1945, I, p. 487.

⁵⁸United Nations Information Organization, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, V (1945), p. 80.

⁵⁹See Thomas F. McGann "The Ambassador and the Dictator: The Braden Mission and its implications for United States Foreign Policy," p. 346; David Green, "The Cold War Comes to Latin America," Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 188; William Hardy McNeil, "America, Britain and Russia, Their Cooperation and Conflict 1941-1946," in Arnold Toynbee, ed., Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, III, pp. 594-95.

There are other deficient explanations of the United States action at San Francisco. For example, Green contends that the United States was organizing the Western Hemisphere as a solid bloc in its overall policy of a "closed hemisphere" in an "open world." See Green, "The Cold War Comes to Latin America," pp. 163-65. The records indicate that when the idea of integrating the inter-American system into the United Nations was being discussed, Assistant Secretary

the United States delegation could have taken in view of prior commitments, which the delegation felt bound to honour in order to achieve its objective of a world organization,⁶⁰ and in view of its determination not to recognize the Lublin Government. There was a very real possibility that if the

Rockefeller was severely criticized by other members of the delegation and censured by Secretary Stettinius for encouraging Latin American efforts to create an hemisphere pressure group. See Minutes of the Tenth Meeting of the United States delegation, April 16, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, I, pp. 303-304, 631-40. See also Harry Hopkins' and George Blanksten's oversimplified linkage of the Polish and Argentine issues in Hopkins' mission to Stalin, cited in Survey of International Affairs, 1939-46, III, p. 585 and George L. Blanksten, Perón's Argentina (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967), pp. 16, 408.

⁶⁰ All the commentators concede that the major United States objective for the postwar world was to create an organization that would ensure a peaceful world according to United States specifications, see e.g., Adler, pp. 312-16; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1969), pp. 761 & 767; S. F. Bemis, American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of Liberty and other essays (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 404; Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 31-32; Minutes of the Eighteenth Meeting of the United States delegation, San Francisco, April 26, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, I, p. 417; Arthur H. Vandenberg Jr. ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 153-57 & 172; Alexander DeConde, A History of the American Foreign Policy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1963), pp. 621-9; Dulles, pp. 208-20; Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade and After (New York: Vintage Books, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1960), pp. 29-31; Louis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 38-39, 50-52; John L. Snell, "The Cold War: Four Contemporary Appraisals," American Historical Review, XLVIII (October, 1962), p. 69; William Appleton Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 150-69; H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbour to Korea (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 146-83; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Mainstrings of American Foreign Policy," American Political Science Review, XLIV (December, 1950), p. 839.

delegation had decided not to support Argentine admission to the United Nations, the Latin American acquiescence in the Yalta agreements would have been forfeited.

CHAPTER III

BRADEN TRIES COERCION

MAY, 1945 - FEBRUARY, 1946

The restoration of diplomatic relations between Argentina and the United States did not see the end of the quarrel between the two countries. The disagreement persisted largely because of Argentina's disinclination to do more than was necessary to meet its inter-American commitments under the Act of Chapultepec and the two countries' differing approaches to the solution of economic and social problems.

Furthermore, chances for settling the quarrel were considerably diminished by the appointment of Spruille Braden as United States Ambassador to Argentina. Anxious to make Argentina live up to her commitments, to change what he considered the "fascist" tendencies of her government and/or to ensure that the "Nazi-militaristic" control of Argentina be replaced "by a constitutional and cooperative democracy," Braden led the attack in attempting to change Argentine policies. He adopted a tough approach and sought to persuade the State Department to employ harsh methods in dealing with the Argentine regime. The Department supported Braden's objectives but found itself unable to accept all of his methods.

However, some of the restraints on the Braden approach to the Argentine problem were removed when the Ambassador himself moved up to replace Nelson Rockefeller as Assistant Secretary of State for American Republics Affairs in October, 1945. While there is some controversy among historians about the reason for his "promotion," there is no question that his occupancy of the office was a period of harsh verbal indictments of the Argentine government and sustained attempts to discredit that government and isolate it in the hemisphere.

During Braden's tenancy the State Department was seeking to secure not merely more adequate Argentine performance in dealing with Axis interest and influence in the Western hemisphere and a more acceptable government in Argentina but also to establish the inter-American system on a new foundation - - defence of democracy - - and to devise a new procedure for achieving inter-American decisions - - a simple majority rule.

The State Department failed in its attempt to secure the support of the strategically placed British and of the Latin Americans for its policy. Its efforts to influence the Argentine election in order to secure a more acceptable regime had the reverse effect; the Department suffered a crushing diplomatic defeat when the Argentine people gave Juan Perón an overwhelming electoral victory.

II

In spite of having adhered to the Final Act of the Mexico City Conference, Argentina seemed as determined as ever to chart her own course in the post-war world. It will be recalled that, in adhering to the Act, the Argentine government undertook, among other things, to enforce various anti-Axis measures. These measures included efforts "to eradicate remaining centres of Axis subversive influence of the hemisphere, " and ". . . to prevent Axis inspired elements from regaining or securing any vantage point within the territory subject to its jurisdiction."¹ It is unclear to what extent the Farrell regime intended to honour the agreement it signed, but the opportunistic nature of the declaration of war against the beaten enemy indicates that it was prepared to do no more than was absolutely necessary to obtain diplomatic recognition and a place in the international community.

In any case, in signing the Final Act of the Mexico City Conference, the Farrell regime had undertaken a very large order; for German influence in Argentina was great. The German colony in Argentina was large and the number of Argentines of German birth even larger. Furthermore, the original German contingent in Argentina had been considerably enhanced by the presence of more than a thousand German

¹Resolution LIX of the Final Act of the Inter-American Conference, Pan American Union, Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, pp. 97-98.

sailors from the scuttled Graf Spee and from merchant ships stranded in Argentina. German investment in Argentina was extensive and diversified. Located in the electric, metalurgical, steel and chemical industries, in the construction industry--both civilian and military--and in sugar, cattle and other rural enterprises, it had been estimated to total 2,500 million pesos.²

It could further be pointed out that during the war the German embassy in Buenos Aires, as well as German nationals and Argentines of German descent, worked to ensure that Argentine neutrality was not anti-Axis; the Argentine army was largely German trained; the Argentine officers who had visited Germany and Italy expressed admiration for the Axis military machine, and the Germans had made a special effort to win their favour.³

In addition, German nationals or Argentine citizens of German origin attained positions of considerable influence with the Argentine government. For example, Ludwig Fruede, whom the United States considered Axis agent number one, was a personal friend of Vice President Juan Perón, and his son

²"German Capital in Argentina" The Economist (London), September 22, 1945, pp. 416-18. See also Spruille Braden "The Germans in Argentina" The Atlantic Monthly, CLXXVII (April, 1946), pp. 37-43.

³Pendle, p. 84; Potash p. 184; Whitaker, Argentina, p. 85; Rennie, The Argentine Republic, p. 268.

was Perón's personal secretary.⁴ Furthermore, Fritz Mandl, and Austrian industrialist who had migrated to Argentina in 1938 and whose Industria Metalúrgica y Plástica Argentina (IMPA) was on the United States Proclaimed List, was very extensively involved in Argentina's armaments and industrial programme as were Fruede, owner of the General Construction Company, and Ricardo Staudt another leading German industrialist.⁵

What might be considered further evidence of Axis interest and influence were the large Italian contingent which considered Mussolini the type of leader they would gladly follow, and the largely Spanish Catholic clergy which was pro-Franco and anti-American.⁶

In addition to this evidence of the actual extent of Axis interest and influence in Argentina, there was also considerable suspicion of even further penetration. For example, it was widely believed that when it had become clear that Germany would lose the war, a "safehaven" programme was devised for the secretion of German economic assets in neutral countries where control could be retained through various "dummy" arrangements. In this fashion, it was

⁴Alexander, p. 213; see also the Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, October 30, 1946, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, XI (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 327; hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relations 1946, XI

⁵Blanksten, p. 404, Alexander, p. 213; see also Rennie, The Argentine Republic, p. 381.

⁶Pendle, p. 84.

thought that German capital and loot from occupied countries, and even experts and technicians under assumed Spanish or Argentine identity, had been transferred to Argentina. It was also widely held that leading Nazis were escaping to Argentina, an idea that was given credence by the removal by British officials at Trinidad of four notorious Nazi agents from a ship bound for Argentina, and the clandestine arrival in Buenos Aires of two German U-boats.⁷

The elimination of Axis interest and influence in Argentina would have been a major task under any circumstances, but the economic programme to which the Farrell regime was committed casts doubt upon the regime's willingness even to attempt it. In its efforts to fulfil its clearly expressed intention of creating an economy capable of supplying all of the nation's needs,⁸ the regime had planned to develop the allegedly "vast" mineral deposits in the Andes and the country's existing water power resources and to create a true balance between the underdeveloped interior and the wealthy capital littoral where economic and political power

⁷Blanksten, pp. 405, and 409; see also S. Ross, "Nazi nest eggs in Argentina," Colliers, CXV (April 21, 1945), pp. 13 and 70. The idea that leading Nazis were escaping to Argentina was subsequently discounted. See Chargé d'Affaires in Argentina (Cabot) to the Director, Office of American Republics Affairs (Briggs), November 17, 1945, Foreign Relations 1945, IX, p. 429.

⁸In describing the Argentine needs Vice President Perón declared that "national defence demands a powerful industry, and not just any kind, but heavy industry." See Olive Holmes, "Argentina, Focus of Conflict in the Americas," Foreign Policy Report, XXI, 1945-1946, p. 301.

had been concentrated.⁹ This development was to be effected without the surrender of Argentina's economic sovereignty, particularly to the United States or to Britain from which the Argentine government was determined to recover her patrimony.¹⁰

Further, the regime seemed dedicated to the idea that the development could best be effected by the complete state control of the economy. The complete state control of the economy typified by the Fábricas Militares (industrial enterprises run by the armed forces) and the Instituto Argentino de Producción e Intercambio (Argentine Institute of Production and Exchange)¹¹ was not yet in full operation, but the outlines were clear.¹² Therefore, the Farrell regime must have been concerned to preserve the remaining sources of capital in the country and probably preferred to deal with the citizens of a beaten Germany than those of victorious United States and Britain. Whatever the reason, throughout the war the Farrell regime channelled considerable government business toward the

⁹Rennie, The Argentine Republic, pp. 375-77; see also Charles C. Cumberland, "Twentieth Century Revolutions in Latin America," Centennial Review, VI (1962), pp. 287-92.

¹⁰Between the Revolution in June 1943 and the signing of the Chapultepec agreement the Argentine government had expropriated several large British and United States holdings. See Blanksten, pp. 237-42; see also Pendle, pp. 103-104.

¹¹These two agencies were established after Perón's election in 1946. For further discussion see Pendle, pp. 102-105.

¹²See Miron Burgin, "Economic Development in Latin America. 1. 'Commerce, Agriculture and Industry'," Inter-American Affairs, 1945, pp. 189, 201-202.

German owned firms although they had been proscribed by the United States.

The Argentine armament programme also indicates that the regime would be reluctant to proceed against German owned interests in Argentina. The efforts of the Farrell regime to secure necessary armaments had been frustrated when Germany proved unable to supply its needs and the United States refused; the Argentine regime therefore sought to develop its own weapons.¹³ In this sphere Mandl's assets seem to have been particularly useful.¹⁴

German economic interest in Argentina was to remain a major cause of conflict between Argentina and the United States throughout the period 1945 to 1946 as the State Department sought the elimination of those interests. The Argentine government moved very slowly and only against those firms "not necessary to Argentina's economy."

The second and most persistent divisive factor in United States-Argentine relations in the period 1945-1946 was the allegedly "fascist" character of the Farrell regime and the concurrent lack of constitutional "democratic" government in Argentina. Fascism seems to be a term that defies specific definition. However, certain features have been isolated, although none is peculiar to that ideology. Fascism is strongly nationalistic and anti-communist. But

¹³Potash, p. 247.

¹⁴Blanksten, p. 404; Rennie, The Argentine Republic, p. 381.

it is more than that. It also opposes liberalism and democracy and seeks to replace them with a new, authoritarian and corporate state where there would be one party whose hierarchy would take over the functions of the state and whose members would be the only ones to hold high office. The ideology includes a super abundance of myths emphasizing territorial expansion as the goal, glorifying the past and emphasizing the role of the leader who can do no wrong and whose charisma inspires his followers. Fascism has a proclivity for the use of violence. It tends to appeal to all social groups excluding only those selected as "whipping boys"--the Jews, the landed oligarchy, foreign investors--and is particularly attractive to the lower economic and social orders of society.¹⁵

Many of these symptoms of fascism were present in the Argentina of 1943 to 1945. For example, the government had imposed itself upon the people of Argentina and continued in office without popular consent.¹⁶ The members of the government openly expressed admiration for the fascist

¹⁵See F.L. Carsten, The Rise of Fascism (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 230-37; See also George L. Mosse, The Culture of Western Europe, The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: John Murray, 1963), pp. 341-56; Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), pp. 16-21; Eugen Weber, Varieties of Fascism. Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1966), pp. 7-69.

¹⁶It was thus paradoxical that this Argentine regime in adhering to the Act of Chapultepec supported a resolution recommending the adoption of an inter-American convention defining and providing for international protection of the "Essential Rights of Man."

dictators Hitler and Mussolini and their expansionist programme and contemplated a similar role for Argentina in South America.¹⁷ The legislature, whose suspension by Castillo in 1941 was reinforced in June, 1943, was in perpetual recess and government was in the hands of the remnants of the army group that had carried out the coup d'etat in June, 1943. In addition, the traditionally autonomous universities were intervened and the "state of siege," which had been imposed by President Castillo in December, 1941, and under which not only constitutional processes but public meetings and the publication in the press of articles critical of the government were banned, was still in effect and made more restrictive with Argentina's declaration of war against the Axis powers. Papers found guilty of criticizing the regime were suspended. The decree of January, 1944 which had outlawed all political parties was still in effect when Argentina signed the Final Act of the Mexico City Conference.¹⁸

Furthermore, following the coup in June, 1943, the provisional government of President Ramírez had decreed the dissolution of Argentina's main labour organization the General Confederation of Labour (C. G. T.). The leaders of the country's principal labour unions were ousted and

¹⁷ See Blanksten, pp. 47-48 and Frank Owen, Perón, His Rise and Fall (London: The Cresset Press, 1957), pp. 1, 13-15.

¹⁸ Potash, pp. 165, 218. See also Blanksten, pp. 220-27, 276-80 for further symptoms of fascism.

replaced by military officers amid repeated reports of torture and ill treatment of political prisoners and labour leaders.¹⁹ Subsequently Juan Perón as Secretary of Labour had removed the labour leaders from the concentration camps where earlier Ramírez policy had put them but had restored to office only those who were prepared to operate as government functionaries.²⁰ Although Perón had secured substantial improvements in wages and conditions of work for Argentine workers, he was not prepared to allow them too much freedom of action. Rather, they were mobilized in support of the government, an action that was criticized both within and without Argentina as fascist, dictatorial and repressive.²¹

Still further evidence of the "fascist" character of the Farrell regime was its emphasis on expansion of Argentina's military potential. For example, the army was expanded and expenditures of the armed forces generally were increased so that the estimated expenditure of 1,431,600,000 pesos for the year 1945 was five times the expenditure for military purposes in 1942, the year before the revolution. Argentina was reported to have embarked on extensive military construction along her borders, with 600

¹⁹ See Greenup, pp. 103-105, 111-16. See also John W. White, "Torture in Argentina," The Nation (March 3, 1945), pp. 248-49.

²⁰ Alexander, pp. 15-16.

²¹ Otis E. Mulliken and Sarah E. Roberts, "Labor and Social Welfare," Inter-American Affairs, 1945, pp. 143-44, 150-51; See also Rennie, The Argentine Republic, p. 361.

miles of strategic road being constructed along the border with Brazil.²² Argentina was also busily engaged in building its arsenal and in developing new aspects of its military machine. For example, in June, 1944, the Ministry of War displayed the first heavy tank and airplane constructed totally in Argentina.²³

In spite of symptoms of fascism in the Argentine regime, it would appear that Argentina was not a truly fascist state. For instance, in spite of the regime's obvious boasting, her military potential was puny compared to the United States--equipped Brazilian military machine; and of the 900 million pesos assigned for the modernizing of the Argentine army after the revolution, almost 800 million remained unspent at the end of 1944.²⁴ Thus even if the inclination to carry out aggression was present, Argentina was not capable of it and even her intent was called into question by subsequent United States observers²⁵

²²See Potash, pp. 249-53, for a discussion on the expansion of the Argentine armed forces. See also Holmes, "Argentina--Focus of Conflict in the Americas," p. 301.

²³Potash, pp. 247, 251-52.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 252-54; See also Rennie, The Argentine Republic, pp. 266-67; Harry Murkland, "The Hispanic American Record," Current History, III (October, 1942), pp. 140-41, and A.P. Whitaker, "Power Politics in South America," Current History, IV (July, 1943), pp. 382-86, for a discussion of the growth of Brazilian power and Argentine fears.

²⁵See Charge' in Argentina (Cabot) to the Director, Office of American Republic Affairs, (Briggs), November 17, 1945, Foreign Relations 1945, IX, pp. 427-28.

and by some other contemporary ones as well.²⁶

It would appear that even if the Farrell regime had the will and the means to commit aggression against its neighbours in South America, the time hardly seemed opportune since the Government's hold on the Argentine situation seemed particularly tenuous. The opposition to the regime was intense and many faceted. For example the traditional political parties, the landed oligarchy which had been ousted by the army in 1943, and the middle-class oriented Union of Civic Radicals, which had been disappointed in its hopes of inheriting the revolution, were hostile. Efforts by the Farrell regime to enlist the support of the Union of Civic Radicals had been rebuffed, and three leaders of that party, Hortensio Quijano, Dr. Armando G. Antille, and Dr. Juan I. Cooke, who had accepted office in the Farrell regime, were promptly read out of the party.²⁷ The middle-class dominated universities were opposed to the government as was the traditional leadership of organized labour. In addition, the internecine rivalry in the regime following the coup d'etat of June, 1943 had resulted in the elimination of many members of the original group who could now be found in the ranks of the opposition.

²⁶Kelly, pp. 296-311.

²⁷For the reaction of the conservative oligarchy see Whitaker, ed., Inter-American Affairs, 1945, pp. 39-40. For the reaction of the Union of Civic Radicals, See Snow, p. 60; and Greenup, pp. 141-42.

The efforts of the Farrell regime to broaden the base of its support, particularly Vice President and Secretary of Labour Juan Perón's efforts to win the support of labour for the regime and his opportunistic decreeing of wage increases and better conditions of work to achieve that end, antagonized the new industrial group which was opposed to the landed oligarchy and would otherwise have supported the regime. These diverse groups, united only in their opposition to the Farrell regime, found a convenient horse to ride in the demand for a return to constitutional government. With the approaching defeat of the Axis they tended to become more vociferous in their demands.²⁸

Even the regime itself was rent by dissension. The struggle for power had not been finally resolved nor Argentina's direction determined. The army hierarchy, which had carried out the revolution of 1943, desired continued control of the government, largely in its own interest. The army was opposed by the civilian element in the government which wanted a constitutional regime dominated by the conservative elements of the country. Both these groups were ultra-nationalist and conservative and opposed to a third element led by Juan Perón who had become the dominant figure in the Farrell regime. Ambitious and able, Perón was determined to build his power on the support of

²⁸See Potash, pp. 255-56. See also Pendle, p. 99; Alexander, pp. 33-34; Whitaker, The United States and Argentina, pp. 132-33.

the under-privileged masses of Argentina,²⁹ and the more he succeeded the more he incurred the wrath of the traditional political and economic elite in Argentina.³⁰

The situation was thus very delicately poised, and the government would have been foolhardy indeed to embark on aggressive adventures. Nevertheless the "fascist" character of the regime and the absence of "constitutional democratic government" were to remain a major cause of conflict between the United States and Argentina.

Unfortunately for the Argentine regime, the United States government was committed to a set of objectives that conflicted with Argentina's. For example, in January, 1943, the United States joined with the other United Nations in a "Declaration against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control." The declaration consisted of a warning "to all concerned, and in particular to persons in neutral countries," that the allies intended to do their utmost to prevent the economic despoiling, by the Axis powers, of occupied countries and that they would not recognize any transfers of assets by the Axis powers even though carried out through "transactions

²⁹Whitaker, ed., Inter-American Affairs, 1945, pp. 40-41; Potash, p. 255.

³⁰Not even those observers most eager to describe Perón as "fascist" deny the need for the social programme that he inaugurated. See for example, Greenup, pp. 117-35; and Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Director, Office of American Republics Affairs (Briggs), November, 17, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 427-30. See also Owen, p. 50.

apparently legal in form."³¹ Again at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, July 1-22, 1944, the same theme was emphasized.³² And at the Inter-American Conference in February, 1945, the United States delegation introduced a resolution embodying the United Nations declaration of 1943 and resolution 6 of the Bretton Woods conference. This latter resolution, the so-called SAFEHAVEN declaration, sought to deny refuge in the American Republics for financial assets of enemy countries.³³

The United States had long held that the German firms in Argentina were the "spearheads" for Axis penetration of the Western Hemisphere and in its Proclaimed List policy had sought to prohibit their expansion, and possibly operation, and had sought the cooperation of the Latin American Governments toward this end.³⁴ Argentina had failed

³¹Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories under enemy Occupation or Control, January, 1943, Foreign Relations, 1943, I, pp. 443-44.

³²The Secretary of State to all Diplomatic Missions, August 19, 1944, Foreign Relations, 1944, II, pp. 218-20.

³³Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 45. See Also Article XVIII, Final Act Mexico City Conference on Problems of War and Peace, pp. 45-47, and Article XIX, pp. 47-49. In preparation for the inter-American conference in February, 1945, State Department personnel listed among the United States objectives: "Implementation of Resolution V of Rio with respect to black-list operations, control of looted assets, and protection against flight of enemy capital. See for example, Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State (Rockefeller) and the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republics Affairs (Lockwood) to the Secretary of State, February 10, 1945, in Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 109.

³⁴Whitaker, ed., Inter-American Affairs, 1941, pp. 103-105; see also Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 94-96.

to cooperate, and for this and other reasons the United States had imposed severe economic sanctions against Argentina throughout 1943 and 1944. At the Mexico City Conference the United States still sought the "strengthening and continuance of blacklist operations," offered "special assistance in elimination of Axis spearheads," and promised that the "transfer of black-listed firms to efficient management will be actively supported."³⁵

Furthermore, the Argentine economic programme ran directly counter to the postwar economic world which the United States government envisaged. The United States' blueprint, as presented by Assistant Secretary Clayton to the Mexico City Conference, favoured "practical and effective co-operative measures to reduce barriers of all kinds to the flow of international trade" and "the elimination of economic nationalism in all its forms." In this connection, the United States delegation successfully sponsored a resolution proposing that no industries be built up in Latin America which depended for their survival on government "subsidies," including protective tariffs.³⁶ In effect, the United States

³⁵Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State Rockefeller and Deputy Director Lockwood to the Secretary of State, February 10, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 109.

³⁶U.S. Department of State, Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Feb. 21 - March 8, 1945 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 216-17; 275-76. This United States resolution came in response to a draft resolution on tariffs proposed by the Colombian delegation to the Mexico City

was promoting a postwar world based on the principles of free trade and dominated by United States capital and trade.³⁷ This theme had been developed earlier at the Bretton Woods Conference in July, 1944 and had its genesis in the Colmer Committee which was established in January, 1944 to make recommendations for a postwar economic policy. The Colmer Committee concluded that in order to establish the economic foundations for a durable peace and to assist in providing high and expanding levels of income "at home and abroad," it was necessary to preserve "the principles of individual freedom and private initiative which has contributed so much to our welfare in the past."³⁸ According to the United States scheme, the Latin American countries, including Argentina, were to become an integral part of an

Conference. The resolution contained a clear reference to the unsatisfactory results of Latin America's wartime dependency on United States industrial exports and stated that the "common desire to abolish unnecessary trade barriers and to increase the volume of international interchange can and must be brought into harmony with the diversification of production in those American countries which are not sufficiently developed, and with their attainment of a higher degree of industrialization."

³⁷Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, pp. 120-24. Donald M. Dozer, Are We Good Neighbours? (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1959), p. 259; Council on Foreign Relations, United States in World Affairs, 1945-47, p. 246.

³⁸U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, The Post War Foreign Economic Policy of the United States, House Report 541, 79th Congress, 1st. Session, May 8, 1945, p. 1. Raymond Mikesell, United States Economic Policy and International Relations (New York: McGraw Nill Book Co., Inc., 1952), p. 213.

international free trading system.

The United States, as Assistant Secretary Braden subsequently declared, was opposed to "industrial development designed to serve the purpose of neurotic nationalism." He added "to eliminate those exaggerated nationalisms and substitute therefor constructive practical co-operation, as good neighbours, in benefit of all concerned is our firm purpose." The United States and, in Braden's estimation, the Latin American countries were opposed to the establishment of "a Western Hemisphere economic bloc." For Braden, "the sole, sane alternative to a hemisphere system of discrimination, and restriction" is "an international system of equal treatment and expansion." This called for concerted effort to eliminate every form of economic discrimination and "the substantial reduction of tariff barriers" which had throttled the trade of the world. For Latin America, the Assistant Secretary had the further prescription:

It must be realized that the sound industrialization of a country can by all odds be carried out more effectively under the dynamic system of private and where possible, competitive enterprise, to which we are dedicated, than it ever can by government. Just as the United States and European capital both greatly benefited from the latter's investments here, so less developed nations who desire to advance the rate of their economic growth may profit by encouraging the entry of capital from abroad.³⁹

³⁹Spruille Braden, "Address to the National Trade Convention" in Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Conciliation Documents for the Year 1946, Pamphlet 419, pp. 165-74.

Braden was only echoing the thinking of State Department policy planners. For example, the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew,⁴⁰ interpreted the inter-American conference resolutions on economic matters, as follows:

Other American republics to join United States in reduction of barriers to free flow of trade and commerce. This will be embodied in an economic charter for the Americas covering the following points: Fullest collaboration in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter to secure for all improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security. Joint action to create conditions which will encourage an economy of abundance, expanded domestic and foreign trade and consumption, and thus, through maximum productive employment, permit peoples everywhere to be healthy, adequately clothed, housed and fed, and to enjoy the rewards of their labor in dignity and freedom. Elimination of existing forms of discrimination and prevention of new forms, and enjoyment of equal access to trade and raw materials.

Reduction of trade barriers and stablilization of currencies. Elimination of excessive economic nationalism in all its forms. Just treatment for enterprise, skill, and capital brought from one country to another. Early action to bring into operation the International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and food and agricultural organization of the United Nations. Adherence to system of private enterprise.

Prevention of cartels and combinations which restrict international trade or access to markets but with provisions for necessary commodity agreements.

Recognition of rights of labor.⁴¹

⁴⁰The Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, was attending the Yalta Conference and the Under Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, was Acting Secretary.

⁴¹Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith) February 5, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 83. See also Draft Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Rockefeller) and the Deputy Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs (Lockwood) to the Secretary of State, ibid., p. 109.

United States spokesmen tried to establish this policy, as enunciated by Braden and Grew, at all postwar international conferences. For example, at the meeting of the United Nations Organization in London in February, 1946, Ambassador Winant proposed a Trade and Employment Conference to open world economic channels. Opposed to "blindly nationalistic and selfish policies," he drew attention to the fact that the United States had called a sixteen nation conference in Washington to negotiate a reduction of specific trade barriers and discriminations. The ambassador proposed that this conference be expanded and become the preparatory committee for a general conference on economic matters.⁴²

In addition to the anti-Axis resolution and the proposal favouring liberal capitalism, the United States delegation at Mexico City also sponsored a resolution which sought to incorporate the principles of the Atlantic Charter⁴³ into the inter-American system.⁴⁴ Included in the

⁴²New York Times, February 12, 1946, p. 5.

⁴³Joint statement by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, issued August 14, 1941, which emphasized, among other things, equality of economic opportunity with equal access to essential raw materials for all nations, fair labour standards, social security and freedom from fear.

⁴⁴See the Acting Secretary of State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, except Argentina and El Salvador, February, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 100-101. See also Memorandum by William Sanders, a technical officer of the United States delegation, to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith), ibid., p. 59. Sanders and Mervin L. Bohan, a foreign service officer of the United States delegation to the Mexico City conference had been instructed to discuss the agenda for the proposed conference with the Mexican Foreign Office. Ibid., p. 57.

so-called "Declaration of Mexico," the resolution declared that "the American States reiterate their fervent adherence to democratic principles, which they consider essential for the peace of America," and that "the purpose of the State is the happiness of man in society." The resolution further declared that "the interests of the community should be harmonized with the rights of the individual," and that "the American man cannot conceive of living without justice, just as he cannot conceive of living without liberty."⁴⁵

While the United States had a long tradition of attempting to promote democracy in Latin America, it is not clear whether or not, in proposing this resolution, the State Department intended to emphasize democratic principles in its future relations with Latin America. Similar resolutions had been passed at previous inter-American conferences, but they had not noticeably hastened the growth of democracy in Latin America, nor had they deterred or hindered United States-Latin American relations. In fact United States policy of the previous twelve years had allowed what have been described as "the vilest sort of dictatorships" to flourish in Latin America.⁴⁶ Secondly, the United States at that time was subordinating its Latin American policy to its larger world role. Hence, it was averse to taking any position that would conflict with the

⁴⁵Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, p. 39.

⁴⁶Petras, p. 304.

United States commitment "to the other major powers not to negotiate" at that time "with other governments concerning the Dumbarton Oaks proposals." Furthermore, the United States delegation to the inter-American conference had been directed to sign no agreement "in the nature of treaties."⁴⁷ The fact that the resolution to promote democracy was presented as merely a recommendation and referred for further study⁴⁸ fitted into these instructions.

In spite of doubts as to the weight the United States was giving to the promotion of democracy in Latin America as a major objective in 1945, this resolution, along with those which opposed Axis interest and influence and promoted liberal trading practices in the western hemisphere, remained as the framework within which Argentine performance would be judged by United States officials.

III

The extent to which the Argentines intended to honour their inter-American commitments remains unclear. While the Farrell regime seemed reluctant to do more than the minimum necessary to achieve recognition, it obviously realized that something had to be done. Even before the opening of the inter-American conference, the Argentine government had taken steps which were described as moving

⁴⁷Memorandum by William Sanders to the Ambassador in Mexico (Messersmith), Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 58.

⁴⁸Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, p. 69.

towards an "adequate if belated compliance with practically all important commitments . . ."⁴⁹ And, before adhering to the Final Act of the Mexico City Conference, the Argentine government went even farther in preparing the machinery for compliance. For example, on April 3, 1945, the Argentine government announced that 150 German subsidiaries with an aggregate of \$40 million in assets had been confiscated and that governmental inspectors had been placed in control of these firms pending transfer to Argentine hands.⁵⁰ Furthermore, after the declaration of war on March 27, 1945, the Argentine government changed the status of the Graf Spee sailors from internees to prisoners of war, suspended fifteen pro-Axis newspapers, interned Japanese diplomatic and consular personnel on such short notice as "to have prevented them making prior arrangements with Japanese agents," and carried out various other anti-Axis measures.⁵¹

Following the extension of diplomatic recognition on April 9, 1945, by the United States, Britain, and by those Latin American countries which had previously withheld it,

⁴⁹Chargé in Argentina (Reed) to the Secretary of State, January 19, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 369-70.

⁵⁰Chargé in Argentina (Reed) to the Secretary of State, April 4, 1945, ibid., pp. 451-53. See also Peterson, pp. 443-44.

⁵¹The Chargé in Argentina (Reed) to the Secretary of State, May 10, 1945, Foreign Relations 1945, IX, p. 460. See also Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, April 4, 1945, ibid., pp. 454-55.

the Farrell regime seemed to have decided that merely ritualistic motions were enough. For instance, on April 16, a memorandum by the Senior Economic Analyst at the United States embassy in Buenos Aires cited the Chairman of the Argentine Government Committee for the control of Axis Firms, Luis Fiore, as stating that the programme for the intervention of Axis firms had advanced more rapidly before than after Argentina's declaration of war against the Axis, and as claiming that "the higher authorities in the Government apparently had been more concerned with the declaration of war, the signing of the Act of Chapultepec, and obtaining recognition, than in taking active immediate steps against Axis firms and individuals."⁵²

The Argentine government after April, 1945, granted certain concessions which it was obligated to make but which cost it nothing. The Chargé in Argentina, in reporting on Argentine efforts to control Axis agents, stated that "in gathering up the loose ends the Argentine police showed commendable patience in waiting until they had the whole story" and that the Axis potential for espionage work had been effectively disrupted.⁵³ In addition, on June 9, the government gave the allies access to the German and Japanese

⁵²Memorandum by the Senior Economic Analyst United States Embassy in Argentina, to the Chargé in Argentina (Reed) and the First Secretary of the Embassy, April 16, 1945, ibid., pp. 454-55.

⁵³The Chargé in Argentina (Reed) to the Secretary of State, May 10, 1945, ibid., pp. 458-59.

consular records⁵⁴ and later readily handed over the two German U-Boats which had clandestinely entered Buenos Aires harbour contrary to the general conditions of surrender.⁵⁵ However, observers agreed that Argentina had not met the obligations which she had assumed under "Rio Resolution XVII . . . and Chapultepec Resolution dealing with subversive activities" which specifically recommended that surveillance be maintained and expanded.⁵⁶

The Argentine government might have been deterred from further action toward meeting these commitments by the unpopularity of the decision to depart from Argentina's traditional policy of neutrality. Even though the conditions imposed upon Argentina for readmission to the inter-American community were not onerous, they were nonetheless opposed by the ultranationalists in the army and among civilian groups and were implemented, amidst threats of civil war, only because the faction led by Vice President Perón thought it necessary to break the diplomatic quarantine.⁵⁷ The Argentine government also might have thought that, with the

⁵⁴Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, June 9, 1945, ibid., p. 385. Braden commented that he found the Argentine decision "interesting . . . especially in view of Argentine government giving us access to German archives more quickly than some other American Republics"

⁵⁵The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden), July 13, 1945, ibid., pp. 393-94, 404.

⁵⁶The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden), to the Secretary of State, July 11, 1945, ibid., pp. 465-66. See also Greenup, p. 143.

⁵⁷Whitaker, ed., Inter-American Affairs, 1945, pp. 40-41.

end of the war approaching and in the absence of any inter-American machinery to ensure follow-up action, it could escape with the semblance of performance. The Farrell regime must also have been restrained in any desire it had to meet its commitments by the importance to Argentina's economic and military programme of the firms against which it was committed to proceed.

The concessions made by the Farrell regime in its international commitments were paralleled and exceeded by concessions made on the domestic scene. For example, in its desire to allay hostile criticism of the regime and, concurrently, to win acceptance from dissident groups, the Farrell government reinstated opponents of the regime who earlier had been deprived of their jobs and restored university autonomy which had been suspended since 1943. This trend was temporarily reversed because of the determination of the opposition forces to make no compromise with the Farrell regime and because of their increased agitation for a change of government. Fearing that the impending fall of the Axis powers would be the occasion for massive attacks by the opposition, the regime resorted to widespread arrests of army officers and civilians with leanings toward constitutional government. The government re-imposed political censorship and sought to impose more rigorous control of foreign correspondents. On the eve of the fall of Berlin, the regime threatened that it would use

force to disperse any public demonstrations.⁵⁸

However, more and more concessions were made by the regime as it responded to new circumstances. In July, 1945, President Farrell announced that a free, national election would be held before the end of the year, and in August, the state of siege, which had been in effect since December, 1941, was lifted.⁵⁹ Reluctantly, the regime granted freedom from censorship for foreign correspondents in Buenos Aires (although never to United States satisfaction) and even allowed the Argentine newspapers to reprint the critical articles sent out by those correspondents. The government also released over a thousand political prisoners.⁶⁰ Finally the Farrell regime even acceded to the demand of the opposition for the resignation of Vice President Perón who was temporarily arrested.⁶¹

These concessions appear to have been made, in the first place, in response to the new forces generated by the defeat of the Axis. Contrary to the expectation of Argentine military spokesmen the allies had successfully launched an invasion of Axis occupied Europe. As the allied forces

⁵⁸Potash, pp. 255-58.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 260; Whitaker, ed., Inter-American Affairs, 1945, p. 43.

⁶⁰Greenup, pp. 142-43; the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, June 13, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 407. See also pp. 514-26, passim.

⁶¹Potash, p. 271.

continued their advance against Germany, a variety of groups in Argentina were emboldened to demand a return to constitutional government. Leaders of the traditional parties, who though cowed had not been proscribed, now joined the labour leaders who had succeeded in defying the regime's attempt to control the labour movement in Argentina and with both retired and active disaffected army officers in this demand. In June, 1945, more than three hundred industrial and commercial organizations, including such interests as the Argentine Industrial Union, the Argentine Rural Confederation and the Argentine Rural Society, signed a manifesto attacking the economic policies of the regime but particularly the social programme which had been initiated by Vice President and Secretary of Labour, Perón. The whole opposition movement coalesced in a "Board of Democratic Coordination" which included groups of every political persuasion in Argentina united only in their opposition to the Farrell regime. Demanding that the Farrell regime hand over the administration of the country to the Supreme Court which would supervise an election, the "Board of Democratic Co-ordination" reached its peak of activity with a mammoth parade, the so-called "March of the Constitution and Liberty," on September 19, 1945, in which an estimated 250,000 people participated. As a result, the Farrell regime reimposed the "state of siege" and resorted to widespread arrests of the organizers of the parade. But student agitation and general unrest continued, and when the army and navy joined

the demand for his retirement, Juan Perón stepped down on October 9, 1945, and was subsequently temporarily arrested.⁶²

The concessions made by the Farrell regime appear to be a response not only to this increased agitation of the Argentine opposition but also to the activities in Argentina of Spruille Braden the newly appointed United States Ambassador to Argentina. Braden, a veteran diplomat and a businessman of wide experience in Latin America, steadied a previously fluctuating United States policy into a consistent hard line and in other ways inspired and encouraged the Argentine opposition while wringing concessions from the Farrell regime.

In the period April 9, to May 25, 1945, between the extension of diplomatic recognition and the arrival in Argentina of Ambassador Braden, the United States seemed indifferent to Argentina's internal affairs and vacillated in its approach to Argentina's performance in her inter-American commitments. For example, on April 19, in response to an Argentine request to have the Proclaimed Lists withdrawn, the State Department had decided that "mere intervention of Axis spearhead firms is not regarded as a valid basis for withdrawing [the] Proclaimed List for Argentina" and demanded "actual accomplishment of the expropriation, forced sale or liquidation" of the firms and

⁶²For a discussion of Argentine internal developments see Owen, pp. 39-49; Potash, pp. 255-72; Peterson, p. 447; Whitaker, The United States and Argentina, pp. 133-34.

"the implementation and execution of a satisfactory replacement program."⁶³ Yet on May 25, 1945, diplomatic representatives in the American Republics were informed that effective May 26, the Confidential List of Unsatisfactory Consignees⁶⁴ would be eliminated and made no exception against Argentina.⁶⁵ Rather, the State Department had requested the Foreign Economic Administration to drop the slowdown policy and expedite export licenses for Argentina.⁶⁶

Further evidence of United States' vacillation is provided by that country's economic policy toward Argentina. Following Argentina's adherence to the Final Act of the Mexico City Conference, its declaration of war against the Axis powers, and the consequent extension of diplomatic recognition by the United States, the State Department decided that the resolution of the political differences with Argentina had removed the occasion for the maintenance of economic sanctions and that henceforth the United States' posture toward Argentina would be "comparable in every respect with the economic policy of this country toward the other

⁶³ Secretary of State to Chargé in Argentina (Reed), April 19, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 456.

⁶⁴ The secret list (popularly known as the "Black List") of firms and persons in Latin America with which United States citizens were forbidden to trade.

⁶⁵ Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics, May 25, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 460.

⁶⁶ The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, May 31, 1945, ibid., p. 537.

American republics. . . ." ⁶⁷ In keeping with this policy, the United States contracted to supply Argentina with fuel oil in return for specified quantities of Argentine vegetable products to satisfy the needs of the United States and the other United Nations. ⁶⁸ The agreement was to exercise considerable influence on subsequent United States policy towards Argentina. ⁶⁹ However, for reasons which are obscure, the United States' decision to restore normal economic relations with Argentina was held in abeyance pending discussions of "the whole problem with Ambassador Braden" prior to his departure for Buenos Aires. ⁷⁰

During this period of United States vacillation the opposition to the Farrell regime, though widespread, was diffused and disorganized. Its mood was one of pessimism following United States' recognition of the regime and the apparent abandonment of the "democratic" forces which had looked to that country for moral support. ⁷¹ Both the uncertainty of the United States policy and the mood of the opposition were changed with the arrival in Argentina of

⁶⁷ Secretary of State to the Chargé in Argentina (Reed), April 12, 1945, ibid., pp. 530-31.

⁶⁸ The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Chargé in Argentina, April 24, 1945, ibid., p. 535. See also Department of State Bulletin XII (June 17, 1945), p. 1116.

⁶⁹ See below, p. 115.

⁷⁰ The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Chargé in Argentina (Reed), April 24, 1945, Foreign Relations 1945, IX, p. 534. See also the Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Argentina, May 18, 1945, ibid., pp. 536-37.

⁷¹ Greenup, pp. 141-42.

Ambassador Braden.

IV

Various motives have been attributed to Braden in his approach to the Argentine problem. The Ambassador may have been concerned to dispel the prevailing impression that the United States preferred to deal with dictatorial regimes.⁷² The situation in Argentina may have challenged "his principles and his love of action;"⁷³ and it is possible that "he viewed the restoration of constitutional rule as the aim of his mission."⁷⁴ Braden might have been genuinely concerned about Argentina's poor performance on her inter-American "commitments." The ambassador himself claimed that he was carrying out United States policy as he interpreted it.⁷⁵ Less charitably, it has been suggested that Braden went to Buenos Aires with "the fixed idea that he had been elected by Providence to overthrow the Farrell-Perón regime," and was flattered by the "more wealthy 'society' members" into launching an attack on the regime.⁷⁶

Whatever his reason for launching the attack, Braden found the framework provided by Argentina's adherence to the Mexico City resolutions--defending democracy,

⁷²Ibid., p. 142.

⁷³Peterson, p. 447.

⁷⁴Potash, p. 258.

⁷⁵McGann, "The Ambassador and the Dictator," pp. 350-51.

⁷⁶Kelly, p. 307.

opposing Axis interest and influence, and promoting liberal trading principles--most useful. The Ambassador zeroed in on the regime's failure to liquidate all Axis holdings in Argentina, on the absence of constitutional democratic government, and on the "fascist" tendencies of the regime. Initially neither guided nor circumscribed by Departmental instructions and apparently left to devise his own methods for dealing with the Argentine government, Braden launched a two-pronged attack on the Farrell regime. In the first place he interfered in Argentina's internal politics in a way which was considered most undiplomatic,⁷⁷ and, secondly, he sought to persuade the State Department to adopt a harsh policy towards the Farrell regime.

Braden's arrival in Argentina coincided with the regime's use of severe measures in dealing with an alleged plot to overthrow the government and its attempts to impose more rigorous controls on foreign correspondents.⁷⁸ The Ambassador made vigorous representation to the Argentine government, demanding that proper freedom be given to foreign press representatives.⁷⁹ While this action could possibly be interpreted as a legitimate function of his office, Braden was to go much farther. He publicly criticized

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Potash, p. 257; Memorandum by Eugene A. Gilmore, Division of River Plate Affairs, June 28, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, 388.

⁷⁹The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, July 5, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 514-21.

the Farrell regime as "authoritarian and fascist" and resorted to measures which commentators interpret as "encouragement to overthrow the government."⁸⁰ Braden also criticized the government for non-performance of its inter-American commitments. Within days of his arrival in Buenos Aires he reminded Argentine officials that they still had not eliminated Axis controlled firms,⁸¹ and on June 19 he demanded the extirpation of all Japanese and German firms.⁸² Furthermore, in official communications with the Argentine government, Braden decried the continued "incarcerations and arrests" of important citizens who on their release "have never even had charges brought" and the "utterly futile and counterproductive censorship of the press."⁸³

Braden's response to the government's control of the press was illustrative of the Ambassador's approach to the Argentine situation in two ways. First, Braden demanded total compliance, insisting on nothing less than "full

⁸⁰ Paz and Ferrari, p. 134; See also Alexander, p. 204; Pendle, p. 102; Welles, Where Are We Heading? pp. 216-17; Whitaker, ed. Inter-American Affairs, 1945, p. 42; Greenup, pp. 141-46; Roger R. Trask, review of Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, IX, American Historical Review, LXXV (April, 1970), pp. 1206-1207.

⁸¹ New York Times, May 30, 1945, p. 15.

⁸² Ibid., June 20, 1945, p. 14.

⁸³ The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, June 1, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 383.

liberty of the press," irrespective of how critical of the regime the printed material might be.⁸⁴ For example, while he reported to the State Department that articles in the New York Times by Arnaldo Cortesi and other articles critical of the Argentine government were "republished widely" in Buenos Aires,⁸⁵ the Ambassador at the same time criticized Perón for censorship of the press,⁸⁶ because the regime still exercised some measure of control. Secondly, Braden was striking at the foundation of the Farrell regime. Since most of the large daily newspapers were pro-Allied and hostile to the government,⁸⁷ Braden in his stand against censorship of the press was tacitly lining up on the side of the opposition forces. And in demanding that the government relinquish control of the press, which was one of the main pillars of its hold on the Argentine situation,⁸⁸ he was in effect asking the government to acquiesce in its own destruction.

In his demands for Argentine compliance with her

⁸⁴The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, June 20, 1945, ibid., p. 509.

⁸⁵The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, June 30, 1945, ibid., p. 511. See also the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, June 26, 1945, ibid., p. 463.

⁸⁶The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, June 1, 1945, ibid., p. 383; see also the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, June 20, 1945, ibid., p. 509.

⁸⁷Whitaker, Argentina, p. 117.

⁸⁸Blanksten, pp. 202-205.

inter-American commitments and for full freedom of the press and in his criticisms of the government, Braden thus drew the lines along which he wanted United States policy toward Argentina to proceed and then endeavoured to win State Department support for his proposed programme.

His attempt to secure adoption of a harsh policy toward the Farrell regime succeeded only in reversing the State Department's intention to ease the economic restrictions against Argentina. Braden began by vigorously protesting the Department's decision to eliminate the Confidential List of Unsatisfactory Consignees, a decision that would have included Argentina. He argued that the decision was "utterly unsound" because it would leave "our enemies a powerful nucleus around which to build and which will severely plague us in the future" and that the United States "must first get effective action from Argentina before abandoning the present system." The Ambassador urged that the entire Proclaimed and Confidential Lists policy be continued in full vigour in Argentina until the situation there "is in hand and this Embassy so reports."⁸⁹ In Braden's estimation the United States "should only supply Argentina in degree to which she genuinely implements her Chapultepec obligations." Argentina was to receive only commodities which constituted "real requirements for health and well being of the Argentine people" and "materials which others will furnish

⁸⁹The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, May 29, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 461.

if we do not."⁹⁰

The State Department, which again seemed to be swinging toward economic restrictions, found no difficulty in accepting Braden's recommendations. It amended its earlier instructions in order to allow the Ambassador in Argentina much greater control over United States exports to Argentina.⁹¹ Further, the State Department had already moved to make the restrictive policy uniform for all United States departments. In reply to a Navy Department's suggestion that the procedure for handling Argentine military export licence applications be simplified and made uniform for both Army and Navy, the State Department declared "that for important political reasons and considerations of foreign policy, no action be taken on the export of material to the Argentine Armed Forces except with the specific approval of the Department of State," and that "the Department of State believes that the 'Certificate of Necessity' system should remain in effect as concerns all material for the Armed Forces of Argentina."⁹²

⁹⁰ Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, May 31, 1945, ibid., p. 537.

⁹¹ The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden), July 4, 1945, ibid., p. 543. See also the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republics Affairs (Rockefeller) to the Acting Secretary of State, June 7, 1945, ibid., p. 462.

⁹² Memorandum from the Acting Director, Office of American Republics Affairs, to Commander C. Parker, Pan American Division, Navy Department, June 11, 1945, ibid., p. 540.

Braden, however, believed that the Argentine problem was more serious than could be met by limited economic sanctions; for he apparently was convinced that the "Nazi-Fascist" influence in Argentina constituted the most serious threat to the peace and safety of the hemisphere and of the entire world.⁹³ He sought to persuade the State Department that

. . . both from the strategic and political aspects it is imperative for the security of [the] United States of America that other American Republics [be] in hands of friendly cooperative governments imbued with principles--i.e. of democracy identical to ours The Fascist militaristic influence here is not [a] superficial temporary phase but a sturdy growth which cannot be quickly or easily destroyed by half-way measures The Nazi-Fascist movement "entrenched in Argentina is in a position to build up and to prepare for future aggression"⁹⁴

Convinced that modifications of Farrell's policies⁹⁵ were the result of the harsh line that the Department had adopted under his prodding, the Ambassador urged that further concessions could be won only if the United States instituted an even more severe policy. He recommended that no military cooperation or material be given to Argentina and that economic assistance be restricted to materials calculated to aid the war effort.

⁹³ Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, July 11, 1945, ibid., pp. 465-66.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ It will be recalled that the Argentine government had been relaxing the various war measures in Argentina and had been reluctantly proceeding against Axis agents and interests in Argentina. See above, pp. 98-103.

Braden was even prepared to seek the aid of Marshall Stalin in dealing with Argentina.⁹⁶ Later he advised the State Department that the desired objectives could be obtained if Secretary of State Byrnes and the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and, if possible, China and France would publicly denounce the continuation of Fascist de facto⁹⁷ governments of Argentina and Spain "either by force or thru [sic] fraudulent elections."⁹⁸ As the ultimate in pressure Braden suggested that:

Thought might be given if not to expulsion of Argentina from the United Nations at least to refusing membership until she has constitutional government having authority to ratify San Francisco instrument. Also the fact that present Argentine regime is not just one more personal or oligarchic dictatorship of traditional Latin American type but is a strategic and political factor inimical to common interests of American Republics might make this regime susceptible to being considered as a threat to the peace and therefore subject to enforcement measures by United Nations Conference on International Organization.⁹⁹

Additional evidence of the Ambassador's favouring an even tougher approach was his willingness to have the United States government renege on its commitment to supply Argentina with fuel in exchange for Argentine vegetable products destined for the liberated areas of Europe. Such

⁹⁶The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, July 11, 1945, ibid., pp. 291-93.

⁹⁷Fascist de facto to distinguish them from others such as Vargas in Brazil.

⁹⁸The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, September 4, 1945, ibid., pp. 406-408.

⁹⁹The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, July 11, 1945, ibid., pp. 391-93.

action would mean starvation and hardship for the people of liberated Europe because of Argentina's burning the vegetable products in lieu of fuel. Nevertheless, Braden was prepared to countenance it in order to create difficulties for the Argentine regime and hasten its downfall.¹⁰⁰

To achieve his aims in Argentina Braden saw that the United States must win the support of the British; for their cooperation would be essential to the success of any coercive policy toward Argentina. The Ambassador recognized both Britain's strategic position as the traditionally principal market for Argentina's chief export (meat) and Argentina's dependence on this market. As Braden stated it, "So great is British influence in this country that we cannot hope to eliminate Nazi militaristic danger unless we have complete coordination with the support of British on every front" ¹⁰¹ The Ambassador was aware of British concern that nothing should disrupt the continued flow of meat from Argentina, Britain's main supplier.¹⁰²

Braden urged that "President Truman in the forthcoming

¹⁰⁰The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, September 20, 1945, ibid., pp. 550-53.

¹⁰¹The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, July 5, 1945, ibid., p. 389.

¹⁰²Britain was then appealing to the United States for help in getting Argentina to supply Britain's meat needs since Argentina showed an inclination to renege on her agreement with Britain in favour of better prices from other European countries. See the Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden), June 9, 1945, ibid., pp. 538-39.

conversations with Premier Churchill insist that long range importance of Argentine problems from political and strategic aspects far outweigh any economic or other considerations." The Ambassador argued that compared to the threat to world peace and prosperity posed by the "Nazi-Fascist" influence in Argentina, ". . . British and American trade investments in this country pale into insignificance." The best way to preserve that investment, advised Braden, was to eliminate Perón who was on "record as intending to recover Argentine patrimony from foreign malefactors."¹⁰³

Seeking to allay British fears about its meat supply if it cooperated in a tough policy toward Argentina, Braden argued that exports of meat would continue under any circumstances barring revolution or chaos. He contended that the likelihood of the meat supply being interrupted would increase in direct ratio to the duration of the Perón regime, while all the desired United States objectives -- elimination of German spearhead firms and attainment of the SAFEHAVEN programme, freedom of the press, and the release of political prisoners -- would be expedited by a return to constitutional democracy.¹⁰⁴

The programme that the Ambassador proposed that the State Department adopt with regard to Argentina seems in many ways to have been based on a misreading of the situation.

¹⁰³The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, July 11, 1945, ibid., pp. 391-93.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

While his fears are understandable in view of the reports, then rampant, of leading Nazis escaping to Argentina and of the symptoms of fascism exhibited by the Argentine regime, Braden seems to have overemphasized the character of the threat; for it would appear that Argentina's capacity for developing an aggressive fascism was severely limited.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, in his optimism regarding his ability to encourage the development of the United States brand of democracy in his host country, the Ambassador seems to have forgotten two important elements in the Argentine situation. First, for more than fifteen years, "democracy" and the constitutional process had been subverted and discredited by the groups who opposed the Farrell regime and who most vociferously demanded a return to constitutional government.¹⁰⁶ Secondly, the Argentines had a tradition of hostility toward the United States, as well as an inveterate opposition to interference by outside forces in Argentina's internal affairs.

¹⁰⁵For a fuller discussion see above, pp. 81-84.

¹⁰⁶The leaders of the opposition included Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Foreign Minister for six years (1933-38) in the highly undemocratic and unconstitutional regime of President Justo, and José María Cantila, Foreign Minister under the equally undemocratic President Castillo. It has been said of such forces, "It is not only a political grouping, it is also a social class, an aristocracy modeled on European aristocracies. . . . These aristocracies aspire to high governmental positions or such things as university professorships; . . . They are repelled by present-day populist political parties" See Alfred Temkin, "Argentina: The Choice before Perón," Commentary, 1 (June, 1946), pp. 14-21. Temkin is an Argentine Jew who had no reason to be partial to Perón who, according to his critics, was himself anti-semitic.

Braden also erred in his apparent judgment that the Farrell regime lacked the support of a majority of the Argentine people and that it would seek to perpetuate itself and allay international criticism by holding a fraudulent election. The Ambassador's estimate that "the Supreme Court and Lower Courts, every political party, university students and faculties, majority of labor, economic interests, the Navy, and even some Army officers are opposed to Perón and his clique"¹⁰⁷ was correct in certain respects. The courts and the traditional political parties, most of the economic interest, the navy, and even some army officers were opposed to Perón; however, the significant misconception in Braden's assessment was his estimate of labour's position. For while the traditional labour leadership was largely hostile to the Farrell government, the underprivileged masses of Argentina had given their allegiance to Perón, who had skillfully exploited the urgent need for social reform in Argentina.¹⁰⁸ This fact would refute Braden's estimate that Perón could only win a fraudulent election--the Argentine leader won the first honest and free election in the country's recent history in February, 1946.

The State Department probably recognized some of the fallacies in Braden's arguments; although it accepted his objectives in Argentina, it showed little enthusiasm for his

¹⁰⁷ The Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) to the Secretary of State, September 4, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 406.

¹⁰⁸ See Alexander, pp. 23-25.

methods. The Department did stress the "urgent importance of pressing for elimination of Axis firms and influence" and for the implementation of the SAFEHAVEN programme, and it was prepared to ask the British government to give its Ambassador in Argentina the same authority to screen British exports to Argentina as the United States had extended to Ambassador Braden. (The Department felt that, if the British cooperated to the extent of vesting Ambassador Kelly with the adequate authority, Braden and Kelly "together should be able to handle this matter satisfactorily.")¹⁰⁹

However, farther than this the State Department was unwilling to go. It refused to involve other powers through the United Nations organization in inter-American affairs because it "believed that the disadvantages" outweighed the "advantages of having non-American Powers intervene in the Argentine situation . . ." at that particular time.¹¹⁰ Rather than have extra-hemisphere powers interfere in Argentine affairs, the Department again suggested that the Argentine matter be taken up with the other American republics in an effort to ensure Argentine

¹⁰⁹The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden), June 13, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 386.

¹¹⁰The Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State, September 13, 1945, ibid., p. 411.

compliance with the Mexico Conference resolutions.¹¹¹ The Department called to Braden's attention the fact that "Argentina altered her basic foreign policy when called upon to do so by a united hemisphere and that the decisions reached at Mexico City have formed the principal basis for the positions which you have taken with the Argentine government." The State Department considered that continued hemispheric unity was essential and urged Braden to "avail himself of every appropriate opportunity for consultation with the Ambassadors of the other American republics."¹¹²

The Department supported Braden's contention that the establishment of effective democracy in Argentina was in the interest of the United States and expressed the hope for a "revival of a militant civic conscience" in Argentina, but it reminded him that this would be a slow process in view of the past twenty years of Argentine history and cautioned that the

Department realizes as you do that there is not much more that can be done either by you or this government which would not result in the resentment to which you refer . . . on the grounds that this government is intervening in Argentine domestic affairs.¹¹³

¹¹¹The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden), July 19, 1945, ibid., pp. 395-97. See also the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina, August 14, 1945, ibid., 402-403, and the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State, September 13, 1945, ibid., pp. 411-12.

¹¹²The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden), July 19, 1945, ibid., pp. 395-96. See also the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden) August 14, 1945, ibid., pp. 402-403.

¹¹³The Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden), July 21, 1945, ibid., pp. 397-98.

The reasons that the State Department adopted a more moderate approach rather than the tough one recommended by Braden are a matter for speculation. The Department seemingly did not accept the Ambassador's analysis of the Nazi-Fascist" threat in Argentina. For example, it apparently did not consider the threat to be sufficiently serious to warrant using Argentina's fuel needs as a lever to force concessions when it meant that the people of liberated Europe would suffer. Another reason that has been suggested is that the Department's more moderate approach was the work of Assistant Secretary Rockefeller who did not consider Perón to be really fascist nor representative of the extreme nationalist elements in Argentina. It has also been pointed out that Rockefeller recognized Perón's eagerness for rapprochement with the United States and was prepared to exploit it in the interest of commercial intercourse, holding that "close business relations . . . were the surest way to under cut a dangerously anti-American nationalism in Argentina."¹¹⁴ Furthermore, as Joe Alex Morris has suggested, Rockefeller was concerned to preserve the unity of the hemisphere.¹¹⁵

However, the restrictions on the Braden approach were soon to be removed as the Ambassador himself was given

¹¹⁴Green, The Containment of Latin America, pp. 250-52.

¹¹⁵See Morris, p. 228.

responsibility for determining the United States policy toward Argentina. In August, 1945 he was appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs in place of Nelson Rockefeller. Until his departure from Buenos Aires, Braden continued his personal campaign against the Farrell regime in general and Perón in particular, while the State Department continued to be cautionary and to appeal for collective inter-American action.¹¹⁶

V

On September 23, Braden left Argentina to become Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. His "promotion" is the subject of some historical controversy. Secretary of State Byrnes¹¹⁷ declared of the Braden nomination:

It is particularly a recognition of his accurate interpretation of the policies of this government in its relations with the present government of the Argentine. As Assistant Secretary in charge of Latin American affairs, it will be his duty to see that the policies which he has so courageously sponsored in the Argentine are continued with unremitting vigour.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶For example, on August 17, Braden denounced the Argentine regime as fascist; see New York Times, August 18, 1945, p. 6; and on August 20, he stated his belief in the public preparedness for democracy; see ibid., August 21, p. 6. For the State Department's reaction see the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden), August 14, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 402-403. See also the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State, September 13, 1945, ibid., pp. 411-12.

¹¹⁷James F. Byrnes had replaced Edward Stettinius as Secretary of State in July, 1945.

¹¹⁸Department of State, Bulletin, XIII (August 26, 1945), p. 291. See also pp. 285-89 for comment by outgoing Assistant Secretary Rockefeller suggesting a return to a tough policy.

This statement has led to the assumption that the Department had found in Braden the official to implement a new, tough policy towards Latin America as a whole.¹¹⁹ However, it also has been suggested that the Braden-for-Rockefeller exchange was only a ploy to blunt public criticism, particularly the attacks of eastern liberal newspapers on Rockefeller and his "pro-Perónist" policy, and that, in effect, Braden was "kicked upstairs" where he would no longer be in a position, as he had been in Argentina, to thwart the policy of Argentine-United States rapprochement which the Truman administration wished to expedite.¹²⁰

Whatever the reason for his "promotion," Braden's arrival in Washington was the beginning of an intense effort to produce an Argentine regime drawn to United States specifications. A reversal of the progress he had made while he was in Buenos Aires provided the necessity, and the Argentine election, which Colonel Perón confidently scheduled, provided the framework for Braden's increased effort.

In spite of departmental reluctance to apply the ultimate pressure on the Argentine regime, Braden apparently

¹¹⁹Blanksten, p. 412; Peterson, p. 448; Welles, Where Are We Heading? pp. 219-20; Guerrant, p. 19.

¹²⁰David Green, "The Cold War Comes to Latin America," p. 169. Professor Green cites interviews with Adolf Berle, former Assistant Secretary of State, and Spruille Braden. According to Green, Braden was unhappy about the move and tried "to get President Truman and Secretary Byrnes to let him delay his departure as long as possible, knowing that his leaving Buenos Aires would weaken the anti-Perónists there."

had been able to achieve some success while he was in Argentina. For example, under his prodding and in response to the Braden-inspired opposition's demands, the Farrell regime had lifted the state of siege and declared that general elections would be held early in 1946. Although, following the "March of the Constitution and Liberty" and Braden's departure from Buenos Aires, the government reimposed the state of siege, Army discontent over the American arms embargo culminated in the resignation and imprisonment of Perón. However, the inability of the opposition forces to form a government and the rapid mobilization of Perón's followers, the so-called descamisados (shirt-less ones), led by Eva Duarte,¹²¹ saw the triumphant return of Perón to power and influence.¹²²

Braden then, as Assistant Secretary, was confronted with what he considered the same situation which he had attempted to combat when he was ambassador. Although he could cite impressive evidence of Argentina's efforts to meet her inter-American commitments, Braden concluded that the Farrell regime was insincere in its efforts to deal with Nazi influence and economic interests in Argentina.¹²³ Braden's analysis of the regime's attempts to deal with the

¹²¹Subsequently Eva Duarte de Perón.

¹²²For a discussion of Braden's activity in Argentina and its results, see Greenup, pp. 142-45; Kelly, pp. 307-308; Peterson, pp. 447-49; Potash, pp. 258-59; Blanksten, pp. 411-12.

¹²³Secretary of State to the Chargé in Argentina (Cabot), December 17, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 497-98.

Axis interest in Argentina was challenged by the United States Charge' in Buenos Aires, John Cabot, who was convinced that "great progress" had been made and that the United States had no case against Argentina for non-compliance with her inter-American commitments.¹²⁴ However, there is no question, as Braden pointed out, that Argentina continued "to envince greater regard for the immediate well-being of her local economy than for the security of the Hemisphere."¹²⁵ Furthermore, the Argentine government was the same that had failed to support the United Nations during the war. These factors, Braden concluded, were cause enough to pursue a tough policy toward Argentina.

Braden proceeded to subject the Argentine regime to diplomatic snubs and to attempt to isolate the regime in the hemisphere. For example, the United States showed its displeasure with the Farrell regime by refusing to appoint a new ambassador; the Embassy was left under a Chargé d'Affaires. More significantly, the State Department abruptly terminated preparations for the inter-American conference scheduled to convene on October 20, 1945. This conference had been provided for at the Mexico City Conference in order to give convention form to the Act of Chapultepec, and at San Fransisco the chiefs of the American Republics delegations

¹²⁴The Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Director, Office of American Republic Affaires (Briggs), November 17, 1945, ibid., pp. 428-29.

¹²⁵The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Argentina (Cabot), December 17, 1945, ibid., pp. 497-98.

had agreed that it would meet at Rio de Janeiro.¹²⁶ By mid-August the Foreign Minister of Brazil had issued the invitations for the conference and on September 19 the State Department had already prepared a draft of the treaty to be concluded.¹²⁷ But on September 29, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson recorded the following memorandum of a conversation between the President, Ambassador Spruille Braden, and himself:

This evening Mr. Braden and I were received by the President. We explained to the President that we were faced with the immediate issue whether to proceed with the Rio Conference or to move for its postponement. The Rio Conference was for the purpose of working out a treaty of mutual assistance between the various states of this hemisphere including Argentina. We had spent the afternoon conferring about the matter with Mr. Hull and the recommendation which Mr. Braden and I made, with Mr. Hull's approval, to the President was that we should move for the postponement of the conference. We felt that our position would be utterly compromised if we should sign a treaty with the Argentine government before the situation was cleared up or that Government changed. We also felt that to sign such a treaty would greatly weaken the forces in Argentina opposed to the Government. Mr. Braden reviewed the situation in Argentina for the President.¹²⁸

Secretary Byrnes, who was at the time attending the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, agreed to the postponement, and on October 1 the Brazilian Government was informed of the United States' determination not to sign a mutual defense

¹²⁶For documentation see Foreign Relations, 1945, I, pp. 712-25, 807-808, and 832-36. See also Morris, pp. 220-21.

¹²⁷For documentation on the proposed conference see Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 154-59.

¹²⁸Memorandum of conversation by the Acting Secretary of State, September 29, 1945, ibid., p. 159.

treaty with the regime in Argentina.¹²⁹ Two days later the decision was announced to the press. The State Department had made its decision to postpone the Rio Conference without consulting the other American Republics, and its representatives met with the Brazilian Chargé only to inform him of the United States position and to demand postponement.¹³⁰

The Acting Secretary of State, in announcing that the United States had requested the postponement of the Rio Conference, argued that Argentina had repudiated "a great many" of its obligations under the Final Act of Chapultepec "such as control of enemy property and persons, observing democratic principles, doing away with war restrictions, permitting freedom of speech and of the press, and the like."¹³¹

However, the decision to postpone the conference seems also to have been the result of more indirect factors. These influences reflected the ambivalent position in which the United States found itself in the postwar world. It had committed itself to preserving and strengthening the inter-American system at the same time it was participating

¹²⁹Memorandum of conversation between the President, the Secretary of State, and Acheson, September 30, 1945, ibid., pp. 159-60.

¹³⁰Memorandum of conversation between the Acting Chargé d'Affaires of Brazil, Braden, and Acheson, October 1, 1945, ibid., pp. 160-61.

¹³¹New York Times, Oct. 4, 1945, p. 1. See also Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to diplomatic representatives, October 3, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 417.

in the development of a world organization calculated to preserve the peace. In this connection the timing of the new offensive against Argentina seems significant, since its initiation coincided with the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. There the Soviet Foreign Minister severely criticized the United States for maintaining diplomatic relations and concluding agreements with the "Fascist or semi-Fascist" Government in Argentina while refusing a treaty with Rumania on the grounds that its government was not democratic.¹³² The Soviet criticism was repeated on September 27, 1945, ¹³³ two days before the State Department decided to postpone the inter-American Conference. If the United States were taking its stand on democracy and representative government in order to achieve objectives in Eastern Europe, it could hardly negotiate a treaty with a regime which it had publicly labelled as unrepresentative, undemocratic, and fascist.

The Department's decision to postpone the inter-American conference was very unpopular within the United States government. Formal protests against the postponement were lodged by Chairman Tom Connally (Democrat) of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and by Arthur H. Vandenberg,

¹³²United States Delegation Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London, September 21, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, II, pp. 291-96.

¹³³Memorandum of conversation by Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State, September 27, 1945, ibid., p. 427.

the ranking Republican on that committee. Both criticized the Department for having acted without consulting either their committee or the other American republics. Connally also objected that the measure was ill adapted to its ostensible purpose. He said that the Department could have administered a more effective rebuff by attending the conference and yet refusing to deal with the Argentine delegation.¹³⁴

Despite such criticism the Department persisted in stalling all attempts to have the inter-American conference convened. Responding in January, 1946 to a Brazilian attempt to convene the postponed conference with Argentine participation, the State Department held that Argentina should participate in the permanent Act of Chaultepec only if she complied with the other provisions of the Final Act of Mexico City.¹³⁵

In addition to postponing the inter-American conference, the State Department attempted other means of discrediting and isolating the Farrell regime. It proposed, for example,

¹³⁴ Congressional Record, 79th. Congress, 1st Session, XCI, pt. 8, pp. 9899-9908; Welles, Where Are We Heading? p. 225.

¹³⁵ Memorandum by Carl Spaeth, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for American Affairs (Braden), Jan. 11, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, p. 1. This State Department attitude could possibly have been an expression of a determination to hold Brazil in line in the face of reported Brazilian overtures to Argentina. See the Acting Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Secretary of State, October 3, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 480.

that Argentina be excluded from the signing of the Mutual Defence Pact by carrying on the discussions bilaterally.¹³⁶ This plan was not accepted by the Latin American republics and was discarded; however, the Department continued its efforts to secure collective hemispheric action against Argentina. In this connection, Secretary of State Byrnes enthusiastically endorsed an Uruguayan proposal calling for multilateral intervention in the affairs of states in cases of flagrant violations of human rights or non-fulfilment of freely contracted obligations.¹³⁷ In Byrnes' estimation

A unique opportunity is now presented to carry forward a principle of public law (derecho de gentes) which would be of enduring significance to the Americas. We would gladly follow the leadership of the Foreign Minister should he urge its acceptance by all of the governments as a basis for joint action in relation to the Farrell Government. We believe that an inter-American declaration at this time which asserted a joint concern with the protection of elementary human and civil rights by governments of this Hemisphere in relation to the Argentine situation would not only have an immediate impact on that situation, but would have significant implications outside the Hemisphere.¹³⁸

But Byrnes' assumption "that the majority of the American republics, their peoples and governments, would accept and support the basic proposition as enunciated by the Minister," proved to be unfounded.

¹³⁶Memorandum of conversation between the Acting Chargé d'Affaires of Brazil, Braden, and the Acting Secretary of State (Acheson), October 1, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 160-61.

¹³⁷The Uruguayan Foreign Minister (Larreta) to the Secretary of State, November 21, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 190-96. The Uruguayan proposal came in response to a United States request for consultation on the Argentine situation. See correspondence in ibid., pp. 185-87.

¹³⁸Ibid., p. 187; See pp. 187-90 for further evidence of Byrnes' support.

Unqualified support for the Uruguayan proposal was forthcoming from only Venezuela and Guatemala, while the others were firmly opposed to any alteration of the principle of non-intervention.¹³⁹ Even in Uruguay a motion to censure the Foreign Minister for initiating the proposal was defeated by a vote of only sixteen to fifteen with the opposition focusing its attack on the fact that the initiative was inspired by the United States.

Simultaneously with the efforts to secure Latin American support for its policies towards Argentina, the State Department mounted other attacks on that country. In keeping with the domestic reconversion programme, the Foreign Economic Administration proposed a sweeping revision of the existing system of export controls. All commodities, except a limited number in short supply, were to be available under general license without value limitations. Argentina, however, was placed on a short list¹⁴⁰ of countries for which "existing export controls . . ." were to be "retained without modifications."¹⁴¹ However, the Department's attempt to maintain economic sanctions against Argentina was frustrated by two factors. In the first place, as the

¹³⁹For correspondence see ibid., pp. 188-221.

¹⁴⁰The list included, in addition, Austria, Caroline Islands, Italy, Marcus Islands, Marianas Islands, Marshall Islands, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, all of which had been active allies or dependencies of the axis powers.

¹⁴¹The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Braden), September 7, 1945, ibid., pp. 548-49.

Department itself revealed, the end of hostilities and the consequent reductions in the military requirements had increased the available international supplies of petroleum and made it impossible and fruitless even to attempt restricting the shipment of petroleum to Argentina.¹⁴² Secondly, the British were not disposed to cooperate with the United States to the extent that the State Department desired.

Voicing its disagreement with the United States policy toward Argentina in Aide Memoires of October 12, and 23, 1945, the British Government reminded the United States of the vital importance to the United Kingdom and the liberated areas of Europe of Argentine food supplies.¹⁴³ The British also accused the United States of interfering in Argentina's internal affairs¹⁴⁴ and failed to support the United States' embargo on the sale to Argentina of aviation equipment capable of military use. The British regarded as articles of a civilian character aero-engined and training and civil aircraft not suitable for combat.¹⁴⁵ The State Department was not prepared "to cut off its nose to spite its face" and decided, on November 21, 1945, that it would release

¹⁴²The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Argentina (Cabot), October 23, 1945, ibid., p. 553.

¹⁴³Argentina had resorted to the burning of wheat and other food grains to counter the United States embargo on fuel exports.

¹⁴⁴Aide Memoire, Department of State to the British Embassy, November 15, 1945, ibid., pp. 555-57.

¹⁴⁵The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, February 13, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, p. 207.

civilian-type aviation equipment to Argentina. Although it attached the rider that "equipment will be used exclusively for civilian use in the development of private and commercial civil aviation," the State Department had already conceded that it could not prevent the Argentine government and its armed forces from converting the aviation equipment to military purposes.¹⁴⁶

In addition to postponing the inter-American conference, seeking British and Latin American support, and maintaining economic restrictions, the State Department applied increased pressure against remaining Nazi influence in Argentina. It requested that the Argentine government "immediately take special precautions for safe custody pending departure on Highland Monarch of four leading Nazis, Becker, Harnish, Freude, and Utzinger."¹⁴⁷

It would appear that in making the request the Department was seeking more than Argentine compliance with its inter-American commitments. This is suggested by the inclusion of Ludwig Freude among the "leading Nazis." In including Freude the Department may have selected deliberately an individual known to be playing a leading role

¹⁴⁶The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Argentina (Cabot), November 21, 1945, ibid., 1945, IX, p. 557.

¹⁴⁷Secretary of State to the Chargé in Argentina (Cabot), January 26, 1946, Foreign Relations 1946, XI, 192-93.

in Argentina's economic programme ¹⁴⁸ and was thus striking at one of the props by which the Argentine government frustrated United States attempts to promote liberal trading practices. There is, of course, the additional possibility that the Department, in presenting conditions which the Argentine government would find impossible to meet, was attempting to justify its predetermined tough policy.

Finally as the ultimate weapon against the Farrell regime, the State Department gathered and published, in the so-called "Blue Book" on Argentina, ¹⁴⁹ evidence that purported to show that the Perón-controlled Argentine government was fascist and totalitarian and had actively collaborated with the enemy during the war. ¹⁵⁰ The "Blue Book" was published ostensibly as the United States contribution to the inter-American consultation on the Argentine

¹⁴⁸For a discussion of Freude's role in Argentina's economic programme see Blanksten, p. 404, and Alexander, p. 213; Ambassador Messersmith subsequently revealed that neither the United States nor the British had any evidence of Freude's "having engaged in espionage activity or of having had contact with espionage agents. . . ." "On the other hand," Messersmith disclosed, "Ludwig Freude has played a constructive role in the Argentine economy and was one of the few Argentine citizens with money who had aided the campaign of President Perón." Ludwig Freude though born in Germany was a naturalized Argentine citizen who had lived in Argentina for decades. See the Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, October 30, 1946, Foreign Relations 1946, XI, pp. 327-28.

¹⁴⁹U.S. Department of State, Consultation among the American Republics with respect to the Argentine Situation (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946).

¹⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 1-85.

situation. There is a ring of truth about the information contained in the "Blue Book," and it could thus be considered cause for consultation among the American republics.

However, the timing and the method of publicizing the "Blue Book" indicate that the State Department was attempting to influence the Argentine election in favour of the opposition forces.

It will be recalled that in July, 1945 President Farrell had announced the holding of elections "before the end of the year." In November the President decreed that balloting would take place on February 24, 1946. The ban on political parties had been lifted in October, 1945 and the campaign was proceeding actively with Juan Perón as a declared candidate for the presidency. The political situation in Argentina was tense. The state of siege was still in effect after being reimposed in September 1945, and the opposition candidates, Dr. José P. Tamborini, a physician, and Dr. Enrique P. Mosca, a lawyer, were constantly harrassed by Perón's supporters with the acquiescence of the Argentine police.¹⁵¹ But the opposition forces were not just sitting ducks. As the United States Chargé reported, "possibility of early revolutionary movement appears steadily increasing." According to the Chargé, civilians were "known to be organizing" and arms were "being ever more widely distributed

¹⁵¹Greenup, pp. 147-48.

among democratic civilians."¹⁵²

At this juncture and after feverish efforts to gather the necessary information,¹⁵³ the State Department published its "Blue Book" on Argentina. The "Blue Book" did contain evidence that the Farrell regime had dallied with the Axis powers and refused to liquidate all of the "Axis" firms, thus making the Argentine situation a legitimate object of inter-American consultation. However, its circulation two weeks prior to the Argentine election and immediate distribution to the press, signal an obvious attempt to influence the Argentine election in favour of the opposition forces. Furthermore, other United States actions at the time seem to have been directed towards influencing the election. For example, earlier, in refusing to conclude a mutual defence pact that would include Argentina, the State Department cited as one of the reasons for the refusal that signing such a treaty "would greatly weaken the forces in Argentina opposed to the government."¹⁵⁴

¹⁵²Chargé in Argentina (Cabot) to the Secretary of State, January 25, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, pp. 190-91.

¹⁵³When the Secretary of State instructed the Chargé in Argentina to find evidence incriminating the Farrell regime, the Chargé was informed that "Prep[aration] Arg[entine] case is regarded as most urgent and imp[ortan]t undertaking confronting this Government in Hemisphere today." See the Secretary of State to the Chargé in Argentina, December 7, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 492.

¹⁵⁴Memorandum of conversation between President Truman, Acheson, and Braden, September 29, 1945, ibid., p. 159.

In the programme it followed towards Argentina in 1945 and early 1946, the State Department was attempting to obtain adequate performance from Argentina on her inter-American commitments to eliminate Axis interests and influence in Argentina. The Department was also striking at the base of the Argentine economic policies which ran counter to United States desires to promote liberal trading practices. In addition, the Department was trying to obtain an Argentine government more in keeping with United States political ideals.

However, the State Department did not establish any new criteria for dealing with the Argentine situation but was operating within the framework established at the Mexico City Conference and endorsed by the Farrell regime when it adhered to the Final Act of the Mexico City Conference and the resolutions to support democracy, eliminate Axis interest and influence, and promote liberal trading practices.

Evidence that the State Department was operating within that framework is supplied by the Department's attitude toward policies that would apply to the entire Latin American area. For example, in continuing to refuse to sign a mutual defence pact with Argentina, the Department contended that it was seeking "real solidarity" of all the twenty-one republics. The State Department apparently aimed to actualize the democratic principles included in the Declaration of Mexico.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ See above p. 97.

As Assistant Secretary Braden described the United States objective, "we now enjoy the friendship of the Argentine people that we have not had in generations. . . . Were we to sign the proposed treaty with [the] Argentine government we would lose this friendship and together with it the friendship and respect of those genuinely democratic elements throughout the rest of Latin America who are our only true friends and only real guarantee for the future."¹⁵⁶ Similar concerns seem to have motivated Secretary of State Byrnes when he endorsed an Uruguayan proposal calling for multilateral intervention in the internal affairs of States in cases of flagrant violations of human rights or non-fulfilment of freely contracted obligations.¹⁵⁷ The State Department was seeking, according to Adolf Berle,¹⁵⁸ to develop the positive elements of the Good Neighbour Policy of which nonintervention was merely the first phase and which included the acceptance by all governments of certain fundamental democratic principles.¹⁵⁹

More concrete evidence existed that the State Department was inclined to promote democratic principles in Latin America. For example, Ambassador Berle in Brazil had forced

¹⁵⁶Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs (Braden), January 26, 1946, in Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, pp. 2-3.

¹⁵⁷For an account of the Uruguayan proposal and Byrnes' response see Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 187-206, passim.

¹⁵⁸Adolf Berle, Ambassador to Brazil and former Assistant Secretary of State.

¹⁵⁹Cited in Schlesinger, "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors," pp. 164-72.

President Vargas to agree to hold elections on schedule when the President indicated his intentions to perpetuate his regime. Further, the United States had granted reasonably early recognition to the Venezuelan and Guatemalan revolutionary governments when dictators in both countries had been overthrown, although the recognition came only after the revolutionary juntas had been recognized by the other Latin American countries and after they had indicated their intention of respecting United States economic interests.

In addition to seeking to base the hemisphere system on democratic principles, the State Department seemed to be attempting improvement of the procedure for arriving at inter-American decisions and for achieving inter-American objectives. In contrast to previous Pan-American practice which emphasized the unanimity rule, the State Department was endeavouring to introduce the simple majority principle. The State Department argued that "mere postponement of the [inter-American] conference in order to avoid embarrassment of decision with regard to Perón government" would fall far short of the needs of the situation and responsibility of the inter-American system. This responsibility, the argument continued, demanded that decisive steps be taken as proof to the United Nations that the regional system could function. Possibly to effect the isolation of the Argentine regime and effect the necessary changes in the inter-American system, the State Department urged that the inter-American conference be convened without Argentina and that republics represented

proceed with the signing of the Mutual Assistance Pact. The State Department argued that the exclusion of Argentina could be justified on the grounds that the latter "aided and continued to protect our enemies."¹⁶⁰

The State Department erred in its estimate of the response of the Latin American republics. In its endeavours to have the inter-American conference convened without Argentina the State Department failed to secure the support of the Latin American governments; for, on March 13, 1946, a majority of those governments voted to postpone the conference, and the United States representatives were constrained to accept the decision.¹⁶¹ Nor did the American republics accept the Department's evaluation of the evidence contained in the "Blue Book." Bolivia announced that she would maintain "cordial" relations with Perón. Brazil announced that she would also continue "friendly relations with Argentina" and urged that any hemisphere mutual assistance pact include all the American States. Chile requested the Argentine viewpoint, and the Mexican government saw no threat to international peace and hemisphere solidarity in Perón's regime. Peru believed that Perón's government "deserved consideration" on the basis of free elections, and Venezuela saw no reason why Argentina should be singled out from other

¹⁶⁰Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for American Republics Affairs (Braden), January 26, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, p. 3.

¹⁶¹The Assistant Secretary of State for American Republics Affairs (Braden), March 13, 1946, ibid., p. 7.

non-democratic regimes.¹⁶²

The State Department not only failed to secure Latin American support for the desired improvements in the inter-American system and for the promotion of democracy in the American republics, it also failed to achieve its specific Argentine objectives. On the matter of Argentine's inter-American commitments, the Farrell regime liquidated most, but not all, of the firms that the State Department considered Axis spearheads. And in spite of many deportations, the Axis agents whom the State Department considered most important remained at large in Argentina.¹⁶³ The efforts to influence the Argentine election were even less successful. At the end of the incident-free balloting, which drew praise from the most hardened Argentine critics of the Perón-Farrell regime, the Argentine people had given Juan Perón an overwhelming electoral victory and the United States the worst diplomatic defeat it ever received in the Western Hemisphere.

¹⁶² See Memoranda from United States Ambassadors in American republics to the Secretary of State, ibid., pp. 8-9, 219-28, passim; see also New York Times, April 8, 1946, p. 4, April 5, p. 12, April 7, p. 20, March 22, p. 2.

¹⁶³ See Alexander, p. 213; see also Memoranda from the Chargé in Argentina to the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, pp. 200-201, 241-44. Note particularly the memorandum by the Special Assistant (Spaeth) to the Assistant Secretary of State for American Republics Affairs (Braden), April 24, 1946, Foreign Relations 1946, XI, p. 247, in which it was claimed that Argentina's performance was much less than adequate.

CHAPTER IV

COERCION YIELDS TO COOPERATION

MARCH, 1946 - SEPTEMBER, 1947

In spite of the results of the Argentine election and regardless of Argentine overtures, throughout the remainder of 1946 the State Department refused to call an end to the prolonged quarrel between the two countries. The State Department modified the policy it had maintained since the previous August to the extent of appointing George S. Messersmith, a veteran diplomat and recent Ambassador to Mexico, as the Ambassador to Argentina. The Department also recognized the futility of attempting to reimpose economic sanctions on Argentina.¹ But in the face of Argentine determination to make no more than token concessions, the State Department continued to maintain a tough stance on the question of signing a Mutual Defence Treaty with Argentina and refused to treat Argentina as it treated the other Latin American countries. Assistant Secretary Braden stated the Department's position as follows:

We will accept the verdict of the elections but continue to stand on our principles that we cannot and will not sign the Rio Treaty with the same elements who have

¹See Peterson, p. 454.

played a leading role in the Farrell-Perón regime which has had such complicity with the enemy.²

This position was subjected to attack from various quarters, two of which were particularly persistent. Vehement dissent came from the new United States Ambassador to Argentina who firmly believed that the Perón government was making a genuine effort to fulfil its inter-American commitments. Secondly, the United States Departments of Army and Navy sought to overcome the State Department's opposition to signing the Mutual Defence Pact and delivering arms to the Latin American countries.

However, Braden possessed an unshakable conviction that he could achieve a uniform and favourable Latin American response to United States aims. Further, he feared that yielding to Argentina would start a chain reaction against United States dominance in the Western Hemisphere. Because of Braden's conviction and his fears and possibly because of the conflict between United States post-war objectives and its commitments to Latin America, the State Department continued to stress the threat to Hemisphere security posed by the Germans in Argentina and to demand extirpation of Axis influence in Argentina as a prerequisite for the restoration of normal relations. Not only did the State Department refuse to approve a Mutual Defence Pact with

²The Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith), March 8, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, p. 233; See also Arthur P. Whitaker, "Blue Book Blues," Current History, X (April, 1946), pp. 289-97.

Argentina, but on other points at issue between the two countries, the State Department made concessions only under duress.

II

Following the election of President Juan Perón, the Argentine government showed itself even more tardy than previously in meeting its inter-American commitments. Rather than expedite action against persons accused of Axis activity, the Argentine government relied on the normal processes of the slow moving and inefficient Argentine judicial system.

In addition to dragging its feet on eliminating Axis influence in Argentina, the Perón government also seemed inclined to renege on other inter-American commitments which had not previously been questioned. For instance, after Perón's inauguration on June 4, 1946, he expressed the opinion that

. . . it is necessary to keep in mind that when international decisions exceed the general framework of the constitutional provisions, the people can choose between not validating the excesses which have been incurred or resorting to the reform of the constitution. And on this delicate point -- where the new-world conceptions of political and economic organization for the future, resting on the Acts of Mexico and San Francisco, converge or conflict with the traditional manner as established in our Great Charter -- I will need the intelligence and the patriotism of the Honourable members of Congress in order to establish the certain definition of what best suits the Republic.³

³Cited in Paz and Ferrari, pp. 139-40.

Perón had referred the Mexico City and San Francisco agreements to the Argentine Congress for its consideration. Since this was done without specific recommendation it was obviously a delaying tactic.

Nor had the repressive nature and policies of the Argentine regime which had poisoned relations between Argentina and the United States in 1945 and earlier altered in the least except perhaps to become more intense. Perón was seeking to consolidate his power in Argentina by setting strict controls over all the organizations which had sparked the recent electoral opposition, and, by the beginning of 1947, had already issued decrees giving the regime complete power and control of the economic life of the nation.

Furthermore, observers then and later found that Perón was becoming much more aggressive in his use of Argentine economic and political power to create a South American bloc which would be inherently hostile to the United States.⁴ For instance, President Perón embarked upon a series of personal visits to Argentina's neighbours and concluded economic agreements which frequently led to

⁴Virginia Prewett, "Colonel Perón's New Order," The Nation, CLXII (June 8, 1946), pp. 685-86; see also Norman McKenzie, "Perón Plays Poker," The New Statesman and Nation, XXXI (June 29, 1946), p. 466; Blanksten, pp. 211, 215-16; Frank Kluckhorn, "Food and Political Pressure Used to Line Up Neighbouring States of South America," New York Times, May 5, 1946, IV, p. E5; Lisandro Montes, "Latin American Bloc," Free World, XII (December 1946), pp. 35-36; Whitaker, The United States and Argentina, pp. 150-52, 158-61, describes how Perón tamed the Supreme Court, the universities, and the press.

unflattering comparison with the United States.⁵ Perón also sought to exploit the conflict then developing between the United States and the Soviet Union to Argentina's advantage.⁶

Thus following the Argentine election the situation confronting State Department personnel responsible for United States policies towards Argentina had not improved. Nor had the State Department's attitude towards the new regime, an attitude that was still determined by Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden.

The State Department quickly indicated the posture that it would adopt towards the new Argentine regime. On March 25, the State Department responded to overtures from the Argentine government seeking "military information and data" in words to the effect that "we shall continue to refuse all assistance which would tend (to) strengthen the Argentine armed forces" and refused to accept a military mission from Argentina.⁷ In the same vein, the Department, on April 1, reiterated the justification for the publication of the

⁵For example President Hertzog of Bolivia remarked of one such agreement between Argentina and Bolivia that, "thanks to the recent agreement with Argentina, Bolivia has obtained better prices for our tin. . . .It is to be hoped the great nation to the north will grant legitimate equitable prices for tin." See New York Times, March 11, 1946,

⁶Prewett, pp. 685-86; McKenzie, "Perón Plays Poker," p. 466.

⁷The Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Chargé in Argentina (Cabot), March 25, 1946, Foreign Relations 1946, XI, p. 238.

"Blue Book" and expressed the hope that the newly elected government would give "prompt implementation by positive acts to its solemn commitments under the inter-American System, in particular those undertaken in [the] Final Act of [the] Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace."

The desired "positive acts" included "the elimination from this hemisphere of Axis influences which have threatened the security of the inter-American system."⁸ An illustration of the State Department's conception of this threatening Axis influence was given by Spruille Braden in an article entitled "The Germans in Argentina" in which he "exposed" a "German conspiracy to convert South America into a German colony through economic and ideological penetration." In this article Braden claimed that vast amounts of German capital, coupled with German technical and managerial skills in Argentina, constituted a dangerous threat to the security of the inter-American system, and he even saw the possibility of atomic weapons being developed in Argentina. In Braden's view the continued survival of the United States and the Western Hemisphere demanded the "eradication of both the will to kill and the means -- both the ideology that requires military action, and the machinery and materials for making

⁸The Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics except Argentina and Haiti, April 1, 1946, *ibid.*, pp. 10-12 and 246. See also Department of State, Bulletin, XIV (April 21, 1946), 666-67.

the weapons of war." Braden argued that Argentina was under "the bare dictatorship of uniformed men who drank at the same fountain where drank Hitler, Franco and Mussolini" and thus constituted a threat to inter-American peace and security.⁹ Until Argentina had rid itself of what Braden considered its unhealthy attitude, the United States refused to negotiate a mutual assistance pact that would include Argentina.¹⁰

This State Department position first came under attack from the newly appointed Ambassador to Argentina. Ambassador Messersmith, who had for many months advocated a conciliatory approach to Argentina,¹¹ began to wage a vigorous campaign for its readmission to the inter-American fold and for the further strengthening of the inter-American system.¹² For example, while Assistant Secretary Braden was prepared to sacrifice hemisphere solidarity in his efforts to coerce Argentina, or as he claimed, to build "real solidarity," Ambassador Messersmith argued that:

⁹See Spruille Braden, "The Germans in Argentina," The Atlantic Monthly, CLXXVII (April, 1946), pp. 37-43.

¹⁰The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Brazil (Daniels), May 10, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, pp. 21-23.

¹¹See Kolko, pp. 459-60.

¹²It is claimed that the new Ambassador "had explicit instructions to take a conciliatory attitude toward Perón and thereby to persuade the new President to complete the anti-Axis 'housecleaning' so that the Rio Conference could proceed." See Green, "The Cold War Comes to Latin America," p. 171. Professor Green cites unpublished Messersmith Manuscripts.

We cannot conceive of such close collaboration on the proper and effective scope unless the whole-hearted collaboration of the Argentine as of every other American republic is included in that picture. . . . I believe that the Argentine Government and people are prepared for this more than they have been at any time in a century.

Whereas the Ambassador was not prepared to make gratuitous concessions to the Argentine regime, he was prepared to give it credit for efforts to meet its inter-American commitments. Messersmith argued that while Argentina had substantially eliminated enemy property and controlled enemy aliens and Axis institutions, the United States only emphasized what remained to be done. Messersmith decried the idea that Perón was interested in the formation of a hostile southern bloc and suggested that the best way to eliminate the idea of a southern alliance was to carry through the defence pact.¹³

Messersmith continued to report favourably on the Argentine attempts to meet its inter-American commitments.¹⁴ On June 25, he contended that he was "completely convinced of the good faith of the Argentine government" in its attempts to control enemy property, aliens and institutions, and concluded: "There is no doubt that in the United States under similar circumstances we would have done exactly the same that the government here has done on return to constitutional procedures." In Messersmith's opinion the

¹³The Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, June 15, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, pp. 255-58.

¹⁴The Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, June 24, 1946, ibid., pp. 263-65.

Argentine Government, by releasing under surveillance some forty aliens arrested during the state of siege and held without trial, was removing itself from a constitutionally untenable position into which it had been pushed by the United States.¹⁵ He also argued that "perfect performance" could not be expected and that it was not within the province of the United States "to lay before Argentina a blue print of what must be done."

In response to Messersmith's arguments and a special Argentine Mission, headed by General Von der Becke, which sought to improve relations between the United States and Argentina, the State Department maintained that compliance with Argentina's inter-American commitments must precede the negotiation of a mutual assistance pact. The Department accepted an unfavourable evaluation of the von der Becke mission propounded by Brig. General C. H. Caldwell, Military and Air Attache at Buenos Aires. In Caldwell's opinion, the mission was an attempt by Perón to capitalize on von der Becke's popularity with the Argentine Army, his professional reputation and his aloofness from politics, in order to overcome opposition within Army and press circles to inter-American military collaboration.¹⁶ On the basis of the Caldwell opinion and von der Becke's

¹⁵The Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, June 25, 1946, ibid., pp. 265-67.

¹⁶Memorandum by Military and Air Attache at Buenos Aires (Caldwell), May 27, 1946, ibid., p. 249.

statements, the State Department concluded that the Argentine government was very eager to have the Mutual Defense Pact negotiated: As Dean Acheson stated the Department's position:

It seemed evident from von der Becke's insistence on need for court procedure in all cases, which he admitted might take '2 or 3 years,' and his agreement that hemisphere defense could not be so delayed, that Argentine Government is endeavouring to have United States abandon insistence on effective compliance, leaving it entirely to Argentine courts what action shall be taken, while at the same time proceeding with negotiation of Rio Treaty. It seemed evident also that von der Becke (and therefore perhaps Argentine Government) is desperately anxious to reach agreement with the United States on defense and especially if it can do so without real compliance.¹⁷

The Department stood firm on its position as enunciated by Secretary of State Byrnes on April 8, 1946, that, "there must be deeds and not merely promises," before it would sign a military treaty and deliver arms to Argentina.¹⁸ The Argentine government should proceed expeditiously against alleged Nazis like Ludwig Freude.

As a result of the State Department's intransigence, Ambassador Messersmith concluded that a serious misunderstanding existed between him and the State Department over

¹⁷The Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith), June 19, 1946, ibid., p. 260.

¹⁸Memorandum on the Argentine Situation by the Assistant Secretary for American Republics Affairs (Braden), July, 1946, ibid., p. 270. See also the Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith), September 25, 1946, ibid., pp. 311-16, and the Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, October 15, 1946, ibid., pp. 325-27.

United States' policy toward Argentina and in November, 1946 he appealed for support to President Truman.¹⁹ The dispute would not be resolved until 1947.²⁰

Ambassador Messersmith's attack on its policy was not the only one that the State Department endured. The War and Navy Departments, while conceding that military defense of the hemisphere was only one aspect of the United States foreign relations and that the Department of State had responsibility for setting political-military goals, were committed to standardization of military equipment and procedures throughout the hemisphere. In December, 1945, Secretary of War Patterson objected to United States failure in implementing a Military Assistance programme²¹ for Latin America intended to attain the goal. He was particularly concerned that British Vickers-Armstrong was offering all types of combatant vessels with equipment at scrap value prices, and presumably instruction and experts, to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru.²²

The State, Navy and War Departments agreed that the pre-war provision to Latin American armies of European

¹⁹The Ambassador in Argentina (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State, November 19, 1946, ibid., pp. 333-35.

²⁰See below pp. 164-65.

²¹See proposals on the Military Assistance Programme in U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, XII (May 19, 1945), pp. 859-60, 1001-1002.

²²The Secretary of War (Patterson) to the Secretary of State, December 17, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, pp. 258-60.

training and equipment had led not only to a diversity of standards, procedures and material, but to what was far worse, the indoctrination of important elements of the armed forces with alien ideologies "espoused by the aggressor nations." The Departments felt the cooperative defense of the Western Hemisphere had thus been threatened and they urged close military collaboration among the American Republics.²³

The State, War and Navy Departments were, in effect, endorsing the consensus arrived at by the representatives of the United States and nineteen other American republics at the Mexico City Conference that the advances in the defensive military interaction made during the war should be preserved and extended.²⁴ The delegates had resolved that the governments consider creating a permanent agency, formed of representatives of the General Staffs of the American republics, to propose measures for better military cooperation in defense of the Western Hemisphere. The resolution also provided for the continued operation of the inter-American Defense Board pending the establishment of the permanent body.²⁵ Pursuant to this resolution the inter-American Defense Board proposed that the wartime development

²³Statement by State, War and Navy Departments, July 7, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX, p. 251.

²⁴Mecham, p. 298.

²⁵Ibid.

of hemisphere telecommunications be continued. The Board also recommended that military equipment and training organization and procedures be standardized and human resources be adequately utilized through measures such as compulsory military service.²⁶ Attempting to implement these recommendations the Secretaries of War and Navy gave strong support to a bill entitled the Inter-American Military Cooperation Act presented to Congress by President Truman on May 6, 1946,²⁷ which would authorize arms supply programmes for Latin American governments including Argentina.

Initially lukewarm in its support of the "Arms Standardization" Bill, the State Department had completely withdrawn its support by the end of 1946. As Assistant Secretary of State Braden stated,

The conditions under which the Department agreed to support H.R. 6326 last spring have changed. . . To proceed with this program would be disastrous to our inter-American relations.²⁸

Moreover, the State Department strongly opposed efforts of the Army and Navy Departments to obtain control over military export authorization procedures. It successfully forbade the delivery of airplanes to Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican

²⁶ See Mecham, p. 294; Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 197.

²⁷ U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, Hearings, House of Representatives, 80th Congress, 1st. Session, 1946, pp. 1-39.

²⁸ Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State Braden to the Secretary of State, December 16, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, p. 110.

Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, or Paraguay.²⁹

In its approach to the "Arms Standardization" Bill and the Army and Navy proposals to supply airplanes to the Latin American countries, the State Department seems to have been again endeavouring to broaden the basis of its dealings with Latin America and to build its policy on respect for democracy. The Under Secretary of State opposed the supply of war planes for the following reasons:

I should like to emphasize again the question of issue relates to the longrange political objectives of the United States in Latin America. Were bombing planes, provided by this government, to be used destructively in an international disputes, or in the course of internal political disturbances I am confident the United States would lose much of the support and friendship of those people of Latin America who are devoted to the cause of peace and stable democratic government. In the long run we must in large measure rely upon the support of those groups if our position of leadership among the American republics is to be maintained and strengthened.³⁰

And Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden cited as one of the reasons for opposing the Military Assistance Program to Latin America that it would "strengthen those Latin American forces -- reactionary military groups -- which are antagonistic to the purposes and interests of the United States."³¹ A similar position was taken by the

²⁹The Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) to the Acting Secretary of War (Royall), January 9, 1946, ibid., p. 88.

³⁰Under Secretary of State to Acting Secretary of War, January 4, 1946, ibid., p. 86.

³¹Memo by Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) to the Secretary of State, December 16, 1946, ibid., p. 109.

Ambassador to Brazil, Adolf Berle, who argued that the policy of nonintervention was merely the first phase in the unfolding of the Good Neighbour policy. According to Berle, the further development of the Good Neighbour policy would include inter-American guarantees against aggression, from within or without the hemisphere, as well as an economic policy that would raise standards of living. The new Good Neighbour policy also presumed the acceptance by all governments of certain fundamental rights, especially freedom of expression and communication. In Berle's estimation, when these principles emerged, they would create a real inter-Americanism based on a community of confidence, not just among governments but among the people of the hemisphere.³²

Concern for the growth of democracy in Latin America was laudable but based on narrow premises. As one well-known historian wrote of the Braden policy toward Argentina, "the most serious criticism of Braden concerns not his diplomatic fumbling but his apparent failure to understand that democracy is more than establishing civil rights and throwing out Nazis, Communists, and (in other Latin American countries) Argentines . . . Braden's concentration on totalitarian penetration has made people overlook the question of why the penetration has been so successful." In Schlesinger's estimation, Peronism arose not from foreign agents but from

³²Cited in Schlesinger, "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors," pp. 164-72.

the profound internal stirrings in Argentina. The way to combat it was to adopt measures to deal with the economic unrest in Argentina.³³ It was in this respect that Braden's policy was weakest.

Beyond any idealistic motivation, immediate political factors influenced United States unwillingness to supply arms to Latin America. The British government exhibited hostility to United States' attempts to monopolize the sale of arms to Latin America and undermine the traditional British predominance in supplying the naval requirements of the Latin American countries. Britain threatened to sabotage the "Gentlemen's Agreement" under which they had agreed not to supply arms to Argentina. Further, it saw the United States "Arms Standardization" Bill as an attempt to circumvent the proposed international agreement with regard to the traffic

³³Schlesinger, "Good Fences Make Good Neighbours," pp. 164-72. Even more caustic comments were made by Carleton Beals who declared: "Nothing, it seems to me, in the records of American diplomacy . . . stinks quite so badly as has our Braden policy toward Argentina. . . .It has not been a policy at all in any true sense of the word. It was directed only at the Argentine government, while we were abetting some of the most intolerable tyrannies ever at large in the Americas. Actually it was the false use of the word 'democracy' to attempt to secure unfair advantages, not for the American people but for certain privileged interests; and above all it was an attempt, in conjunction with Argentine federal and big business elements, to block a movement attempting to improve the welfare of the Argentine people, establish social justice, create a free Argentina, and liberate its economy from foreign imperialism." Cited in Manross, pp. 52-53. See also Hubert C. Herring, "Can We Run Argentina?" Harpers Magazine, CXCI (October, 1946), pp. 298-305; Lewis Hanke, "Friendship Now With Latin America," Virginia Quarterly, XXII (1946), pp. 498-518; Shiras Morris, Jr., "Argentina--Too Big to Spank," Arizona Quarterly, III

in arms.³⁴ The State Department's spokesmen assured the British that the United States' primary objective was to eliminate an arms race in Latin America, that it had absolutely no intention of supplying arms to Argentina and that the United States was firmly committed to an international arms limitation agreement.³⁵ A Mutual Defense Pact with Argentina and arms delivered under that pact would be incompatible with such firm commitments.

Even more significant than British hostility as a factor impeding a Mutual Defense Pact was the United States role in world affairs. As Braden himself states, "the United States had taken a leading role in seeking the adoption by the United Nations of a disarmament program."³⁶ The United States could hardly deliver arms to Argentina in such circumstances; and later arms supply to Latin American

(Autumn, 1947), pp. 250-60; A. P. Whitaker, "Blue Book Blues," Current History, X (April, 1946), pp. 289-97, and Dana Munro, "Good Neighbour Policy re-examined," New York Times Magazine, April 28, 1946, pp. 10 and 43, for more hostile criticism of the Braden policy towards Argentina.

³⁴ Aide-Memoire, The British Embassy to the Department of State, July 16, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, pp. 278-79.

³⁵ Memorandum of conversation by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson), July 18, 1946, ibid., pp. 280-82, 307-309. Under the "Gentleman's Agreement" Britain, Canada, and Sweden had all agreed to support the United States embargo on arms sales to Argentina. There was no guarantee that those countries would respect United States desire to standardize arms in Latin America.

³⁶ Assistant Secretary of State Braden to the Secretary of State, December 16, 1946, ibid., p. 108. For the United States stand on disarmament see U.S. Department of State, Bulletin XV (November, 1946), pp. 934, 1084-85, 1137-42.

countries was consistently in terms of hemispheric defense
 allowed under the United Nations Charter.³⁷ Moreover,
 throughout most of 1946, the United States sought to reduce
 Soviet influence in Eastern Europe through demands for free
 elections, nonrecognition, and loans, "the most viable
 diplomatic lever in an area in which the United States had
 minimal influence,"³⁸ While there is no definitive link
 between the Argentine and Eastern European situations the
 United States would not likely lay itself open to the
 charge of maintaining double standards in the defense of
 democracy.

Finally, there is no doubt that the State Department
 was convinced that concessions to Argentina would seriously
 undermine the United States position of leadership in the
 Western Hemisphere. Braden stated this view as follows:

There is both a long term and an immediate Argentine
 problem. The essence of the long-term problem is that
 Argentine Governments have long aspired to create and
 control an anti-United States bloc of Latin American
 states and to become the dominant power in South America.
 Perón's aim already partially accomplished, of forming
 a totalitarian-type state, with almost absolute power in
 his hands increases the danger which this traditional
 Argentine policy represents to the inter-American system.

³⁷ Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Moscow
 (Harriman), December 21, 1945, Foreign Relations, 1945, IX,
 p. 263; see also Secretary of State to Diplomatic
 Representatives in Caserta, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Moscow,
 Paris, and Stockholm, March 21, 1946, Foreign Relations,
 1946, XI, p. 96.

³⁸ Thomas G. Patterson, review of Papers Relating to
 the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, VI,
American Historical Review LXXV (June, 1970), p. 1549. See
 also Foreign Relations, 1946, VI, pp. 9-11, 13, 22-31, 35-38,
 47-48, 57-59, 6 -64, 110-11, 166-67, 178-241.

In Braden's opinion it was only by continuing to stand for the principle "that agreements must be honored by performance," and by continuing to identify itself with economic progress, democracy, and liberty, rather than with opportunism and totalitarianism, could the United States "demonstrate the vitality and utility of democracy and lay the foundations for a sound and enduring solidarity of governments and peoples." If the tough policy were abandoned, Braden argued, it would be interpreted by neighbour states as proof of United States vacillation, weakness and defeat and Argentine success in violating her agreements while forcing acquiescence to the military pact. It would encourage the Argentine Government "to continue to demand tribute under the threat of associating itself with a European power," and "to proceed with its current National-Socialist program with all the attendant dangers for United States capital investments and influence." If the United States adopted a policy of appeasement it would lose "political prestige and moral influence throughout the hemisphere." Braden was convinced that "the almost desperate desire of the Argentine armed forces for modern equipment and material will induce 'the deeds' which we have been requesting since 1942."³⁹ These concepts formed the basis for United States policy towards Argentina to the end of 1946. But new forces were added to

³⁹Memorandum on the Argentine situation by the Assistant Secretary of State (Braden), July 12, 1946, Foreign Relations, 1946, XI, pp. 270-78.

those applied by Ambassador Messersmith, and the Departments of Army and Navy and would finally erode the State Department's position in 1947.

III

Although in early 1947, the State Department's rhetoric toward Argentina was maintained consistently, and the Perón regime only superficially conformed with the United States demands, the two not only participated in an inter-American conference in August, but also concluded, on September 2, a Mutual Defense Pact.

The Department's about-face on Argentina seems to have been the result of intensified pressure from Messersmith and the Departments of Navy and War, and also criticism, present though muted in 1946 and openly expressed in 1947, by leaders of Congress. Pressure by the Latin American countries to convene the inter-American conference had additional effect. However, the most important factors contributing to the Department's decision seem to have been concurrent recognition that the "one world" concept was illusory and desire to secure the Western Hemisphere against a threat from international communism. The decision to restore normal relations with Argentina cannot be considered to have been the result of that country's compliance with what the State Department considered its inter-American commitments.

The Perón regime did go through the motions of compliance with the State Department's demand that Axis interest and influence in Argentina be eliminated. For example, in January, 1947 it purchased sixty concerns once owned by Axis nationals.⁴⁰ But this action went no further than those which Braden had persistently designated as merely evidence of Argentine insincerity.

It is true, as Argentine Foreign Minister Juan Atilio Bramuglia announced, that eight more Nazi agents (making a total of sixty agents) had been deported aboard an Argentine liner to Belgium and that Argentina consequently considered that she had satisfied all her hemisphere obligations.⁴¹ But this step can hardly be regarded as compliance with the inter-American commitments since the deportees were not of the group named as major agents in the State Department's "Blue Book" on Argentina. Moreover, a number of prominent Germans who had done significant work for Hitler had found refuge in Argentina.⁴²

Despite this failure to comply with United States demands, Assistant Secretary Braden's policy was facing stronger opposition as the idea of an Axis threat to the hemisphere became more and more outmoded.

⁴⁰ New York Times, Jan. 25, 1947, p. 7.

⁴¹ Ibid., May 24, p. 6.

⁴² Blanksten, p. 402; see also Alexander, p. 213.

The first challenge came from Ambassador Messersmith who, it will be recalled, in November, 1946, had demanded a showdown with the State Department. That confrontation took place on January 2, 1947, when Secretary of State Byrnes and Assistant Secretary Braden met with the Ambassador who had been recalled from Buenos Aires for consultation. At issue were the questions of the supply of United States arms to Argentina, the convening of the inter-American conference, and a defence scheme for the hemisphere. There was general agreement that the basis for the State Department's Argentine policy was, as reestablished by Secretary Byrnes in April, 1946, that Argentina should fulfil her inter-American commitments and rid herself of Nazi influences. It was further agreed that the Perón government had not complied with the United States position as set forth by Secretary Byrnes. But whereas Ambassador Messersmith thought highly of Perón and had confidence that he would meet the commitments, Assistant Secretary Braden thought otherwise. The result was a stalemate; for, as James Reston stated:

The President and Secretary Byrnes were confronted with two totally different analyses of the Perón regime by two sharply opposed advocates and without any objective information on which to solve the dilemma. . . . The facts presented by both sides were remarkably similar. What was at issue was the weight to be given to the facts. On this, Mr. Messersmith and Mr. Braden were in disagreement. . . . The Chapultepec Conference decisions asked Argentina to comply with certain stringent anti-Nazi measures that other Latin American states were not asked to meet. Mr. Messersmith evidently took the position that it was not fair to seek a measure of compliance from Argentina that was not demanded of the other Latin American states. Mr. Braden in contrast

argued that such a demand was made at Chapultepec and should be kept because Argentina was more a menace to the peace of the continent than any other state.

The decision taken was that Ambassador Messersmith would return to his post in Buenos Aires and that Braden would continue as Assistant Secretary.⁴³

But this decision was shortly to be modified in Messersmith's favour. Although Messersmith did return to Argentina and Braden continued as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, a new Secretary of State, George Marshall, shortly assumed office and was favourably inclined towards a settlement of the Argentine problem. When the War and Navy Departments, which throughout 1946 had been frustrated in their efforts to standardize the military equipment of the American republics, again pressed for action on a Mutual Defense Treaty, Secretary Marshall overruled Braden's opposition.⁴⁴ The weighting factor in this decision seems to have been the fact that Britain, released from her wartime "gentleman's agreement" with the United States, was peddling modern war equipment and had recently sold several jet fighter planes to Argentina,⁴⁵ a

⁴³ New York Times, January 2, p. 15, January 8, p. 11, January 14, p. 21. See also The United States in World Affairs, 1945-47, pp. 231-32.

⁴⁴ Marshall was credited with having proposed the Military Assistance Programme to supply arms to Latin America, which had failed to gain Congressional approval in 1946.

⁴⁵ New York Times, May 25, 1947, p. 26. A Foreign Office spokesman said that the British Government was satisfied that Argentine authorities were complying with allied requirements regarding German nationals and assets and

move which threatened the United States programme for arms standardization in the Western Hemisphere.

It was reported that President Truman also was convinced that a decision on the Argentine issue was long overdue and that he had requested Secretary Marshall to give it top priority. The President's concern may have resulted from advice he had received from former President Hoover⁴⁶ that continued friction between the United States and Argentina was jeopardizing relations with all Latin American countries where the feeling prevailed that each country would be "next in line" if the Braden policy proved successful in Argentina.⁴⁷

In addition to these pressures, the legislative branch broadened a controversy which theretofore could have been considered a dispute between two government officials. Senator Vandenberg, who following the Republican party's victory in the November, 1946 Congressional elections had become the Senate Majority leader, had been privately critical of the State Department's policy for some time.⁴⁸ Early in 1947 he declared publicly that "all" the American

that British firms were free to sell military equipment to Argentina. The British Government was no longer scrutinizing contracts.

⁴⁶ Hoover had been sent on a fact-finding mission to Latin America for President Truman.

⁴⁷ New York Times, January 26, 1947, IV, p. 7.

⁴⁸ Smith, p. 166; Peterson, pp. 456-57.

republics must collaborate with one another to promote unity in the hemisphere. He castigated the Department for the policy of delay in calling the inter-American conference and implementing the Mutual Defense Agreement. Addressing the Cleveland Council of World Affairs on January 11, 1947, the Senator mentioned the repeatedly postponed Rio Conference, recalling that Secretary of State Stettinius had promised to invite the other American Republics to such a conference "in the near future." Vandenberg continued:

That was on May 15, 1945. This is January 11, 1947. 'In the near future' has not yet arrived. The Secretary said of the proposed conference that 'it would be another important step in carrying forward the good neighbor policy.' If he was right--and I think he was-- this long failure to hold the conference has had the opposite effect. I am well aware of the reasons for the delay. I entirely sympathize with the anxiety to purge the Americas of their last vestige of nazism. But I think that, under half a dozen solemn treaties to which we are a party, this is a multilateral decision which should always be made by all of us jointly and not influenced or dictated by us alone. In some aspects it can be said that we have been proceeding jointly. But I think it is past time to hold the Pan American conference which we promised in 1945, and there to formally renew the joint new world authority which is the genius of our new world unity.⁴⁹

If, as Dean Acheson reveals, the State Department felt the need of Congressional support for United States foreign policy in a world no longer friendly⁵⁰ it could ill afford to ignore such a firm statement on its inter-American

⁴⁹ New York Times, Jan. 12, 1947, p. 6. See also April 15, 1947, p. 1, when the Senator speaking at the Pan American Union repeatedly stressed the importance of consultation among the American Republics.

⁵⁰ Acheson, pp. 194-99 and particularly pp. 200-201. See also Campbell, United States in World Affairs, 1945-47, pp. 454-65.

policy. Nor could it ignore the other voices raised in the Congress on that policy. For example, Representative Jacob Javits of New York warned that communism was gaining ground in South America and urged that the United States spend from \$50,000,000 to \$100,000,000 annually for the next ten years in economic and social assistance to the Latin American republics. Similar concern was voiced by Representative Robert B. Chiperfield, Republican of Illinois, Chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who urged the settlement of differences between the United States and Argentina on the grounds that delay of harmony "is hurting our friendship with the nations to the South of us." Chiperfield conceded that "every nation in this hemisphere has the right to expect other nations to live up to and carry out their international agreements and to determine for itself, when those promises have been complied with." "But," he continued, "if on a high policy level our State Department has reached an impasse because of sincere differences of opinion as to the facts of the case, I strongly urge that other methods be devised so that we can determine case by case whether there has been actual implementation of the international obligations agreed to by Argentina."⁵¹

Growing difficulties with the Soviet Union, which failed to subscribe to the American view of the post-war

⁵¹ New York Times, April 15, 1947, p. 16.

world added weight to the foregoing influences. The State Department accused the Russians of undermining attempts to conclude peace treaties with the ex-enemy states when those treaties conflicted with Russian desires, and of fomenting discord in Iran, Greece, and Turkey and various other countries in order to create Soviet-oriented regimes.⁵² While there is considerable disagreement among United States government spokesmen and historians over the cause of the Cold War,⁵³ there is almost universal agreement that by January, 1947 the United States had revised its estimate of the postwar world and its dependence on cooperation with the Soviet Union as the means of securing its objectives and had accepted the concept of spheres of influence. It seems logical that, as Whitaker suggests, the United States decided to end its quarrel with Argentina in part because of the growing

⁵²For Russian failure to cooperate in the peace making process, see Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, II (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).

⁵³Most statements by United States officials involved in foreign policy making in 1946-47 have emphasized Russian intransigence and obstructionist tactics and the Soviet desire to carve out a sphere of influence and to expand communism as the cause of the Cold War. See, for example, Acheson, pp. 194-201, and James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947). See also President Truman's special message to Congress on aid to Greece and Turkey, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, January 1 to December 31, 1947 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 176-80.

The official interpretation has been accepted by some historians. See for example, Adler, pp. 327-33; Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 8th. ed., 1963), pp. 776-94. Other historians have suggested different reasons for the Cold War. For example, Norman A. Graebner, The Cold

difficulties with the Soviet Union.⁵⁴

Whatever the reason, in January, 1947 the State Department reversed its practice of ignoring what Argentina had done to meet its commitments and emphasizing Argentina's sins of omission when it praised President Perón's decree providing elimination of enemy control over sixty Axis firms.⁵⁵ Further, in April President Truman paid particularly favourable attention to the Argentine Ambassador to the United States when he extended to him a special invitation to the White House. At this meeting with Ambassador Ivanissevich, who was returning shortly to Buenos Aires, Truman expressed his desire

War: Ideological Conflict or Power Struggle (Boston: D.C. Heath and Company, 1963), pp. 7-44, and Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 639-43, indicates that the Cold War was largely the result of United States commitment to the "legalistic-moralistic" approach to diplomacy and its increasingly threatening efforts to force the Soviets to accept its principles. The real attack on the official position, however, comes from those historians who contend that the Cold War was triggered in large measure by the dynamics of American capitalism. See for example, W. Appleton Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy, II: 1900-1955 pp. 938-50, and The Tragedy of American Diplomacy pp. 148-212; and Barton J. Bernstein, "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration, pp. 15-60.

⁵⁴Whitaker, "Rio and Bogota: Pan American Perspective," Inter-American Economic Affairs, I (December, 1947), pp. 33-44, and The United States and Argentina, pp. 220-21.

⁵⁵Department of State, Bulletin, XVI, pt. I (February 2, 1947), p. 214.

to proceed with the Inter-American defence pact.⁵⁶ Finally, on June 3, 1947, President Truman agreed "that no obstacle remained to discussions looking toward the treaty of mutual assistance contemplated by the Act of Chapultepec."⁵⁷ The inter-American conference was called in August, 1947, the Mutual Assistance Pact signed on September 2, and Braden resigned as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Republics Affairs.

⁵⁶ New York Times, April 15, 1947, p. 16. The President invited Under Secretary Acheson, but not Assistant Secretary Braden, to attend the conference with Ambassador Ivanissevich.

⁵⁷ Department of State, Bulletin, XVI, Pt. 2 (June 15, 1947), p. 1177; Public Papers of the Presidents. Harry S. Truman, 1947, p. 261.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This examination of United States-Argentine relations during the period 1945-47 has had three main purposes. It has attempted to isolate the goals and objectives which the United States sought in its dealings with Argentina, to analyze the methods used by State Department officials in their efforts to achieve these objectives and the relationship of individuals to the methodology, and to show the role of circumstances as a factor in the relations between the two countries.

A survey of the historical milieu within which these relations evolved has shown that from 1889 to 1945 the United States sought with varying degrees of intensity and by different methods to obtain from all Latin America a uniform acceptance of United States ideas of the common good of the hemisphere and of the best means of achieving it. What constituted the common good and how it should be effected varied with time and situations.

In the period 1889-1914, the mood in the United States was one of commercial expansionism, and United States policy toward Latin America was dominated by the desire for markets and the need to protect American investors and investments in Latin America. During this period State Department officials spoke of "promotion of trade and the maintenance of

peace for the general good." It was also in the period 1889-1914 that the United States achieved the status of a world power and sought, by making the Monroe Doctrine operative, to reserve the Western Hemisphere as an American sphere of influence. As a key aspect of its right to hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, the United States arrogated the right to the "exercise of an international police power" in Latin America. In order to achieve its objectives, the United States sought by negotiation to obtain the cooperation of Latin American governments but did not hesitate to use force when some of those governments proved unwilling or unable to cooperate.

During the First World War, the most pressing consideration was the security of the United States and, in the opinion of American foreign policy makers, the Western Hemisphere. Initially, the United States State Department thought that neutrality was the best policy and invited the Latin Americans to be neutral. After the United States government decided to enter the war, it tried to induce the Latin Americans to follow suit.

In the period 1889-1918, these United States conceptions of the general good and how best to achieve it ran counter to Argentina's view of her peculiar interests and how they could best be served. For instance, Argentina with her agricultural-pastoral economy had looked to Europe for her commercial contacts rather than to the United States with whose farming citizens the Argentines were in competition.

In addition, although Argentina herself was not subjected to the armed intervention to which the United States periodically resorted, her notions of sovereignty were scandalized by such interventions in other parts of Latin America.

In addition to resisting United States attempts to promote closer trading relations and protesting United States infringements of Latin American sovereignty, the Argentines resented American efforts to change their neutral position during the war of 1914-18 and to give the Monroe Doctrine hemispheric validity. The latter United States objective was particularly resented because it clashed with the Argentine desire to exercise influence in South America.

The differences which existed between the United States and Argentina in the period 1889-1918 persisted up to 1928 and were aggravated by United States post-war foreign economic policies which militated against Argentine exports to the United States.

Some of the issues which divided the United States and Argentina in the period 1889-1928 were removed when in the period 1933-42 the Good Neighbour policy had as major components the liquidation by the United States of its former practices--armed intervention and interference in Latin America and the use of non-recognition of governments as a diplomatic weapon--and the emphasizing of cooperation and compromise as the major diplomatic technique. However, the same period saw the introduction of new divisive issues when the United States sought to create a supra-national inter-

American organization calculated to induce the Latin American governments to respond uniformly and favourably to United States wishes.

In its attempts to improve the inter-American system, the Roosevelt administration was most concerned to provide for the peace and security of the hemisphere and particularly to "erect barriers against aggression from abroad." Simultaneously, the administration was working to promote liberal trading practices as the best means of coping with the effects of the depression of 1929. But United States desires exacerbated Argentine sensitivity on the issue of sovereignty and conflicted with what the Argentines saw as their peculiar economic needs. However, in spite of difficulties during the Good Neighbour period, the latent hostility between the two countries was muted due to willingness of both the United States and Argentina to compromise and cooperate.

Unlike the previous twelve years, the period 1943-45 witnessed a distinct parting of the ways which can be attributed to several inter-related factors. In the first place, it was a period of war in which the United States was a belligerent and Argentina was neutral. Secondly, shifts in the State Department had resulted in the resignation of Sumner Welles, the main architect of the Good Neighbour policy and the principal exponent of the technique of cooperation and compromise in inter-American relations. Welles' resignation left Secretary of State Hull as the chief formulator of United States Policy. In the third place,

shifts on the Argentine scene had brought to power first the traditionally anti-American conservative element and then an ultra-nationalist army clique, both of which were determined to keep their country neutral during the war. The army clique in particular, which came to power in June, 1943, showed a callous disregard for the fate of the allied cause and exhibited a predilection for the nationalist-socialist policies and the totalitarian practices of the fascist powers Germany and Italy.

Secretary Hull was determined that Argentina should declare war on the Axis powers. The Secretary was committed to making both the Argentine government and the Argentine people behave as responsible international citizens and feared the results, for United States interest and influence in Latin America, of the success of the Argentine domestic programme and of the defiance of United States wishes. Hull's futile attempts to reorient Argentine foreign and domestic policies served only to further embitter relations between the United States and Argentina, and at his resignation in November, 1944, the situation could hardly have been worse, short of a state of war.

Such was the background against which United States-Argentine relations would be formulated in the period 1945-1947. These relations began with a short-lived attempt to reconstitute the inter-American system as it was prior to the parting of the ways in 1943. In an atmosphere of compromise on both sides, the United States government offered conditions

and the Argentines found them acceptable. This development on the United States side apparently took place for two reasons. In the first place, Nelson Rockefeller, the then current Assistant Secretary of State for American Republics Affairs, was determined that a strengthened and improved inter-American system should be an integral part of United States postwar foreign policy. However, it is possible that he induced Argentina to return to the hemispheric fold where pressure could be more effectively applied to the recalcitrant state to make it more amenable to United States wishes. It is also possible that the Assistant Secretary was concerned to explore the possibilities for commercial intercourse with Argentina. The second factor that seems to have influenced the short-lived attempt at rapprochement was the United States concern to assuage Latin American fears about their postwar position in United States foreign policy.

The United States mood of compromise met a corresponding attitude in Argentina. The government, dominated by Colonel Juan Perón, desired to end its long diplomatic quarantine and to play a part in arranging the postwar world. At the request of the other American republics assembled at Mexico City, the Farrell-Perón regime reversed the previous Argentine neutrality policy and declared war on the defeated Axis powers. The Argentine government also met the other inter-American stipulation when it adhered to the Final Act of the Mexico City Conference and accepted thereby recommendations to eliminate Axis interest and influence in

Argentina, promote liberal trading practices, and encourage the growth of democratic principles and practices.

However, although the Argentine government was recognized by the United States and by those Latin American countries which the United States had induced to withhold recognition, the course of United States-Argentine relations did not run smoothly. Rockefeller's view of the role of the inter-American system and his mood of compromise were not shared by his colleagues in the State Department. Here, a strong element argued that the United Nations organization would be the main focus of postwar United States foreign policy and that any strengthening of the inter-American system would tend to weaken the world organization. And nearly all Department officials opposed Argentine participation in the San Francisco conference.

At this point, circumstances that were almost totally unrelated to the Argentine-United States differences played a decisive role in United States policy toward Argentina; for they caused the United States to sponsor the Argentine government for membership in the United Nations. The circumstances to which the United States was responding were its objectives in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, where it was determined to establish and maintain a measure of influence; its commitment to secure multiple membership for the Soviet Union in the United Nations; and the determination of the Latin Americans and Rockefeller to reconstitute the inter-American system.

In spite of American support for Argentina's admission to the United Nations in May, 1945, the Rockefeller policy of compromise and cooperation was not reinstated. Rather, with the advent of Spruille Braden into the policy-making milieu in May, 1945, a trend toward coercion became evident. It is not possible to be categorical about Braden's motivation. Nor is it possible to be definite about the weighting that the United States was giving to its objectives--defence of democracy, elimination of Axis interest and influence in the Western Hemisphere, and the promotion of liberal trading principles--which the United States delegation had proposed and supported at the Mexico City conference in February, 1945. It does seem certain that the United States was committed to the promotion of liberal trading practices and that it wished to eradicate the last vestige of Axis interest and influence in the hemisphere; but it is by no means clear that it had the same commitment to the promotion of democracy. Neither the previous history of United States support of democracy in Latin America nor the circumstances surrounding the promotion of the resolution indicate that in February, 1945 the commitment was more than ideological. However, those objectives and the resolutions within which they were enshrined, and to which the Argentine government had adhered, provided the criteria to which Braden referred first as Ambassador to Argentina and secondly as Assistant Secretary for American Republics Affairs.

Braden's tour as Ambassador coincided with the

Argentine government's institution of policies which violated the Mexico City recommendation to promote democratic practices, a recommendation to which the Farrell-Perón regime had adhered apparently more as a matter of expediency than of conviction. The Argentine regime was not only derelict on the recommendation to promote democracy; it had also failed to eradicate Axis interest and influence, and its economic policies were diametrically opposed to the resolution to promote liberal trading practices.

As Ambassador, Braden interfered flagrantly in Argentina's internal affairs but was able to persuade the State Department, still influenced by Rockefeller, to take only limited economic sanctions against that country in an effort to secure adequate performance from Argentina on her inter-American commitments.

As Assistant Secretary of State, Braden mounted a sustained effort to reorient Argentina's national-socialist programme, to ensure the elimination of all Axis interest and influence, and to promote democracy in Argentina. The Assistant Secretary tried diplomatic snubs, public denunciations, and the withholding of much desired military equipment from Argentina. Braden also caused to be published evidence incriminating the Farrell-Peron regime of complicity with the Axis powers and of entertaining sinister designs against the Western Hemisphere. This publication was meant to appeal to the Argentine voting public, then in the midst of a presidential election campaign, and to the other American Republics

whose support the Assistant Secretary sought in the application of collective pressure on Argentina.

Although Braden was seeking laudable objectives and employing legitimate diplomatic practice, he seemed to be out of step with his times. The Assistant Secretary's choice of priorities was rejected both in Argentina and in the rest of Latin America, as well as by the British whose help Braden also desired. Within the United States leading voices were raised against both the list of priorities and Braden's methods. However, the most significant factors influencing the non-acceptance of Braden's programme appear to be the failure of the postwar world to develop according to United States specifications, a growing rift with the Soviet Union, and fears of the spread of international communism. Had circumstances been different Braden might have been able to achieve his goals. But because of the circumstances then extant, the United States government opted for a policy of cooperation and compromise in its further relations with Argentina.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Primary Sources

A. Government Documents

U. S. Congress. Congressional Record. 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.

_____. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, Hearings. House of Representatives, on H. R. 6326, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947.

_____. House. The Post-War Foreign Economic Policy of the United States. House Report 541, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 1945.

_____. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Decade of American Foreign Policy. S. Doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1949.

U. S. President. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Washington, D. C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1945-53, Harry S. Truman, 1947.

U. S. Department of State. Bulletin. XII, January-June 1945. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1945.

_____. Bulletin. XIII, July-December 1945. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1945.

_____. Bulletin. XIV, January-June 1946. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1946.

_____. Bulletin. XV, July-December 1946. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1946.

_____. Bulletin. XVI, January-June 1947. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.

_____. Consultation Among the American Republics with Respect to the Argentine Situation. Memorandum of the U.S. Government. Publication 2473, Inter-American Series 29, Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1946.

. In Quest of Peace and Security. Select Documents on American Foreign Policy 1941-51. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1951.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1936, V. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1954.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1938, V. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1955.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, V. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1961.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, V. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1962.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, V. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1965.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, VII. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1967.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, I. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, II. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1970.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, VI. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, XI. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.

. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Conferences of Malta and Yalta; Proceedings and Documents. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1955.

. Report of the U.S. Delegation to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, February 21-March 8, 1945. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1946.

B. Other Official Publications

Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico, 1945. Report Submitted to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union, by the Director General. Washington, D. C.: Pan American Union, 1945.

Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro, August 15-September 2, Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. Washington, D. C.: Pan American Union, 1947.

Pan American Union. Bulletin. LXXIX (January, 1945).

United Nations. Conference Documents. I, 1945.

C. Published Writings and Speeches

Braden, Spruille. "Address to the National Trade Convention." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, International Conciliation. Documents for the year 1946, Pamphlet 419.

Clark, J. Reuben. Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine. Washington, D. C.: Department of State, Publication No. 37, 1930.

Nixon, Edgar B, ed. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, II, March 1934-August 1935. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969.

Rosenman, Samuel I, ed. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. II. New York: Random House, 1938.

D. Autobiographies and Memoirs

Acheson, Dean G. Present at the Creation. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969.

Byrnes, James F. Speaking Frankly. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947.

Connally, Tom. My Name is Tom Connally. New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Co., 1954.

Hull, Cordell. Memoirs. 2 vols. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948.

Stettinius, Edward R, jr. Roosevelt and the Russians. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1949.

Truman, Harry S. Memoirs. 2 vols. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1957.

Vandenberg, Arthur H., jr., ed. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952.

Welles, Sumner. The Roosevelt Administration and Its Dealings with the Republics of the Western Hemisphere. Washington, D. C.: Department of State, 1935.

E. Contemporary Articles and Newspapers

Beals, C. "Argentina vs. the United States." Current History, L (July, 1939), pp. 28-31.

Braden, Spruille. "The Germans in Argentina." The Atlantic Monthly, CLXXVII (1946), pp. 37-43.

Canyes, Manuel S. "The Inter-American System and the Conference of Chapultepec." The American Journal of International Law, XXXIX (July, 1945), pp. 504-17.

Emmet, C. "Our Future Argentine Policy." Commonweal, XLIII (February 15, 1946), pp. 449-54.

_____. "Our Argentine Blunder. How our correspondents Diplomats and Commentators Misread the Situation," Commonweal, XLIII (February 8, 1946), pp. 422-26.

Fisk, Ysabel. "Argentina: The Thirteen year crisis." Foreign Affairs, XXII (January, 1944), pp. 256-66.

_____. "Argentina and the United States." Foreign Policy Report, XX (May, 1944), p. 48.

_____ and Rennie, Robert. "Argentina in Crisis." Foreign Policy Reports, XX (May 1, 1944), pp. 34-48.

"German Capital in Argentina." The Economist. (September, 1945), pp. 416-18.

Hanke, Lewis. "Friendship Now With Latin America." Virginia Quarterly, XXII (October, 1946), pp. 498-519.

Herring, H. "Can We Run Argentina?" Harper's, CXCI (October, 1946), pp. 298-305.

_____. "Our Argentine Policy." Headline Series, Foreign Policy Association, LXV, 1947.

_____. "Wanted: An Argentine Policy." Inter-American (October, 1946), pp. 12-13, 34-35.

Holmes, Olive. "Argentina: Focus of Conflict in the Americas." Foreign Policy Report, XXI (February, 1946), pp. 298-307.

_____. "Brazil, Rising Power in the Americas." Foreign Policy Reports, XXI (February, 1946), p. 308.

_____. "The Mexico City Conference and Regional Security." Foreign Policy Reports, XXI (May 1, 1945), pp. 42-48.

Humphrey, J. P. "Argentina's Diplomatic Victory." Canadian Forum, XXI (March, 1942), pp. 362-64.

Humphreys, Robin. "The Pan American System and the United Nations." International Affairs, XXII (January, 1946), pp. 75-84.

"Honeymoon Over." New Republic, CXVI (January 27, 1947), p. 6.

Inman, Samuel Guy. "Some Latin American Views on Postwar Reconstruction." Foreign Policy Reports, XX (March 15, 1944), pp. 1-11.

"In Search of Security." News Week, XXX (August 18, 1947), p. 45.

"Interventionist: Food as an Instrument of Policy." Time, XLVII (May 20, 1946), p. 34.

Jessup, J. K. "Spruille Braden, Our Battling Assistant Secretary of State." Life, XX (March, 1946), pp. 54-56.

Jones, J. M. "Good Neighbor New Style." Harper's, CXCI (April, 1946), pp. 313-21.

Kennie, Robert A. "Argentine Fiscal Policy." Inter-American Economic Affairs, X (Autumn, 1947), pp. 51-76.

Kluckhorn, Frank. "Food and Political Pressure used to line-up Neighboring States of South America." New York Times, May 5, 1946, IV, p. E5.

Kunz, Joseph, L. "The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace at Mexico City and the problem of reorganization of the Inter-American System." The American Journal of International Law, XXXIX (July 1, 1945), pp. 527-33.

MacKenzie, Norman. "Argentina and Britain." The Political Quarterly, XVI (April, 1945), pp. 124-34.

_____. "Perón Plays Poker." The New Statesman and Nation, XXXI (June 29, 1946), p. 466.

- Montes, Lisandro. "A Latin American Bloc." Free World, (December, 1946), pp. 35-36.
- Morris, Shiras, jr. "Argentina--Too Big to Spank." Arizona Quarterly, III (Autumn, 1947), pp. 250-60.
- Mulliken, Otis E. and Roberts, Sarah E. "Labor and Social Welfare." Inter-American Affairs, 1945, pp. 143-44, 150-51.
- Munro, Dana. "The Good Neighbor Policy Re-examined." The New York Times Magazine, April 28, 1946, pp. 10, 43.
- Murkland, H. B. "What Latin American Policy." Inter-American, V (May, 1946), pp. 14-16, 33.
- Newman, J. "Diplomatic Dynamite, Spruille Braden." Colliers, CXVI (November 10, 1945), pp. 11-12.
- New York Times, January 28, 1945 - September 7, 1947.
- Pattee, R. "The Argentine Question: The War Stage." Review of Politics, VIII (October, 1946), pp. 475-500.
- Popper, David H. "The Rio de Janeiro Conference of 1942." Foreign Policy Report, XVIII (April 15, 1942), pp. 26-35.
- Prewett, Virginia. "Colonel Perón's New Order." The Nation, CLXII (June 8, 1946), pp. 685-86.
- Ross, S. "Nazi Nest Eggs in Argentina." Colliers, CVX (April 21, 1945), pp. 137-70.
- "Styles in Political Morality." The Nation, CLXII (April 20, 1946), pp
- "State Department and Argentina." New Republic, CXIII (September 3, 1945), p. 269.
- Schlesinger, A. M. jr. "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors." Fortune, XXXIV (August, 1946), pp. 164-72).
- Soule, George. "Anglo-American Economic Relations." The Political Quarterly, XVI (April, 1945), pp. 116-23.
- Temkin, Alfred. "The Choice before Perón." Commentary, I (June, 1946), pp 14-21.
- Welles, Sumner. "Intervention and Intervention." Foreign Affairs, XXVI (October 1947), pp. 116-34.
- Whitaker, A. P. "Blue Book Blues." Current History, X (April, 1946), pp. 289-97.

_____. "Inter-American Intervention." Current History,
X (March, 1946), pp. 206-11.

_____. "Power Politics in South America." Current
History, IV (July, 1943), pp. 382-86.

_____. "Rio and Bogota: Pan American Perspective."
Inter-American Economic Affairs, I (December, 1947),
pp. 33-44.

White, John W. "Torture in Argentina." The Nation, CLX
(March 3, 1945), pp. 248-49.

II. Secondary Works

A. Books

- Adler, Selig. The Isolationist Impulse. Its Twentieth Century Reaction. New York: Crowell, Collier Publishing Company, 1961.
- Agar, H. The Price of Power: America since 1945. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
- Alexander, Robert J. The Perón Era. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.
- American Assembly. The United States and Latin America. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
- Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1955.
- Baily, Samuel L. Labor, Nationalism and Politics in Argentina. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1967.
- Beard, Charles A. American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-40. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946.
- Bemis, Samuel F. American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of Liberty and other Essays. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.
- _____. A Diplomatic History of the United States. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.
- _____. The Latin American Policy of the United States: Historical Interpretation. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943.
- Berle, A. A. Latin America, Diplomacy and Reality. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
- Bernstein, Barton J., ed. Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970.
- Blanksten, G. I. Perón's Argentina. New York: Russell and Russell, 1967.
- Brookings Institution. Major Problems of United States Foreign Relations, I, 1947. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1953.

- Brown, Seyom. The Faces of Power. Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy from Truman to Johnson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.
- Brown, W. A., and Opie, R. American Foreign Assistance. Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1953.
- Burr, Robert N. and Hussey, R. D., eds. Documents on Inter-American Co-operation. 2 vols. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1955.
- Campbell, John C. United States in World Affairs, 1945-47. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1948.
- _____. Social Change in Latin America Today. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950.
- Carsten, F. L. The Rise of Fascism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- Churchill, Winston S. Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Bantam Books, 1953.
- Cline, H. C. The United States and Mexico. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.
- Conil Paz, A. and Ferrari, G. Argentine Foreign Policy 1930-62. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1966.
- Daniels, J. Man of Independence. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1950.
- DeConde, A. The American Secretary of State: An Interpretation. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Dozer, D. M. Are We Good Neighbors? Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959.
- Duggan, L. The Americas: The Search for Hemispheric Security. New York: Holt, 1949.
- Dulles, Foster Rhea. America's Rise to World Power, 1898-1954. New York: Harper and Row, 1955.
- Ellis, Ethan. Republican Foreign Policy, 1921-33. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1968.
- Ferns, H. S. Argentina. London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1969.
- Ferrel, Robert. George C. Marshall. American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy New Series, 1925-1961, Vol. . New York: Cooper Square Pub., Inc., 1966.

- Furniss, E. S. jr. American Military Policy. New York: Rinehart, 1957.
- Goldman, Eric F. The Crucial Decade and After. New York: Vintage Books, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1960.
- Graebner, N. A. Cold War Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy 1945-60. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962.
- _____. The Cold War, Ideological Conflict or Power Struggle. Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1963.
- _____. Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Green, David. The Containment of Latin America. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971.
- Greenup, Ruth and Leonard. Revolution Before Breakfast. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947.
- Guerrant, Edwin O. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1950.
- Halle, Louis J. The Cold War as History. New York: Harper and Row, 1967.
- Harris, S. E. ed. Foreign Economic Policy for the United States. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1948.
- Hicks, John D. Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933. New York: Harper and Row, 1960.
- Hinton, H. B. Cordell Hull. New York: Hurst and Blackett Ltd., 1942.
- Holsti, K. J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967.
- Houston, John A. Latin America in the United Nations. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956.
- Josephs, Ray. Argentine Diary. New York: Random House, 1944.
- Kelly, Sir David. The Ruling Few. London: Hollis and Carter, 1952.

- Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy, 1900-1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951.
- _____. Realities of American Foreign Policy. New York: Norton, 1966.
- Kirkendall, Richard S. The Truman period as a Research Field. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1967.
- Kolko, Gabriel. The Politics of War; The World and the United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945. New York: Random House, 1968.
- Langer, W. L. and Gleason, S. E. The Challenge to Isolationism, 1937-1940. New York: Harper and Row, 1952.
- _____. The Undeclared War. New York: Harper and Row, 1953.
- Lerche, Charles O. Foreign Policy of the American People. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967.
- Leuchtenburg, W. E. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-40. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
- _____. The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
- Lieuwen, Edwin, Arms and Politics in Latin America. New York: Frederick A. Praeger (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1961.
- Link, Arthur S. Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era. New York: Harper and Row, 1954.
- Machado, Manuel A. jr. Aftosa: A Historical Survey of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Inter-American Relations. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1969.
- Manross, Lottie M. United States Policy Toward Argentina. A Survey of Past and Present Policy. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.
- Marshall, Charles B. The Limits of Foreign Policy. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954.
- Martin, Percy Alvin. Latin America and the War. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1925.
- McCamy, James L. The Conduct of the New Diplomacy. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.
- McCloy, John J. The Challenge to American Foreign Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953.

McGann, Thomas F. Argentina: The Divided Land. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1966.

_____. Argentina, the United States, and the Inter-American System, 1880-1914. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957.

Mecham, J. L. A Survey of United States Latin American Relations. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956.

_____. The United States and Inter-American Security, 1899-1960. Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1961.

Mikesell, R. F. United States Economic Policy and International Relations. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952.

Morgenthau, Hans J. In Defence of the National Interest. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1951.

_____. Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1967.

Morris, Joe Alex. Nelson Rockefeller: A Biography. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960.

Mosse, George L. The Culture of Western Europe, The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. London: John Murray, 1963.

Mowry, George E. The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America, 1900-1912. New York: Harper and Row, 1955.

Nevins, Allan. The New Deal and World Affairs. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

Nolte, Ernst. Three Faces of Fascism. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966.

Opie, Redvers, et al. The Search for Peace Settlements. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1951.

Osgood, Robert Endicott. Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Owen, Frank. Perón, His Rise and Fall. London: The Cresset Press, 1957.

Palmer, Thomas W., Jr. Search for a Latin American Policy. Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1957.

- Parker, Franklin D. The Central American Republics. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Pendle, George. Perón's Argentina. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Perkins, Dexter. American Approach to Foreign Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962.
- _____. A History of the Monroe Doctrine. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955.
- _____. The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt, 1932-1945. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
- _____. United States and the Caribbean. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.
- _____. United States and Latin America. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961.
- Peterson, Harold F. Argentina and the United States, 1810-1960. New York: University Publishers, 1964.
- Petras, James. Politics and Social Structure in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970.
- Potash, Robert A. The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928-1945: Yrigoyen to Perón. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969.
- Pratt, Julius W. A History of United States Foreign Policy. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955.
- Rauch, Basil. The History of the New Deal, 1933-1938. New York: Capricorn Books, 1963.
- _____. Roosevelt: From Munich to Pearl Harbor. New York: Creative Age Press, 1950.
- Reitzel, W., Kaplan, M. A., and Coblenz, C. G. United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1956.
- Rennie, Ysabel F. The Argentine Republic. New York: Macmillan Company, 1945.
- Rippy, J. F. Globe and Hemisphere: Latin America's Place in the Post War Foreign Relations of the United States. Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1958.
- Russell, Ruth B. A History of the United Nations Charter, the Role of the United States, 1940-1945. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1948.

- Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The New Deal in Action, 1933-39. New York: Macmillan Company, 1940.
- Scobie, James A. Argentina: A City and a Nation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Scott, Andrew M., and Dawson, Raymond, eds. Readings in the Making of American Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan Company, 1965.
- Smith, O. E. Yankee Diplomacy: United States Intervention in Argentina. Dallas, Tex.: Southern Methodist University Press, 1953.
- Snow, Peter G. Argentine Radicalism. Iowa City, Ia.: University of Iowa Press, 1965.
- Steinberg, Alfred. The Man from Missouri: The Life and Times of Harry S. Truman. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962.
- Stuart, Graham. Department of State, A History of its Organization, Procedure and Personnel. New York: Macmillan Company, 1949.
- _____. Latin America and the United States. New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1955.
- Warburg, J. P. The United States, a Changing World: An Historical Analysis of American Foreign Policy. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1954.
- _____. The United States in the Post War World. New York: Atheneum, 1966.
- Weber, Eugen. Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964.
- Weil, Felix. Argentine Riddle. New York: John Day Company, 1944.
- Welles, Sumner. The Time for Decision. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944.
- _____. Where Are We Heading? New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946.
- Westerfield, H. Bradford. Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955.
- Whitaker, A. P. Argentina. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964.

- Whitaker, A. P. The United States and Argentina. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954.
- _____. The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965.
- Whythe, George. The United States and Inter-American Relations. Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1964.
- Williams, W. Appleton. The Shaping of American Diplomacy. II: 1900-1955. 2 vols. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1956.
- _____. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York: The World Publishing Company, 1959.
- Wood, Bryce. The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961.

B. ARTICLES

- Alexander, R. J. "The Latin American Aprista Parties." Political Quarterly, XX (July, 1949), pp. 236-47.
- _____. "Peronism and Argentina's Quest for Leadership in Latin America." Journal of International Affairs, IX (January, 1955), pp. 46-55.
- Allen, W. R. "International Trade Philosophy of Cordell Hull." American Economic Review, XLIII (March, 1953), p. 101.
- Cronon, E. David. "Interpreting the New Good Neighbor Policy: The Cuban Crisis of 1933." Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIX (November, 1959), pp. 538-67.
- Cumberland, Charles C. "Twentieth Century Revolutions in Latin America." Centennial Review, VI (Summer, 1962), pp. 279-96.
- Furniss, E. S. "Our Policy in Latin America." Forum, III (April, 1949), pp. 210-13.
- Griffin, Charles C., ed. "Welles to Roosevelt: A Memorandum on Inter-American Relations, 1933." Hispanic American Historical Review, XXXIV (May, 1954), pp. 190-92.
- Hanson, Simon G. "The End of the Good Neighbor Policy." Inter-American Economic Affairs, VII (Autumn, 1953), pp. 3-49.

- Harris, Seymour. "How Good Is Our Good Neighbor Policy?" New York Times Magazine, November 28, 1954
- Hilton, S. E. "Argentine Neutrality, September 1939-June 1940: A Re-Examination." The Americas, XX (January, 1966), pp. 227-57.
- Lee, Manwoo. "Argentine Political Instability." Journal of Inter-American Studies, XI (October, 1969), pp. 558-70.
- McGann, Thomas F. "The Ambassador and the Dictator: The Braden Mission and Its Implications for United States Foreign Policy." The Centennial Review, VI (Summer, 1962), pp. 346-57.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. "The Mainstrings of American Foreign Policy." American Political Science Review, XLIV (December, 1950), p. 839.
- Patterson, Thomas G. Review of Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 VI. American Historical Review, LXXV (June, 1970), pp. 1548-50.
- Peffer, E. L. "Cordell Hull's Argentine Policy and Britain's Meat Supply." Inter-American Economic Affairs, X (Autumn, 1956), pp. 3-21.
- Snell, John L. "The Cold War: Four Contemporary Appraisals." American Historical Review, LXVIII (October, 1962), p. 69.
- Tannenbaum, Frank. "The Anvil of American Foreign Policy." Political Science Quarterly, LXIII (December, 1948), pp. 501-27.
- _____. "Argentina: The Recalcitrant State." Foreign Affairs, XXIII (January, 1945), pp. 27-83.
- Trask, Roger R. Review of Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, IX. American Historical Review, LXXV (April, 1970), pp. 1206-1207.
- Wood, Bryce. "The Department of State and the Non-National Interest: The Cases of Argentine Meat and Paraguayan Tea." Inter-American Economic Affairs, XV (Autumn, 1961), pp. 3-32.

B29999